

TWO WAYS OF PRESENTING THE PAST, OR HOW WORLDVIEW PATTERNS AND BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS TRANSFORM HISTORY INTO IDEOLOGY



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Abstract

The article examines the phenomenon of “sponsored history,” understood as a representation of the past shaped by political, social, or ideological interests and distinguished from scholarly history by its reliance on emotional, dramatic, symbolic, and mythical modes of presentation. The article asks why such representations, despite their departure from factual historiography, can acquire considerable psychological and social influence. It argues that the effectiveness of sponsored history cannot be explained solely by its manipulation of historical facts. Rather, its viability derives from its capacity to activate dimensions of the past that are preserved through experience, memory, emotion, and recurrent patterns of human perception and behavior. To develop this argument, the article employs an operational distinction between factual and experiential presentations of the past and, correspondingly, between its substantive and formal dimensions. Drawing on Ortega y Gasset, Collingwood, Mead, Waters, Cassirer, Eliade, and, most extensively, Jung, it proposes that scholarly history primarily articulates the unique and contingent content of past events, whereas sponsored history can reactivate recurrent psychological forms and invest them with particular historical content. In this sense, ideology gives emotionally and symbolically charged representations of the past renewed concrete meaning, helping explain their enduring capacity for identification and mobilization.

Keywords: Sponsored History, Historiography, Ideology, Myth, Archetypes.

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Introduction

Reflecting on the meaning of history, Karl Jaspers writes: “The manner in which we think of history sets limits on our potentialities, or sustains us by its implications, or lures us away from our reality. Even in unimpeachable

objectivity, historical knowledge is no mere indifferent factual content, but an active element in our lives. The use of this knowledge for purposes of propaganda in the interests of a power amounts to a lie about history" (Jaspers, 1965, p. 231). These words of the German philosopher reveal the multifaceted nature of history's influence. From the perspective of its impact on society and on the individual, history as an academic discipline clearly surpasses all other disciplines. It can influence contemporary social life and even stimulate social processes that, in turn, may radically alter the subsequent course of history. This is precisely where the power of history as a science lies. At this point, however, an important qualification must be made. The thing is that history as a science, as a collection of facts with a certain validity cannot, in principle, have a significantly greater impact on the average member of society than any other academic discipline. Are historical and, for example, astrophysical facts endowed with different meanings for a non-specialist? The emergence of ancient Sumerian civilization and the explosion of a supernova are equally remote from the immediate lifeworld of human individual; They may well be fascinating facts, but they do not affect course of human life in any way.

Strangely, the influence of history increases incomparably when it loses its validity, when it changes its nature and purpose - instead of providing a true or approximate description of past events, it creates or invents a unique image of the past, which, however, in terms of exerting influence, far exceeds history presented as a collection of dry facts. It turns out that we have several forms of history. Providing a classification of historical writings, Antoon De Baets distinguishes between prescientific history, irresponsible history, responsible, provisionally scientific history, and nonscientific history. The group of irresponsible history, in turn, is divided into two subgroups: 1) abusive history (deceptive history, pseudohistory) and 2) negligent and reckless history. In this classification, the circumstance most interesting to us is that, when characterizing irresponsible (abusive) history, De Baets notes that it is always morally and professionally wrong, sometimes legally wrong as well, always harmful, and often dangerous, whereas so-called provisionally scientific history is morally, professionally, and legally correct (De Baets, 2009, p.13). Moreover, "The abuse of history is its use with intent to deceive" (De Baets, 2009, p.14).

The discussion of the problem of sponsored histories is based on the duality of history. Alongside history built on scientific methodology, endowed with the purpose of providing the most objective assessment possible of "authentic," "reliable," and "true" historical process, we have a "fabricated," "false," and "distorted" history born of political, social, or any other interest and propaganda, which, in our conception, has no connection to the actual

historical process, but, nevertheless, it can have a greater influence on individual and social life. Here, quite naturally, an important question arises: if a sponsored history is not in some way supported by factuality (otherwise it would not simply be called a sponsored history), meaning that, in the literal sense of the word, it is not history, then why does it exist as history, and what is the foundation and justification for its existence, vitality, and influence? This inquiry leads to another, no less important question: does a sponsored history itself express some other reality, and if so, what kind of reality is that?

This article attempts to answer these questions. Our hypothesis is as follows: *sponsored history represents a concrete reality, the nature of which is purely psychological*. In what follows, we will seek to substantiate this assumption.

The Two Forms of Presenting the Past: Scientific History and Non-scientific History

Any discussion regarding abusive or sponsored history created for propaganda purposes rests upon its comparison with the data of historiography built on an objective, impartial foundation. The possibility of historiography, in turn, stems from the premises of the existence and cognizability of the past. If we attempt to provide a general definition of the subject matter of history, historiography, historiology, and historical science, we can say with a certain degree of conviction that it is the past. Regardless of the assessment given to specific historical knowledge, the ontological and epistemological status of the past is usually not questioned; there exists a past, and it is, in essence, cognizable. Clearly, such a conception of the past implies that its existence is independent of historical research and precedes it. Most of the historiographical theories are built upon this foundation. Helge Kragh's observations are telling in this respect. He notes, in particular: "According to one historiographical theory associated with positivism, history is a description of the past, based on a series of well-documented facts" (Kragh, 1989, p. 41). Kragh claims that "positivist historiography is based on the following assumptions: a. History (i.e. the past, H;) is an objective reality that is the unchangeable object of interest to the historian. b. It is the task of the historian to reconstruct the past as it actually was, i.e. give a true description of the course of events of the past. But it is not his task to interpret or evaluate the occurrences of the past or to draw conclusions about the present or future on the basis of history. The study of history is the study of the past as the past. c. It is, in fact, possible to write history 'wie es eigentlich gewesen', i.e. to attain an objective knowledge of parts of the historical past. This epistemological objectivity implies, among other things, that the subject (the historian) can be separated from the object (the historic events) that can

be viewed impartially, be seen 'from without'. d. History can be viewed as an organized sum of simple, particular facts that can be discovered through the study of documents from the past, using methods that are critical of sources. It is the most exalted task of the historian to uncover these facts" (Kragh, 1989, pp. 41-42).

It is from this very perspective that historical data is assumed to be reliable, truthfully or at least approximately truthfully representing events that occurred in the past. And it is precisely as a result of comparison with these, rather than with actual historical processes, and the identification of inconsistencies, that sponsored or fabricated history is evaluated as such. It follows that the comparison is made between forms of representing the past; however, as a presupposition, the existence of the historical past, of historical reality, independently of those forms, is tacitly accepted. But what significance can factual history have; what is its role in the life activities of society and the individual?

As strange as it may sound, the fact is that in our era of the dominance of the scientific worldview, science does not have a significant role in the daily life of modern society and its average member. The scientific data of physics, chemistry, biology, and cybernetics interest the average person very little, as they only encounter the achievements of these sciences through the use of household appliances, mechanized equipment, household chemicals, and computer technology. At best, they may become acquainted with popular science presentations, which, however, are quite far from the research conducted in scientific laboratories and the content of articles published in scientific journals. The same can be said about history as a science. To what extent can the average member of society, having no professional connection to history, be interested in a history composed of mere facts? Certainly, there will be those who read historiological research for entertainment, but it is obvious that the number of those reading historical novels or historical dramas will be greater. The non-specialist is more interested not in the factual side of a historical event, but in the drama played out within it. And there is nothing strange about this: human life is not a collection of chronologically ordered facts, but a drama being enacted.

This is a different conception of history. José Ortega y Gasset writes: "Man is no thing, but a drama - his life, a pure and universal happening which happens to each one of us and in which each one in his turn is nothing but happening" (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, pp.199-200). That drama is the history of human life: "Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is ...history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history, *res gestae*, is to man", - writes the author (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, p. 217). That history, however, is not the historian's

factual history; that history is history experienced emotionally. Moreover, it is by no means necessary that the past represented by such a history be one experienced personally by me: "But experience of life is not made up solely of my past, of the experiences that I personally have had. It is built up also of the past of my forebears, handed down to me by the society I live in" (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, p. 210). "That past is past not because it happened to others but because it forms part of our present, of what we are in the form of having been, because, in short, it is our past. Life as a reality is absolute presence: we cannot say that there is anything unless it be present, of this moment. If then, there is a past, it must be as something present, something active in us now" (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, pp. 212-213).

This train of thought leads to a unique definition of history as a science. "History is the systematic science of that radical reality, my life. It is therefore a science of the present in the most rigorous and actual sense of the word. Was it not a science of the present, where should we find that past that is commonly assigned to it as theme? The opposite – and customary – interpretation is equivalent to making of the past an abstract, unreal something lying lifeless just where it happened in time, whereas the past is in truth the live, active force that sustains our today. There is no *actio in distans*. The past is not yonder, at the date when it happened, but here, in me. The past is I-by which I mean my life", - as Ortega y Gasset writes (Ortega y Gasset, 1961, p. 223).

Ortega y Gasset speaks about the real past, the past that a person lives, or more accurately, that lives within a person, forming their essence. This is a living past, the presentation of which is not factual. This past is dramatic, emotionally tinted; it is an active part of the present that determines the course of the present and the future, regardless of where or when it took place. Here, however, an important distinction must be made. The point is that such a past cannot appear in historical research, because modern historiography, as a science, has nothing to do with emotion and experience; it is a science about facts that took place in the past and has purely scientific value. For the average member of society, these facts have no decisive vital significance and knowing them is merely a sign of erudition.

In his aforementioned article, distinguishing scientific history from other forms of history, De Baets writes: "History that turns out to be of the pre-, non- or exscientific kind is not meaningless. On the contrary, as part of ideologies, myths, legends, or beliefs about the world, it may provide meaning for those who hold such beliefs" (De Baets, 2009, p.11).

This is exactly where the connection between history and ideology is revealed. If we accept De Baets's viewpoint, we can say that non-scientific history, in all its manifestations, acts as a component of ideology. If an ideology has the

goal of deceiving, then in this case, we are dealing with abusive history, although it is very close to scientific history, is presented as such, and distorts the image of the past through numerous tricks, such as, for example, the destruction of archives or the forgery of archival documents.

It turns out that non-scientific types of history or abused history can have a clear significance; they can be used for the purpose of creating a specific perception of reality, when they are incorporated into an ideology, on one hand, they strengthen the latter's scientific-historical foundation, on the other hand, they expand their scope of influence, extending their impact over the present and the future. Willard A. Mullins offers the following definition of ideology: "Ideology is a logically coherent system of symbols that, in a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition – especially its prospects for the future – to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration, or transformation of society" (Mullins, 1974, p. 235).

It turns out that ideology unites all dimensions of time: the past, the present, and the future. And furthermore, according to some researchers, it contains elements characteristic of dramatized thinking: emotions and experiences. In his work dedicated to the comparative analysis of political ideologies, Mostafa Rejai provides the following definition of it: "Political ideology is an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and values about people and society, legitimacy and authority, that is acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit. The myths and values of ideology are communicated through symbols in a simplified, economical, and efficient manner. Ideological beliefs are more or less coherent, more or less articulate, more or less open to new evidence and information. Ideologies have a high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation, and control; in that sense, they are mobilized belief systems" (Rejai, 1991, p. 11).

All of this may mean that history, as a presentation of the past, has at least two manifestations: on one hand, scientific history, which deals with an image of the past that is factually reinforced, validated, and devoid of elements of fabrication, emotion, and dramatization; on the other hand, non-scientific history, which tolerates fabrications, emotion, and dramatization, and which values the past from the perspective of the present and future, and which, at times, can be used for the purpose of deception. Clearly, this second manifestation of history is not a representation of the past, but rather creation or invention. But is the past presented by scientific history more factual than that presented by non-scientific history?

The Factual and Experiential Aspects of the Past: History and Memory

In the quest for a truthful representation of the past, the advantage of scholarly historiography is that it relies entirely on historical facts and provides an impartial account of the past, with any errors arising solely from the insufficiency of the available facts. Can we, however, be convinced that the past is present within those facts, or given by them, or, in other words, can we confidently assert that the investigation of these facts is, in fact, an investigation of the past itself? This gives rise to another equally important question: how is the past given to us at all, and how can one confidently assert that the historical past precedes historiological research, rather than being formed as a result of it?

In discussing the subject matter of history, Robin George Collingwood writes: "One science differs from another in that it finds out things of a different kind. What kind of things does history find out? I answer, *res gestae*: actions of human beings that have been done in the past. Although this answer raises all kinds of further questions many of which are controversial, still, however they may be answered, the answers do not discredit the proposition that history is the science of *res gestae*, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past" (Collingwood, 1993, p. 9). Subsequently, when discussing historical thought, the author notes that "historical thought is of something which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer perceptible do they become objects for historical thought (Collingwood, 1993, p. 233).

But surely the historian acts here and now. In that case, where and how do historical thought and the events that took place in the past interact? Does historical thought reach out to the latter by moving against the flow of time, or do they present themselves to historical thought in the here and now? Clearly, the first answer could lead into the realm of parapsychology and has nothing in common with the methodology of historical science. From this perspective, it would be more accurate to acknowledge that certain elements existing in the present - that is, in the here and now - present themselves to the human mind as representatives of the past, as bridges connecting the here and now to the past, through which historical thought can explore events that, as such, do not exist in the "here and now" without ever leaving the present moment. These are the very facts that Kragh speaks of.

Here, however, an important problem regarding the relationship between the present and the past arises. The point is that the conception of an objectively existing past implies that the present is a continuation of the past. An analysis of historical scholarship, however, shows that the exact opposite may be the

case. At this point, it is worth recalling the view of George Herbert Mead. He particularly argues that the significance of the results of historical research and the constructions based upon them is determined not by the past, in which the events under investigation took place, but is instead discovered in the present and the future. The interpretation of historical facts is directly shaped by the present. Each generation and even individual thinkers within the same generation discovers different images of the past. "How many different Caesars have crossed the Rubicon since 1800?", - Mead asks (Mead, 1956, p. 63). All this leads, quite naturally, to the conclusion that the historical past is dependent on the present: "the past is a working hypothesis that has validity in the present within which it works but has no other validity" (Mead, 1956, p. 64).

It follows that, as a result of the historian's work, the past is not described or reconstructed but constructed. Moreover, this concerns not only the content of the past but the very existence of the past as such. We have every reason to call into question not only the claim that the past was as history presents it, but even that the past existed at all. Consider, for example, Bertrand Russell's five-minute hypothesis, according to which "the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are logically independent of the past; they are wholly analysable into present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no past had existed" (Russell, 1921, p. 160).

One might, of course, object that Russell's hypothesis represents an extreme form of skepticism, that it concerns memory, and therefore has no relevance to the issue under consideration. However, if we are genuinely concerned with the problem of how historical thought represents the past, we must also take this possibility into account. After all, this brings us to a broader question: if our present experience does not presuppose the existence of the past, then on what is the very notion of the past grounded, where and how does it arise?

No matter how much we try to avoid psychologism, the only answer to this question remains that our notions of the past stem from the differences in the mental components of our current experience. Regardless of whether or not we trust memory, the fact remains that in our current experience, we are presented with contents of memory that differ significantly, for example, from contents provided by sensation or imagination. Given the objectives of this article, we will not dwell on these differences in detail but will simply recall the words of St. Augustine: "...but what now is manifest and clear is, that neither are there future nor past things. Nor is it fitly said, "There are three times, past, present, and future;" but perchance it might be fitly said, "There are three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do somehow exist in the soul, and otherwise I

see them not: present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation” (Augustine, 1943, p. 291).

By following Augustine’s train of thought, we can overcome the limitations posed by the “five-minute hypothesis”. The thing is that the hypothesis proposed by Russell, which questions the justification of the past based on current experience, already rests on a specific notion of the past and assumes the presupposition of the past’s existence and its precedence over the present. Augustine’s train of thought reveals an entirely different picture. In this case, it is not only irrelevant whether the past is exactly as it is given in the contents of memory, but also whether the past, as something preceding the present, has existed at all. What is more important is that the contents of memory exist, are unique, and differ from the contents of direct intuition, sensory perception, and imagination. In this case, the logical justification for the past is the very presence of memory contents, even if, in themselves, they do not express anything other than themselves. Methodologically, it is impossible to justify that memory provides us with something that is not memory itself, that differs from memory and is merely presented through the contents of memory. We can only accept that memory is the past, and the past is memory; they are synchronous, do not genealogically follow or precede one another, and neither stems from the other, as thinking otherwise would require a preconceived notion of the past.

Can we transfer these reflections regarding memory analogously to history and say that history is not a description or investigation of the past, but the past itself? Perhaps not. For, as Bruce Waters observes: “It would be a mistake to regard the different forms of pastness as mere parts of one inclusive whole. There is no whole past, containing other pasts in the way in which, say, a century contains its decades. The different forms of pastness are logically dissimilar, and to treat them as one, simply because they are all past, is to constitute a false fusion to which nothing in experience corresponds” (Waters, 1955, p. 255). Waters distinguishes between the past given by memory and the past given by history. “...the past that I remember is peculiarly my past; I share with others a few beliefs about the events of the Renaissance-this is our past, our common knowledge. Clearly, we cannot, in this case, equate “my knowledge” to “our knowledge” because what I (truly) remember I once perceived; but what we know about the Renaissance was perceived by neither of us. Veridical memory originated in the process of perception, but what we agree upon concerning history results from our common assent to the meaning of certain symbols. We remember things seen and heard-we memorize history” (Waters, 1955, p. 255).

The pasts represented by history and memory differ in one further important respect. As Waters notes: "The most obvious negative feature of history is its non-memorial character. Toward a remembered event one has a strong feeling of intimacy, but toward any purely historical event, say Caesar's conquest of Gaul, one's justifiable attitude is circumscribed by bare assent" (Waters, 1955, p. 256). There is nothing strange in this distinction. Clearly, the contents of memory preserve not only descriptions of events in one's own life, but also the positive or negative experiences that accompanied them. It is also evident that, for a defeated Gaul, the memory of Caesar's conquest of Gaul will likewise be accompanied by a strong sense of intimacy, since in this case it is no longer a purely historical fact.

The Contentual and Formal Aspects of the Past: History and Myth

This capacity of memory to revive the past is known in psychology as the re-experiencing of traumatic experience. This phenomenon is apparently related to the fact that significant life events are not only recorded as facts occurring within one's own life, but are also lived through, accompanied by a certain emotional response. Furthermore, in many cases, an event as a fact may not be remembered, but its emotional shading persists. As a most illustrative example of this, we can refer to the trauma of birth discovered by Otto Rank (Rank, 1929, pp. xv+224).

The phenomenon of reliving traumatic experiences shows that, in essence, there is no "past as such" in an individual's life. More accurately: in a cognitive, factual sense, it exists; but in an experiential, emotional sense, it does not. This may be related to the fact that the events - the life incidents and episodes - that make up an individual's life history are unique in their diversity, whereas the emotions accompanying them, being incomparably fewer in number, recur periodically and identically. When I am afraid, for example, my fear, regardless of what I am afraid of, is always the same as an emotion; only the intensity of the emotion may differ. And if I am afraid here and now, by doing so, I repeat and revive all my previous fears.

In the case of the historical past, things are entirely different. "Since sentences indicate their verifiers, and since the relation of the sentences of history to what they indicate (their verifiers) is admittedly remote, history is shown to be epistemologically unique: the events of history (its objects) do not recur. Land battles and naval engagements recur, but Austerlitz and Trafalgar do not recur because Napoleon and Nelson do not recur" (Waters, 1955, pp. 253-269, p. 267). Clearly, historical events are distinguished and individualized; this is the very possibility of history, the essence of history itself. Without such

differentiation, there would be no history at all, including the history of an individual's life - that is, biography.

But are the experiences of the participants in the battles of Austerlitz and Trafalgar, of Napoleon and Nelson, just as distinct? Did the participants of the Punic Wars and the Second World War have experiences and feelings that were essentially different from one another? If we possessed a tool to purely measure and evaluate experiences, could we, solely through such measurement, determine which specific war the subject participated in? Historical thought largely bypasses these questions. This is why time here is linear; historical events are unrepeatable and arranged in the depth of a chronological series. In this case, the past cannot, in principle, be present-ed; it is constructed in the present. Multiple Caesars, Napoleons, and Nelsons are created, whose belonging to the past is determined solely by the position assigned to them in a chronological series.

The past is truly present only as repetition, as a repetition of lived experience and feeling. And if, for the observer, what matters most is not the cognitive or factual aspect of the event but rather its experiential and affective dimension, then time loses its linear character and is transformed into a cycle. This is already the mythical time.

In his famous work "An Essay on Man" Ernst Cassirer writes: "Mythical time has no definite structure; it is still an 'eternal time.'" From the point of view of the mythical consciousness the past has never passed away; it is always here and now" (Cassirer, 1956, p. 219). Cassirer, most probably, does not have in mind an eternal time conditioned by the periodic repetition of experiences and feelings. His viewpoint is likely closer to that of Mircea Eliade, according to which archaic ontology abolishes time through the imitation of so-called archetypes and the repetition of paradigms in the process of endowing objects and actions with reality. Eliade notes: "...insofar as an act (or an object) acquires a certain reality through the repetition of certain paradigmatic gestures, and acquires it through that alone, there is an implicit abolition of profane time, of duration, of 'history'; and he who reproduces the exemplary gesture thus finds himself transported into the mythical epoch in which its revelation took place" (Eliade, 1959, p. 35). And in general, "...an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Thus, reality is acquired solely through repetition or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary model is 'meaningless,' i.e., it lacks reality" (Eliade, 1959, p. 34).

And what compels a person with a mythical mindset to act in this very way? Are their repetitive actions the result of rational choice; are they aware of the abstract idea of eternity in its highest degree, and do they simply align their actions with it? A positive answer to these questions would contain nothing

strange if the subsequent development of human civilization only reinforced such behavior, for the idea of eternity reached the peak of its elaboration in the domain of philosophical thought that followed the mythical. Everything, however, suggests that a person with a mythical mindset did all this unconsciously, driven by internal psychological forces which, in Carl Gustav Jung's psychological theory are called archetypes. In our days of the sole dominance of human consciousness, such behavior can, at best, be found in traditional religious rituals, and even those people who speak and write about eternity and elaborate its philosophical idea often refrain from the initiative to build their own lifeworld around it, because today the main regulator of our behavior is our consciousness, for which time is linear.

If we attempt to look at the question from a Jungian perspective, we must say that the repetitive behavior of a person with a mythic mindset and the philosophical idea of eternity are manifestations of the same archetype. Here, however, it must be noted that the concept of archetype acquires a unique meaning for Jung. Eliade specifically emphasizes that his application of this concept differs significantly from its Jungian application (Eliade, 1959, pp. viii-ix). If, for Eliade, an archetype is a model of behavior that is given to a person, or more precisely, passed down through the power of tradition, from the outside, from generation to generation, then according to Jung, "The widely held view that mythologems or myth motifs are always connected with a tradition proves untenable, since they may reappear anywhere, at any time, and in any individual regardless of tradition" (Jung, 1954, pp. 379-380). The expression of these motifs, according to Jung, is linked to the manifestation of the corresponding archetype. The Jungian archetype precedes human behavioral manifestations and determines their nature and form. It is an internal pattern for perceiving a situation and exhibiting a behavioral response to it. It shapes the nature of an individual's behavioral expression in a given situation.

Jung justifies this understanding of the archetype with an interesting example taken from biology. In his essay "Instinct and the Unconscious" Jung refers to the Austrian botanist Anton Joseph Kerner von Marilaun, who, in his work "The Life of Plants" describes the complex egg-laying process of the *Pronuba yuccasella* moth, during which this small insect pollinates the Yucca plant. It is interesting that this bell-shaped flower remains open for only one night. The next day, having turned into a ball, it falls off. It is during that very night that the *Pronuba yuccasella* moth takes the pollen from the flower, not to eat it, but for the purpose of transporting it. It makes a ball out of this pollen and, laden with it, flies to another flower. In the pistil of this second flower, it lays its eggs and seals the entrance with the pollen ball. Thus, the moth ensures the safety and food of its larvae, while simultaneously pollinating the flower.

This example, according to Jung, shows that the element of learning is completely absent in instinctive manifestations; the moth performs this complex action only once in its life (Jung, 1919, Part 1, pp. 17-18). One could, of course, assume that generations ago some moth accidentally discovered this path, and subsequent generations were under the influence of certain conditions in an embryonic state, and in some of them, an instinct was formed to repeat the mother's accidental experience (Jung, 1919, Part 1, p. 18). Here, however, another question arises: what ensures the precise repetition of the formal side of an instinct? How does a moth perform that complex sequence of actions so precisely?

In Jung's opinion, this phenomenon can be most effectively explained from the perspective of Bergsonian intuitionism. "Intuition, as a psychological function, is also an unconscious process. Just as instinct is the intrusion of an unconsciously motivated impulse into conscious action, so intuition is the intrusion of an unconscious content of an 'image' into conscious apperception. Intuition is a process of unconscious perception, either of subjective unconscious contents, or of objective but subliminal facts. Thus, colloquial language speaks of intuition as instinctive apprehension (*Erfassung*). The mechanism of intuition is analogous to that of instinct, with this difference that whereas instinct means a teleological impulse towards a highly complicated action, intuition means an unconscious teleological apprehension of a highly complicated situation. In a way intuition is a counterpart of instinct, not more and not less incomprehensible and astounding than instinct itself" (Jung, 1919, Part 1, p. 18).

According to Jung, it is precisely the a priori forms of intuition and instinct - the archetypes - that make an individual's behavior truly human. "Just as instincts compel man to a conduct of life which is specifically human, so the archetypes or categories u priori coerce intuition and apprehension to forms specifically human" (Jung, 1919, Part 1, p. 19). Furthermore, these a priori categories are inherent to all individuals of the *Homo sapiens* species. Jung continues, "I propose to designate the sum of such inherited psychic qualities as instincts and archetypes of apprehension by the words the 'collective unconscious.' I call it 'collective' because it does not possess individual contents of sporadic occurrence, but qualities of uniform and general occurrence. Clearly instinctive activity is an essentially collective phenomenon of uniform and regular occurrence and has nothing to do with the individual qualities of man. The archetypes of apprehension have the same uniformity and universality as instincts and therefore equally deserve denomination as collective phenomena" (Jung, 1919, Part 1, p. 19). And "...the way in which man conceives the world, is still, in spite of manifold variations in detail, as uniform and as regular as his instinctive actions. Just as we have been compelled to

establish the concept of an instinct determining and regulating our conscious action, we must also have recourse to the correlated concept of a factor determining the uniformity and regularity of our apprehension. It is this factor which I term the archetype, the primordial image. The image might be suitably understood as intuition of the instinct in itself, analogous to the conception of consciousness as an internal image of our objective vital processes. Just as our conscious conception determines the form and purpose of our conscious action, so unconscious apprehension determines through the archetype the form and purpose of instinct. Just as we believe instinct to be thoroughly adapted and sometimes incredibly clever, so we have to assume that intuition to which instinct owes its existence, must be of extraordinary precision" (Jung, 1919, Part 1, p. 22).

The Jungian archetype is a universal formative factor, an inner pattern underlying human perception and behavioral manifestations. It gives a certain form and direction to an individual's life, which periodically recurs throughout history. The archetype is filled with new individual contents. It must be emphasized that the archetype is purely a form, a matrix; it has no content of its own. "Again and again, I encounter the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content, in other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if such an expression be admissible). It is necessary to point out once more that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. Its form <...> might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own. This first appears according to the specific way in which the ions and molecules aggregate. The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a *facultas praeformandi*, a possibility of representation which is given *a priori*. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect, they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form only. The existence of the instincts can no more be proved than the existence of the archetypes, so long as they do not manifest them-selves concretely. With regard to the definiteness of the form, our comparison with the crystal is illuminating inasmuch as the axial system determines only the stereometric structure but not the concrete form of the individual crystal. This may be either large or small, and it may vary endlessly by reason of the different size of its planes or by the growing together of two crystals. The only thing that remains constant is the axial system, or rather, the invariable geometric proportions underlying it. The same is true of the archetype. In principle, it can be named

and has an invariable nucleus of meaning – but always only in principle, never as regards its concrete manifestation”, Jung writes. (Jung, 1977, pp. 79-80).

As we saw, Jung distinguishes between the formal and contentual aspects of human activity. The formal aspect is universal, independent of individual experience, and contains the experience of all humanity. It recurs periodically, manifesting here and now, thereby closing the flow of time. A person with a mythic mindset fills these eternal forms with new, individual content. Through myth, a person periodically encounters eternity - the permanent formal aspect of their existence. “The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas”, claims the author (Jung, 1972, p. 69).

Under the light of the aforementioned, the distinction between history and myth becomes clear. Discussing the question of the universal and the individual in history, Jaspers writes “That which is repeated, that which as an individual is replaceable by another individual, which amounts to an instance of a universal, none of this, as such, amounts to history. To be history the individual must be unique, irreplaceable, single” (Jaspers, 1965, p. 241). This is the contentual side of our past. Yet the past also has a formal dimension. The latter is expressed as myth. If we attempt to apply the categories of necessity and contingency within this context, we can say that history presents the contingency of the past, while myth presents its necessity. Necessarily, the enduring and universal form that exists in itself is, in the course of the historical process, filled with contingent, temporary, and particular content.

Conclusion

The analysis developed in this article suggests that the influence of sponsored history cannot be explained exclusively by its relation to historical facts. While scholarly historiography is primarily concerned with establishing and interpreting the unique and contingent content of past events, human engagement with the past is not exhausted by factual knowledge. The past may also become psychologically present through memory, experience, emotion, and the recurrent patterns through which individuals and groups interpret their existence. It is precisely this experiential dimension that helps explain why representations of the past that depart from, or even contradict, established historical knowledge may nevertheless acquire considerable meaning and influence.

The distinction between the factual and experiential dimensions of the past, as well as between its substantive and formal aspects, has been employed here as an operational and ideal-typical framework rather than as an

exhaustive account of history, memory, or myth. Within this framework, historical events are understood primarily in terms of their particular and contingent content, whereas recurrent forms of human experience provide a basis for the symbolic and affective representation of that content. Myth, in this restricted sense, expresses the formal and recurrent dimension of experience, while historical representation provides it with particular content. The argument does not imply that scientific historiography is devoid of interpretation or subjectivity, nor that history and myth constitute mutually exclusive forms of temporal experience. Rather, the distinction serves to identify different emphases in the ways in which representations of the past may acquire meaning.

Sponsored history becomes significant at the point where these dimensions converge. Ideology provides recurrent psychological and symbolic forms with concrete historical content, while emotionally charged representations of that content allow individuals and groups to recognize their own experiences, values, and concerns in an image of the past. Sponsored history therefore does not merely falsify or distort an independently given historical narrative; it can produce a representation capable of becoming psychologically present and personally meaningful. Its effectiveness lies precisely in this capacity to connect particular historical narratives with recurrent forms of human experience, thereby transforming representations of the past into sources of identification, meaning, and collective orientation. The distinction between scientific and sponsored history therefore concerns, in the present argument, not two exhaustive types of historical writing, but two ideal-typical modes of relating representations of the past to human experience.

Notes

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Conflict of Interest

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical Standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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