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THE EXPERIENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE(S) AGAINST ARMENIANS

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My contribution deals with different but interrelated aspects of the historical and contemporary Armenian experience of genocide. I point out the significance of the Ottoman genocide against Armenians for the coining of the term genocide and the UN Genocide Convention. I also examine the assessment under international law of the nine-month-long starvation blockade against the Republic of Artsakh, the military attack on 19 September 2023 in violation of international law and the expulsion of the population. What are the effects of repeated experiences of genocide, loss of homeland (“patricide”) and international indifference?

In the third part of my article, I examine the Azerbaijani genocide accusations against Armenia in the context of the historical and political facts and explore the question of whether Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Armenia were “collateral victims” (de Waal, 2013, p. 75) of the Ottoman genocide against the Armenians. Which were and are the consequences of the equation of Turks and Azerbaijanis? Is this really a case of “one nation in two states” (Heydar Aliyev) or an identity problem of the Turkic-speaking, predominantly Shiite population in the south-eastern Caucasus? And how should early genocidal declarations of intent by state politicians of Azerbaijan be interpreted?

What about the culture of remembrance in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, which has erected museums and memorials analogous to Armenia's culture of remembrance – perhaps in imitation of it – to support its genocide accusation against Armenia.

Keywords: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Turkey; Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh); genocide; victim-blaming; identity.

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Introduction

Nothing in modern history has had a more lasting impact on the plight of Armenians than the threat and experience of annihilation. This also resulted in mass exodus and loss of the ancestral homeland. The repression and nationwide massacres under Sultan Abdülhamit II in 1894-1896 led to the flight of 100,000 Armenians. The massacres in the Ottoman province of Adana in April 1909 shook the confidence of many Ottoman Armenians in the progress envisaged by the Young Turk *Committee for Unity and Progress (C.U.P.)*. Six years later, the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war, forced by Germany, provided the smokescreen behind which the C.U.P. could realize its genocidal intentions against the indigenous Christian population of the Ottoman Empire. According to a projection-based estimate by the German embassy in Constantinople of 4 October 1916, one and a half of the 2.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire had already become victims of the massacres and death marches by this time ("Der Geschäftsträger der Botschaft Konstantinopel (Radowitz) an den Reichskanzler (Bethmann Hollweg) Bericht" 4 October, 1916). In 1923 and 1926, the Republic of Turkey passed two laws to prevent the return of survivors who had not remained in the country.¹ As a result of the genocidal depopulation of the Armenian settlement area and the largely prevented return of survivors, the Armenians lost over nine-tenths of their historical homeland.

For the author of the United Nations Genocide Convention, Raphael Lemkin, the Ottoman genocide of Armenians and Greeks and the extermination of European Jews during the Second World War determined his definition of genocide ("Genocide", 1946, p. 17).

Four of the crimes defined in Article II of the UN Convention as "genocide in whole or in part" were committed against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and against the Armenian and East Syriac population of temporarily Ottoman-occupied northwest Iran during the First World War:

"(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" ("Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", 1951).

Repeated eliticide, expulsion and patricide

The genocidal experiences of the Armenians continued in the rest of Armenia, which was first under Russian and then Soviet rule. During the "Bolshaya Chistka", the Stalinist purge in the years 1936-39, a further eliticide of the Armenian population took place, a persecution and extermination of their intellectual and spiritual elite. This eliticide disproportionately affected those Armenians who had fled to Eastern or

Russian Armenia as refugees from the Ottoman Empire and who were persecuted by the Soviet regime as supposed nationalists and revanchists.

In the late and post-Soviet period, the arbitrary administrative decisions from the initial phase of Soviet rule in the South Caucasus gave rise to irredentist and secessionist aspirations: in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia did not dare to unite with the former autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which subsequently remained internationally unacknowledged. In the First Karabakh War of 1991-94, the latter not only managed to fend off the Azerbaijani military attack, but also succeeded in taking control of the seven neighboring districts that make up the historical Karabakh of 12,000 square kilometers. In the following 26 years, international efforts to reach a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia failed, which the international public perceived and still perceives as the primary party to the conflict. Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh has been largely excluded from the negotiations since the fall of 1997. Azerbaijan used the long phase in which the Republic of Armenia played for time, to arm itself with the most modern Turkish and, above all, Israeli weapons and attacked again in the fall of 2020, this time successfully. It took control of a third of the Republic of Artsakh. Like the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region during the Soviet era, Artsakh was now only connected to the outside world via the Lachin Corridor. In the following three years, Azerbaijan tightened the belt ever more: by interrupting the supply of electricity and gas and, since 12 December 2022, by blockading (Cox and Eibner, 1993, p. 51f)² the Lachin Corridor and increasingly preventing the supply of food, medicine and fuel to the people of Artsakh.

As early as August 2022, the *Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention* warned of a “significant genocide risk for Armenians in the South Caucasus” (“Red flag alert”, 17 August, 2022). The *International Association of Genocide Scholars*, as the largest professional association of genocide scholars, echoed the warning (“Statement on Azerbaijani Aggression”, 2022). In early August 2023, the first Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Dr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, assessed the hunger blockade of Azerbaijan as genocide in accordance with Article II c) of the Genocide Convention and reiterated this assessment in a lecture in December 2023 (Ocampo, 2023a; 2023b). He characterized the arrest of eight political and military leaders of the Artsakh government as elicide comparable to the Young Turkish measure of 1915. On 18 April 2024, the US *Center for Truth and Justice* requested the International Criminal Court to investigate President Ilham Aliyev and others for planning and carrying out genocide (“The planning, inciting, ordering, instigating and implementation of Genocide”, 2024).

The starvation blockade and expulsion of the entire population of the Republic of Artsakh and the loss of a further 12,000 square kilometers of their historical settlement area plunged many Armenians in the Republic of Armenia and in the diaspora into a

deep depression. This was exacerbated by the indifference of world public opinion, which largely stood idly by and watched the crimes committed by Azerbaijan without imposing sanctions. This indifference also echoes historical collective experience, as in the First World War both the Allies and the Central Powers associated with the Ottoman Empire stood idly by and watched the annihilation of indigenous Christians for reasons of military strategy. Then, as in 2023, the experience of international indifference led many Armenians to feel that they were the most abandoned nation in the world.

Genocidal intent and recognition of historical responsibility

Ideologically and politically, there is a close connection between Turkish and Azerbaijani ethnonationalism. Heydar Aliyev, the father of the current Azerbaijani president, coined the Pan-Turkic slogan on 5 May 1997: “one nation in two states” (“Official visit”, 1997).

The two Turkic brother nations are united in their Armenophobia and genocidal intentions. The first Interior Minister of the first Republic of Azerbaijan, Behbud Javanshir (Cavansır), spoke out in coded telegrams in favor of the elimination of the Armenians in Azerbaijan: “The Armenians are the only obstacle on the path to our success. We must eliminate the Armenians and continue our path over their corpses” (Kofler-Bettschart, 2024, p. 120f; Ketibian, 2024)³. Like his former head of government Fatali Khan Khoisky, Javanshir was responsible for the massacre of tens of thousands of Armenians in Baku in September 1918 during the Turkish invasion of the eastern South Caucasus. Javanshir was therefore regarded by many Armenians as a copy of the Ottoman Interior Minister Mehmet Talat. When, in October 1921, a British military court in Constantinople heard the assassination of Javanshir by the Armenian avenger Misak Torlakyan, Princess Tamara Volkonskaya, a Russian noblewoman working for the Red Cross, described as a witness how Armenian women and children were abducted and massacred in Baku and how the streets were littered with corpses. She also told the court about a conversation with a member of the Azerbaijani government. “You are an educated person. How could you allow such pogroms?” Volkonskaya had asked him, and received the answer: “We will not lay down our arms until we have destroyed all the Armenians in Azerbaijan” (Kofler-Bettschart, 2024, p. 120f).

The chain of Azerbaijani acts of violence against Armenians in the 20th century is long. Atrocities regularly broke out when the central power in Moscow was weakened, such as in 1904/5 during the first Russian Social Revolution, the October Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet reform era of the late 1980s. In the South Caucasus, local authorities under Czarist rule diverted social and political conflicts to ethnic tensions. As the police did not intervene or were clearly on the “Tatar” side, as Turkic speaking Muslims were still called in Russian until the 1930s, Armenians organized their self-

defense. This was successful in the First Armenian-Tatar War in 1905-07, but no longer in the so-called Second Armenian Tatar War of 1918-20.

How do Turkey and Azerbaijan deal with the dark sides of their history in terms of history and remembrance policy? Both states not only deny the genocidal nature of the crimes committed against Armenians, but even reverse the blame by victim-blaming. On the website of the Turkish Foreign Minister, the genocide during the First World War is primarily denied with the claim that the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire rose up against their government. There is no mention here of the internationally recognized right of self-defense. Turkey only recognizes the European Jews as “genuine” victims of genocide. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, unlike the Armenians in Constantinople, there were no attempts by Berlin Jews to revolt. The Turkish account omits the failed attempt at self-defense by the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto on 19 April 1943 (“The Armenian allegation of Genocide”, n.d.), and similar, lesser-known cases of Jewish self-defense attempts.

Azerbaijan’s victim narrative, genocide commemoration and self-perception

Post-Soviet Azerbaijan has essentially developed its victim narrative since the 1990s. It is a remarkable case of historical appropriation, as Azerbaijan is clearly trying to outdo the Armenian narrative of a consistent Pan-Turkish genocidal threat. For this aim, official Azerbaijan constructed an alleged Armenian intention to exterminate the Azerbaijani nation throughout the entire 20th century and arranged heterogeneous events in a continuity, from the beginning of the 20th century to the First Karabakh War, from mass killings by the Bolsheviks, led by the Armenian Stepan Shahumyan, to the shelling of the escape corridor of the small Karabakh town of Khojalu (Xocali) in February 1992. The exact reasons for the killings of fleeing civilians and Azerbaijani fighters there remain as controversial as the number of victims. Ayaz Mütəllibov, the first president of post-Soviet Azerbaijan, suggested at the time that the mass killings in Khojalu had been “organized” by the Azerbaijani opposition to force his resignation (Cox & Eibner, 1993, p. 58). In 2010, however, Mütəllibov revised his statement to the effect that the opposition *People's Front of Azerbaijan* had “exploited” the Khojalu massacre politically (Batyev, 14 May, 2010)¹. In an interview with the Russian weekly magazine “Megapolis-Ekspress”, the former head of administration of Khojaly, Elman [also Elmar] Mamedov, also attributed indirect blame for the massacre to the Azerbaijani government and the opposition (“Interview of Elman Mamedov”, 1992; Grigoryan, 2010).

The victim narrative served the Azerbaijani state leadership under Ilham Aliyev to justify its Armenophobe policy and to instigate the population to fight the Armenians. It was expressed in the construction of various imposing and architecturally attractive memorials, starting with the two Khojaly Memorials in Baku in 1993 and 2008, followed by the “Genocide Memorial of Guba City” in 2013. On 26 February 2024,

Ilham Aliyev laid the foundation stone for another Khojaly Genocide Memorial in the very town of Khojaly. His speech on this occasion was remarkable, as Aliyev not only commemorated the victims of the massacre, which took place 32 years ago, but also threatened the Armenians with the anger of the Azerbaijanis, which still lingers after 300 years. At the same time, the President regretted that only 18 states have so far recognized the “bloody tragedy” of Khojaly as genocide, including not a single “major state”: “International organizations, many of them have remained indifferent to this tragedy” (“Ilham Aliyev laid foundation stone”, 2024).

The Azerbaijani victim narrative was combined with triumphalism during the gradual conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh (2020-2023). In conquered Shushi, the memorial to the Armenian genocide victims was already destroyed in September 2020 and, according to Azerbaijani media reports, a mosque was erected as a symbol of victory; a nearby ‘victory museum’ is also planned here (“Azerbaijani museum, mosque, square”, 2024).

The 32-year-old Azerbaijani victim narrative and the state-initiated and legalized racist hatred of Armenians have not only influenced media coverage and the education system in Azerbaijan for decades, but have also led to the loss of elementary humanity. There is no other explanation for the large number of videos circulating on so-called social media, especially TikTok and Telegram channels, in which the torture and mutilation of living and dead Armenian victims is depicted with triumphalism. Apparently, hatred against Armenians is also needed for identity politics, as a negative counter-image of what Azerbaijani society is not and does not want to be. Culturally, religiously and linguistically, the young Azerbaijani nation finds it difficult to distinguish itself from its self-proclaimed Turkish brother nation and the religiously related Shiite Iran. The independent Talysh journalist Rahim Saliyev wrote on X (17 October 2023) about the hybrid identity of Azerbaijanis and the resulting appropriation of neighboring cultures: “Being an Azerbaijani means living in Persian land, reading Russian literature, having Armenian architecture, practicing Arabic religion, celebrating Talysh holidays, buying Western technology, listening to Caucasian music, drinking Georgian wine, but in the end claiming that everything belongs to you. And to hate all the peoples who have given you all this beauty ...” (Saliyev, 2023).

How can a society so brutalized and unsure of itself find a peaceful coexistence with its neighbouring country, which has so far been vilified as fascists, aggressors and occupiers? Critics and supporters of a constructive peace solution and reconciliation are having a hard time in Azerbaijan (Pfeilschifter and Barberis, 2023). According to *Amnesty International*, “in September and October [2023], more than a dozen activists were arrested in administrative proceedings for criticizing the government and its military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh” (Amnesty International, 2024, p. 88).

Authors who address the suffering of the other side are perceived and rejected by their society as traitors and provocateurs. The Armenian author Levon Javakhyan was

the first to experience this with his short story *Kirva*, in which he depicted the beginning of the First Karabakh War and the suffering of people on both sides. In 2010, the Peace Center (Baku) awarded him the Peace Prize for promoting tolerance and peace in the South Caucasus (Javakhyan, 2008), and in 2019 he received the Armenian President's Prize for his literary oeuvre.

The once celebrated Azerbaijani writer Akram Aylisli was persecuted and threatened, and his books were publicly burned in the capital Baku and in Aylisli's home town Aylis after he published *Stone Dreams* in December 2012. The "requiem-novella" recalls the nationalist-motivated crimes perpetrated in Azerbaijan against the Armenian minority in 1988-1990 and previously in 1919 in Nakhchivan. The reason for the publication in late 2012 by Aylisli was the transfer of the Budapest axe assassin Ramil Safarov, who had murdered the Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe in his sleep on 19 February 2004 during a NATO exercise in Hungary. The *National Democratic Party of Azerbaijan* responded by naming Safarov "Man of the Year 2005" for his "services" to the nation, namely for killing an Armenian ("16 axe blows" 2013). In 2006, Safarov was sentenced to life imprisonment by a Hungarian court, but during a visit by Viktor Orbán to Baku, Azerbaijan managed to have Safarov transferred back to his homeland in 2012, where he was pardoned and celebrated as a national hero. Azerbaijan rewarded Hungary by buying three billion Hungarian government bonds.

This was the impetus for the writer Aylisli to publish *Stone Dreams*, which he had already written in 2006 and 2007 in Aylis and Baku. As punishment for his alleged "betrayal" of the entire Turkish nation, A. Aylisli was stripped of the title "People's Writer" and his author's pension was canceled. Aylisli himself writes: "My wife and sons lost their jobs. My books were removed from all libraries and all my texts from textbooks. This was followed by a ban on theater performances, the revocation of all honorary rights and expulsion from the writers' association".

On 31 January 2013, a mob gathered in front of Aylisli's house in Baku, calling him an "Armenian" in slogans and publicly burning his books. The public burning of books in his beloved hometown of Aylisli was particularly painful on 9 February 2013. The author wrote about it: . "The bonfires of my books in Aylis were probably calculated to break me once and for all. To some extent, they succeeded. My Aylis – sunny and bright – suddenly disappeared from my dreams. Now, even finding myself there in my dreams, I was always searching for my own bright Aylis" (Aylisli, 2018, p. 296).

There were also loud calls for the ax murderer Safarov ("Come, and bring your ax!"). The Azerbaijani parliament was asked to revoke the writer's citizenship or force him to take a DNA test to prove his presumed Armenian descent. Aylisli was also insinuated to be jealous of his Turkish colleague Orhan Pamuk, who received international attention for his recognition of the Armenian genocide. Russia and some

Western countries have offered Aylisli refuge, but the courageous author did not want to be pushed out of the country.

Melahat İbrahimkızı, a member of parliament known for her racist views, has accused the author of insulting not only Azerbaijan but also the entire Turkish nation, thus provoking the spread of the hate campaign to neighboring Turkey. The lynching campaign reached its climax when the pro-government Muasir Müsavat Partisi (“New Equality” Party) offered a reward of ten thousand manats (about 9,500 euros) for cutting off the writer’s ear.

All these acts were only made possible by President Ilham Aliyev’s 7 February 2013 decree revoking Aylisli’s title of People’s Writer and cutting his associated honorary pension. In doing so, he also cleared the way for his prosecution with impunity. It was only thanks to the intervention of the international community – including Human Rights Watch, the Helsinki Citizens’ Forum, the Russian PEN Center and the US State Department – that the Azerbaijani authorities felt compelled to put the extremists in their place. However, the author’s freedom of travel and movement was restricted by the ban on leaving Baku. He was not even allowed to visit his beloved Aylis when his brother died.

But Aylisli seems unbroken. Even in 2018, he publicly professed his friendship with Armenians: “Friendship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is not high-flown rhetoric for me but an extremely important question of principles. I sincerely value this friendship and consider it a historically important cultural heritage of my people. For me, this friendship is worth much more than all the material blessings achieved by my country during its 11 years of independence. For a long time I have perceived the current enmity and estrangement sowed between us by shortsighted politicians as my own personal tragedy” (Aylisli, 2018, p. 294).

In 2014, Aylisli was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Taking a self-critical look at the dark sides of one’s own national history is one of the greatest challenges facing any author, especially in authoritarian states. Aylisli has succeeded in taking this look, as have his Armenian colleagues Levon Javakhyan and Hovik Afyan whose novel *Karmir* (2020) describes mutual Azerbaijani-Armenian atrocities during the First Karabakh War. My wish would be for the three authors to read together. But Aylisli is not allowed to leave Azerbaijan.

Summary and conclusion

In the above article I analyzed the traumatizing consequences of the Armenians’ repeated experience of genocide under Ottoman-Turkish, Tsarist-Russian, Soviet and Azerbaijani rule.

While the annihilation of one and a half million Armenians by the Young Turk regime in just 19 months over at least four generations shaped the thinking and identity of Armenians in Armenia and its diaspora, and served the main author of the UN

Genocide Convention, Raphael Lemkin, alongside the Shoah in the Second World War as the empirical basis of his definition of genocide, the subsequent genocidal experiences – the Soviet eliticide of 1936-39 and the massacres and expulsions under Azerbaijani rule 1905-1990 – have still not or only partially been addressed. Furthermore, the range of interpretations is far greater than in the case of the C.U.P. genocide against Armenians.

While in the Republic of Armenia, at least on the official side, there seems to be a lack of certainty as to whether the most recent crimes committed by Azerbaijan in 2022 and 2023 against the population of the Republic of Artsakh should be categorized as genocide, “ethnic cleansing” or other atrocity crimes, both Azerbaijan as well as the Republic of Turkey, defining themselves as brother nations and supporting each other in the spirit of Pan-Turkism, accuse the Armenian nation and its political leaders of genocide. Azerbaijan, which developed its accusations in the 1990s, understands this to mean the events since 1918, as well as the crimes committed during the First Karabakh War, in particular the Khojalu massacre (1993). However, the exact course of events and number of victims remain unclear to this day.

The official victim narrative serves both to increase the Azerbaijani willingness to fight against Armenians, as well as to strengthen a collective identity based on Armenophobia. Both motifs are conceivably unfavorable conditions for peaceful coexistence, let alone a fact-based reappraisal of the shared history of conflict.

As in the Soviet era, it is left to fictional prose to discuss politically undesirable truths. In Azerbaijan, this was done by the once prominent author Akram Aylisli, in Armenia by Levon Javakhyan and Hovik Afyan. A. Aylisli paid for his civic and literary courage with the loss of his freedom to travel.

Notes

1. “A law was adopted as early as September 1923, stating that no Armenian who had emigrated from Cilicia and the “Eastern Provinces” could return to Turkey. A second law of 23 May 1927 states that all citizens who had not participated in the war for independence and had not returned to Turkey between 24 July 1923 and the announcement of the law would lose their citizenship.” (Hofmann, October 2002, p. 15)

2. Blockades are a frequently employed genocidal tool and have been used both during the Ottoman genocide (1915-17) and by post-Soviet Azerbaijan, for example during “Operation Ring” (fall 1991). Cf. Cox and Eibner, 1993.

3. The U.S. media coverage of Azerbaijani massacres of Armenians during 1905-1921 was collected and edited by Ara Ketibian. The volume is a compilation of US news reports, eyewitness accounts, editorial opinions and political analyses. Cf. Ketibian, A. 2024.

4. In the original Russian text we find the following words: “Ya ne govoril takikh slov o cheshskoy jurnalistke Dane Mazarovoy. Ya nikogda takogo ne govoril. Ya skazal, chto NFA vospol’zovalsya tem, chto proizoshlo v Khojaly. Ne bole togo [I didn’t say such words to the Czech journalist Dana Mazarova. I never said that. I said that NFA took advantage of what happened in Khijaly. Nothing more.]. Cf. Batyev, 14 May, 2010.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no ethical issues or conflict of interests in this research.

Ethical standards

The author affirms this research does not involve human subjects.

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**ՀԱՅԵՐԻ ԴԵՄ ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ (ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԵՐԻ)
ՓՈՐՁԸ ԵՎ ՀԵՏԵՎԱՆՔՆԵՐԸ**

Թեսա Հոփման

Իմ ներդրումը վերաբերում է ցեղասպանության պատմական և ժամանակակից հայկական փորձառության տարբեր, բայց փոխկապակցված կողմերին: Ես մատնանշում եմ հայերի դեմ Օսմանյան կայսրության ցեղասպանության նշանակությունը ցեղասպանություն տերմինի և ՄԱԿ-ի ցեղասպանության կոնվենցիայի ստեղծման հարցում: Ուսումնասիրում եմ նաև միջազգային իրավունքով սահմանված գնահատականը Արցախի Հանրապետության դեմ իննամյա տուի, շրջափակման, 2023 թվականի սեպտեմբերի 19-ին միջազգային իրավունքի խախտմամբ ռազմական հարձակման և դրան հաջորդած բնակչության արտաքսման վերաբերյալ:

Որո՞նք են ցեղասպանության կրկնվող փորձառությունների, հայրենիքի կորստի («հայրենազրկման») և միջազգային անտարբերության հետևանքները:

Հոդվածում ուսումնասիրում եմ նաև Հայաստանի դեմ աղբեջանական մեղադրանքները պատմաքաղաքական փաստերի ֆոնին, ինչպես նաև այն հարցը, թե արդյո՞ք Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունում աղբեջանցիները հայերի դեմ Օսմանյան կայսրության իրականացրած ցեղասպանության (de Waal, 2013, 75) «կողմանակի զոհերն» են եղել: Կարևոր է նաև այն, թե ի՞նչ հետևանքներ ունեցավ և այսօր էլ ունի թուրքերի և աղբեջանցիների նույնացումը: Արդյոք «մեկ ազգ երկու պետություն» (Հեյդար Ալիև) որակումը համապատասխանում է իրականությանը, թե սա հարավ-արևելյան Կովկասի թյուրքալեզու, հիմնականում շիա բնակչության ինքնության խնդիրն է: Բայց ինչպես պետք է մեկնարանվեն Աղբեջանի պետական քաղաքական գործիչների վաղաժամ հայտարարություններն իրենց իշխանությունների ցեղասպանական մտադրության մասին: Ինչ վերաբերում է հիշողության մշակույթին հետխորհրդային Աղբեջանում, ապա ակնհայտ է որ այն թանգարաններ ու հուշահամալիրներ են կառուցել՝ նմանակելով Հայաստանի հիշողության մշակույթը և նպատակ ունենալով աշակել Հայաստանի դեմ ուղղված ցեղասպանության իր մեղադրանքին:

Բանալի բառեր՝ Հայաստան, Աղբեջան, Թուրքիա, Լեռնային Ղարաբաղ (Արցախ), ցեղասպանություն, զոհերի մեղադրում, ինքնություն: