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## THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEWS OF GRIGOR TATEVATSI

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Saint Grigor Tatevatsi's (1346-1409) epistemological views have an optimistic nature: first, he does not doubt the real existence of the knowable created world and particular things; second, he is convinced that man has sufficient epistemic means to know existence. The supreme goal of cognition is the knowledge of God, so knowledge is valued according to its nature and orientation as well as its contribution to the salvation of the soul. Tatevatsi defends the fundamental proposition of Aristotelian epistemology: human knowledge is acquired, because there are no innate ideas and knowledge in human soul. Tatevatsi distinguishes three degrees of knowledge: sensual, rational and knowledge acquired through faith. Although these have different objects, knowledge tools, methods and involve different abilities, together they ensure the integrity of human knowledge. Even though the knowing subject is generally passive, general concepts in the mind are formed in part thanks to the activity of the subject. He defines truth as the correspondence between thought and reality. Although Tatevatsi separates philosophical and theological truths, he does not support the teaching of "two truths". Philosophical propositions are true if they are consistent with the truths of Revelation.

**Key words**: Grigor Tatevatsi, epistemology, means of cognation, sensual and rational degrees of cognation, faith, knowledge, truth, teaching of "two truths", universals

Epistemological issues occupy a significant place in the works of greatest representative of medieval Armenian philosophy, rector of Tatev University Saint Grigor Tatevatsi (1346-1409)<sup>1</sup>. Tatevatsi's epistemological views are based on the idea that man is a rational animal. Human ability of cognition and self- cognation distinguish him from the animal world and raise him above other breathing creatures; "Man differs from animals in cognition and thought. Now, whoever does not know with his mind, he does not belong to mankind, but an animal"<sup>2</sup>. Knowing is not only the quality of being different from animals, but also the quality that gives meaning to human existence. A person cannot survive, cannot manage and regulate his life without knowing, without hav-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Saint Grigor Tatevatsi (1346-1409) is the most prominent figure of the Armenian medieval theological-philosophical thought, and his theoretical legacy is the apogee of medieval Armenian thought, which includes the best traditions of both the Armenian and European scholastic thought of the previous centuries. He was the head of the Tatev University (XIV-XVcc.), whichwas the leading scientific and cultural centre of the time. Tatevatsi wrote many books:"The Book of Questions", "Voskeporik" ("Book of Golden Content"), Summer and Winter volumes of "Book of Sermons", "Solution to "Introduction" of Porphyry", "Commentary on the Philosophy of David", interpretation and analysis of the Old and New Testaments, works of the holy fathers, etc. To learn more about Tatevatsi's philosophy, see Arevshatyan S. S. Philosophical views of Grigor Tatevatsi, Yerevan, 1957 (in Russian); Zakaryan S. A. Armenian Philosophers (Grigor Tatevatsi), Yerevan, 1998; the same: Philosophers of Tatev University, Yerevan, 2018, p. 132-237 (in Armenian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Voskeporik, Constantinople, 1746, p. 26 (in Armenian).

ing clear ideas about things. In other words, ability of knowledge acquisition has not only an epistemological, but also an existential and life-saving value for a person.

Tatevatsi is optimistic when it comes to epistemological issues. First of all, he does not doubt the real existence of knowable entities, the created world and particular things. This is due to both religious (God first created the world, then man) and purely epistemological belief. Knowable entities precede cognition, "because nature is first before our cognation". Second, Tatevatsi is convinced that a person has sufficient abilities and means to know not only sensuous but also mental, supersensual entities. This conviction is based on the premise that during cognation, the human soul reflects and copies reality like a mirror. Thus he accepted that a certain correspondence/similarity exists between the reality and thought. Third, Tatevatsi believes that there are both theological (Revelation) and philosophical truths, but from the epistemological point of view, the truths of Revelation, which are absolute, infallible and non-relative in nature, are more valuable. Fourth, Tatevatsi is convinced that cognition is not an end in itself, it is meant to serve the cause of human salvation. Man is given means and tools of cognition: senses, thought, memory, imagination, emotions, language, will, theoretical and practical wisdom, etc., to decorate his soul with theoretical knowledge and put them at the service of salvation. **Fifth,** Tatevatsi's epistemology has an obvious theistic character. God has given man the grace of cognitive abilities and tools, knowledge and wisdom, not so that with them he merely knows earthly phenomena, strives to acquire earthly goods and puts all that to service only for worldly purposes, but also to know God and use his knowledge for getting closer to God and saving his soul. In this sense, "the first wisdom is to look at God, and to know and believe in God"<sup>3</sup>. God gave man senses and mind not just to feel and know, but to please God with them, to think about Him, to listen and fulfill His commands. According to Tatevatsi, although the cognitive nature of man has been weakened due to his original sin, he still surpasses other creatures in his cognitive abilities. In contrast to divine and angelic knowledge, human knowledge is derivative, composite, and comprehensible because its nature is composite. Man is a unity of soul and sensible and knowable body. And this unity determines the composite nature of his cognition.

Tatevatsi defends the fundamental principle of Aristotelian epistemology, that human knowledge is acquired, because there are no innate ideas or any knowledge in human soul. A person is born with a pure soul and body, both cognitively and morally: "we are naturally naked and empty of all good, bodily and spiritual, because we do not have a natural dress as an animal, and no sin and anything else. Likewise, according to the spirit, we do not have holiness, wisdom and anything else, but we will receive everything later". Following Aristotle, Tatevatsi compares the human soul to "unwritten board" or "washed parchment", which over time, along with the improvement of the human soul

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> **St. Grigor Tatevatsi,** Summer volume of "Book of Sermons", Constantinople, 1741, p. 135 (in Armenian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Voskeporik, p. 105.

and development of cognitive activity, is filled with knowledge: "The rational soul of man is like an unwritten board or a washed parchment – whatever is written, is impressed on it"5. God created man naturally "empty" so that man can acquire the knowledge he needs through sweat and hard work.

According to Tatevatsi, a person has three cognitive "eyes" - senses, reason (mind) and faith, which correspond to the sensory, rational and faith based levels of knowledge. In other words, a person is a feeling, thinking and believing being. With senses, he acquires knowledge of tangible material entities, with intellect he acquires knowledge of immaterial and conceivable entities, and with the light of faith comes to know divine realities and God. A person's abilities to feel, think and believe are constituent parts of a single cognitive nature and only their joint activity ensures the completeness of human cognition. St. Tatevatsi not only does not put these three degrees or means of knowledge in contrast, but on the contrary, views them as natural-necessary forms of human cognition, each of which has a cognitive function predetermined from above. Bearing this in mind, it would be wrong to characterize his epistemological theory either as sensualist, or as rationalist or fideistic, because, first, those three forms of knowledge are anchored on the principle of "justice", that is, each one fulfills the cognitive function assigned to it, second, none of these has a higher or lower epistemic value than others, regardless of what place they occupy in the ladder of cognition. Just as each step of the ladder is necessary and suitable, and one cannot replace the other, so the three forms of human cognition are necessary and indispensable. They are interconnected and one complements the other. Sensations, thought and faith are different cognitive abilities. The mind is moderate, moral, and free, but it is not able to rise beyond knowledge of natural things, because: "The cognition of mind follows the nature of things. And he does not see what is above nature, because where nature does not reach, there mind does not reach"6. Those who are guided only by sense and reason are inevitably buried in sin, fall into the abyss of ignorance and delusion. Moreover, sense and reason do not notice their shortcomings and limitations. Just as the eye does not see its lack of vision, likewise reason does not see its delusion. And this means that they cannot be a criterion for evaluating their ability. It is the faith that enlightens, corrects and expands human knowledge. Like other human cognitive abilities, faith is a gift from God. Faith is not separated from reason. In fact it is the light of reason ("faith is the light that entered the mind, poured in the first light into the rational person..."<sup>7</sup>), that is, it is more powerful than reason in terms of its cognitive power, so it should be observed as the highest degree of human knowledge. Thus, Tatevatsi's epistemological theory has a synthetic nature and hierarchical structure. The lower level of knowledge is sensory cognition, whose instruments are the senses, the middle level is the rational, whose instrument is reason, and the upper level is faith, whose instrument is the "bright light" above the mind.

<sup>5</sup> St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Summer volume of "Book of Sermons", p. 454. <sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 72.

Tatevatsi distinguishes ten means or powers of cognition: five internal and five external. These powers are located in different parts of the head. The five external or bodily powers are the senses of sight, touch, hearing, taste, smell. The internal or soul powers are common sense, imagination, opinion, reasoning, and thought, which he sometimes identifies with memory, and sometimes sees memory as a separate epistemic power. Common sense knows the present, reason knows the future and memory knows the past. In the first part of the chapter are the five senses, imagination and opinion, in the second part Tatevatsi talks about the intellect and will, and in the third part he discusses the mind and memory.

Tatevatsi describes cognition as a process in which each of the means of knowledge performs a specific function. He compares the cognitive process with the activity of the royal court. The common sense, like the king's foreign embassy in assembly, collects the data of the external senses and transmits them to the imagination. The latter examines these data, separates them from each other, groups them, selects them and sends them to the brain. Prudence is closer to the mind, as the vizier is to the king. Reason sees everything directly, which allows it to distinguish between the true and the false, to make a choice to reject and send back the lie and, as a faithful friend of the king, to communicate only the true to the mind. The mind, as the king of all, issues final decisions that are true to the extent that they correspond to reality.

According to Tatevatsi, the lower and first stage of cognition is sensory cognition, which is realized through the five senses. The senses are arranged in the body like the four elements in the universe. The sense of touch is located below, like the soil, the sense of taste is above it, like the water, the sense of hearing is like the air, and the sense of sight is at the bottom, like the wind. Three of these five senses (touch, smell, and taste) are vulgar, because they "come to know the sensible thing by mixing it." And the other two - the visible and the audible - are "royal" because they are not directly mixed with recognizable things. Of the five senses, the sight is the most honorable and guiding, because sight is epistemologically more valuable and reliable than other senses. Sensual cognition begins when the material things of the external world affect the human senses, bring about corresponding sensations and sensory images. Tatevatsi is convinced that a person's senses (if, of course, the senses are healthy and there are no other disturbing circumstances) almost accurately reflect the external forms of known things, which is why the known and its epistemic image resemble each other. Of course, the senses also make mistakes. However, according to Tatevatsi, in general, sensual cognition is distinguished by the reliability of reflection and conveys complete information about the five properties of sensible-material entities. Tatevatsi emphasizes the role of senses in cognition, but he also points out their limitation, which refers not so much to the reliability of reflection as to the cognitive ability of the senses. Because of its limitations, sensual knowledge cannot play a leading role in human cognition. These limitations are overcome in the rational level of cognition. A more profound and complete understanding of external things is achieved through intelligence. Comparing the forms of sensual and intellectual cognition, Tatevatsi notes the following differences between them. First, only sensible-

corporeal entities are recognized by the senses, while the incorporeal are recognized by intellectual cognition. The object of sense is corporeal, and that of mind is incorporeal. **Second**, the mind recognizes the essence of a thing, while senses recognize the external and accidental properties of a thing. Third, senses provide knowledge of the particular, while the mind provides knowledge of the general and the whole. We see the particular man, Socrates, but we know the common essence, humanity, with our intellect. Besides, if the senses only know things, the mind also perceives the similarities and differences of things. **Fourth**, senses know only the present, and the mind knows the past, the present and the future. Senses provide knowledge only of nearby things, of things that are "here and now", while the mind does not have any space-time limitation. The mind is so "prose" that it can summarize the science of all creatures and never be satisfied with what it has acquired. Fifth, the mind is an "interactive reason and artificer", and the feeling is "an active reason and a mediator between significant reality and conscious thought". Sixth, the difference between the senses and the mind also has an aesthetic nature; "May the eye be drawn to beauty, and the mind to the beauty of the thing ... eye to my various theories, and my mind to my various meanings"8. Thus, the rational cognition is superior to the sensual in terms of both quantity, quality and value.

Tatevatsi classifies the three forms of knowledge into two groups: **natural** and gifted. The natural form of knowledge, which includes sensual and rational forms of knowledge, are empirical, have a mediated character, and the gifted form of knowledge, which includes faith, has a direct-intuitive character. The following properties are characteristic of the natural knowledge. First, senses must be healthy, second, sense and reason must "bow down" in front of known things, third, they must be mixed with them, fourth, the mind must classify, analyze the knowledge material and "find the truth through a tour". Knowledge through grace, with which the prophets, apostles and saints are endowed, is opposed to the natural forms of knowledge, because it "rises to divine knowledge through simple knowledge". Even if Tatevatsi appreciates the cognitive value of intellectual knowledge, he still views it as another step on the way to full cognition of the world and of God. Reason is not able to acquire knowledge of divine reality, not because it is antirational, but because it is transcendental, it is beyond the reach of rational knowledge.

Tatevatsi, like many medieval thinkers, has a dual approach to worldly wisdom and natural theory. At the basis of this dual approach lies the attitude of the Christian religion towards nature, the world and earthly life. From the point of view of Christianity, this world is an unreal existence, a temporary refuge and a place of exile. Therefore, worldly wisdom is "foolish, vain" and fundamentally worthy of contempt if it binds a person to earthly life and thereby diverts him from the path of divine knowledge and salvation. If knowledge (theory, science) has no fear of God and is without good works, then it "proceeds indiscriminately into sin, because it does not have the face and bridle of God. Like a stiff-necked and unbridled horse, let the throne be overthrown and the horse destroyed. In the same way, having received wisdom and knowledge and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> St. Grigor Tatevatsi, The Book of Questions, Constantinople, 1729, p. 104 (in Armenian).

being proud, he leads his way to loss. It is true that God has granted worldly sciences to people, but the latter use them for the realization of earthly goals, with them they bury themselves in sins and forget the spiritual, so they are "earthly, spiritual and demonic" sciences. The theoretical and practical sciences of external philosophers are called diabolical, the spiritual sciences of carnal law-abiding people and the earthly sciences of pursuing material gain ("such as medicine and political law").

The ultimate goal of natural cognition is the acquisition of true knowledge. Tatevatsi defends the Aristotelian theory truth, according to which a judgment is true if it corresponds to reality, and false if it does not correspond to reality: "And the philosophers define this way: it is true that the thing and the sound are equal to each other so that the thing we speak is the same, to tell a person that he is a person and is alive and verbal, etc. it is true. And the lie is when we say that a person is a stone or a stick: his body and voice are not equal, it is a lie to each other"<sup>10</sup>. It follows from this theory of truth that the senses and the mind reflect reality like a mirror: "As clean as a mirror, they will impress themselves with this and that. Likewise, the mind is clear, impress them with what we know..."<sup>11</sup>. Although Tatevatsi defends the principle of the mirror-like reflection of entities in the mind, this does not mean that the subject of knowledge is generally subjective and the knowable is not processed by senses and thought. In the course of cognition, general concepts (universals) are formed, which in reality do not correspond to certain formations (Tatevatsi solves the problem of universals in Aristotelian vein, that is, from the position of moderate realism<sup>12</sup>). Since there is a difference between things and the general in thought, it means that the general entity or concept in the mind is the result of epistemic reconfiguration: "our thinking creates the various." And how does the corporeal transform into an incorporeal entity in the mind? According to Tatevatsi, cognition of general is the result of the joint activity of sensual and intellectual modes of knowledge acquisition. Sensual cognition gives a sensory image of the recognized object. The sensory image is located in the memory. Then, thanks to the activity of opinion, imagination and thought, the sensual image is completely dematerialized, freed from individual traits. As a result, one common mental image/entity is created, which is denoted by a common concept: "The light of the mind rejects all the darkness of the bodily and external senses, and the clear incorporeal is in the mind"13. In addition to the correspondence of thought and reality, Tatevatsi emphasizes the use of forms of thought, concepts, judgments and thoughts in accordance with the laws and rules of logic.

Since Tatevatsi distinguishes the natural cognition from the theory of faith, he deals with the problem of correlation between two truths: philosophical and theological. Although philosophy and theology differ from each other, they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> **St. Grigor Tatevatsi.** Commentary on the Gospel of John, with the diligence of Ghukas Abegha Zakaryan, S. Etchmiadzin, 2005, p. 31 (in Armenian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Summer volume of "Book of Sermons", p. 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> **Ibid**, p. 444.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See **Zakaryan S. A.**, Aristotle and Armenian philosophy of the XIV century. Yerevan, 2017, p. 54-82 (in Armenian).

<sup>2017,</sup> p. 54-82 (in Armenian).

13 St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Solution to "Introduction" of Porphyry, Constantinople, 1793, p. 332 (in Armenian).

are equal in one point: both seek to discover the truth ("the aim of both is to know the truth"). But that equality is overshadowed by the fundamental "inequalities" between them. Tatevatsi differentiates between the terms "true" and "truth", which relate to each other as part and whole or particular and general, man and humanity. Truth is the divine Word, which is truth in itself, and "has no falsehood or its opposite." Theology deals not with experimental, probable or relative knowledge, but with absolute and immutable propositions, non-relativistic truths that exclude falsehood and delusion. And human natural cognation has only relatively true results, because depending on the circumstances, they can turn into lies, like, for example, the judgments of philosophers. The study of earthly realities via senses and the mind reveals relatively true results, while theology reveals only divine, absolute truth.

Tatevatsi is convinced that there are not and cannot be two contradictory truths. There is one biblical Truth and different interpretations of it that can be true or false. Philosophical statements are true if they do not contradict, and false if they contradict the truths of Revelation and church doctrine. According to Tatevatsi, if the prophets and apostles "spoke all the truth", "as if the heavens and the earth were in existence and over the beginning and the end of the world", then philosophers "spoke many things that were true and knew many lies and falsehoods", therefore, "it is our duty to accept what the wise man said as true and to consider the word against the doctrine of the church as vain and a lie" 14.

As is known, in the European medieval philosophy of the XIII century<sup>15</sup>, the question of the eternity of the world is cited as an example of two truths: according to philosophers, the world is eternal, but according to theologians, the world was created. Tatevatsi also discusses the question of the eternity of the world in the context of truth, considering philosophical truth to be delusion. "And even if other sciences teach some of what I have said, especially the wickedness of the world, of which they have spoken many times, but not with the truth, but with a lie, saving that God created the world according to necessity, and it is from eternity, and many other lies from time to time..."<sup>16</sup>. Such a conclusion is based on the epistemological and value differences between logicians and theologians, as well as knowledge acquisition through natural/rational means and grace/faith. Doubt and delusion are inseparable from natural theory, and faith is "unmistakable and unconcerned with the truth." Natural inquiry derives truth from thought, and in the theory of faith thought follows truth. As a rule, the natural examination deviates from the truth, falls into schism, and the theory of faith follows the orthodox truth unswervingly. The natural knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through senses and mind, is unpaid, and knowledge through faith "accept my wages and glory". Finally, in natural means of knowl-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> **St. Grigor Tatevatsi**, Summer volume of "Book of Sermons", p.28. For example, Tatevatsi highly appreciates Aristotle as a philosopher, considers him to be "the one who speaks the truth among all philosophers", and at the same time notes that "however, he was often misled by the world, because he said it was eternal..." (**St. Grigor Tatevatsi**, Commentary on the Gospel of John, S. Etchmiadzin, 2005, p. 63).

See Dales, R. C., Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World, Leiden, Brill, 1990.
 St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Winter volume of "Book of Sermons", Constantinople, 1740, p.174 (in Armenian).

edge acquisition, the knower and the truth are different from each other, but in the theological knowledge, "truth does not change, as the light of faith for from this truth the light of faith has arisen in those who have believed in me and confirm the faithful in the truth with unchanging closeness and truth, on the other hand, as knowledge that unites the knower and the known. In the same way, faith unites truth and belief"<sup>17</sup>. The advantage of knowledge acquired through faith (theology) over other sciences is also manifested in the fact that scientists, unlike theorists of faith, do not die for the sake of science. "It is clear that those who had knowledge entered into it, for the sake of knowledge no one should die. What else do they have faith in? Many died for their faith... Then it is known to those who have understood that the theory of faith is better than knowledge and experience"<sup>18</sup>. Of course, in this matter, Tatevatsi is either ignorant or simply ignores the many facts about ancient philosophers and medieval theologians who were condemned, persecuted, imprisoned and even executed for their scientific views.

In fact, Tatevatsi does not consider any statement contradicting the truths of the Revelation to be true, therefore his point of view cannot correspond to the teaching of "two truths". H. Grigoryan is right when he claims that in the works of medieval Armenian thinkers, including Grigor Tatevatsi, the distinction between secular-philosophical and religious-theological knowledge was clearly demonstrated, but they did not express the opposition and peaceful coexistence of the truths of these two fields. In the works of medieval Armenian thinkers, the teaching of "dual truth" was not fully elaborated, because according to that teaching, secular-philosophical and theological knowledge about the same thing "may not only differ from each other, but also oppose each other, and may be contradictory truths"<sup>19</sup>. Tatevatsi formulated his point of view about theological and philosophical truths so clearly and unambiguously that we cannot define it as a teaching of "two truths" in the true sense. However, such a position does not prevent it from being noted that "the delimitation of the fields of theology and rational cognition opened perspectives for the development of science and to a significant extent freed it from the role of the servant of theology"<sup>20</sup>.

From the above we can draw the following conclusions:

a) Grigor Tatevatsi's epistemology has an optimistic nature: first, he does not doubt the real existence of the created world, and of particular entities, second, he is convinced that man has sufficient abilities and means to know the created world. The ultimate goal of cognition is knowledge of God. Knowledge is valued according to its orientation and how much it contributes to the salvation of the soul.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> **St. Grigor Tatevatsi,** Commentary on the Gospel of John, p. 38.

St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Commencary on the Gospel of John, D. 36.

18 St. Grigor Tatevatsi, Summer volume of "Book of Sermons", p. 72.

19 Grigoryan G. H., On the key issues of medieval Armenian philosophy, Yerevan, 1987, p. 79 (in Armenian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> **Arevshatyan S. S.,** Grigor Tatevatsi, in the book: "Prominent figures of Armenian culture" (V-XVIII centuries), Yerevan, 1976, p. 409 (in Armenian). By the way, in this regard, H. Gabrielyan's idea that "Tatevatsi used the doctrine of the duality of truth not only to overcome the obstacles that the churchmen put before the development of science, but also to make the truths of religion dependent on the truths of science" (**Gabrielyan G. G.** Key Problems of Philosophy in Medieval Armenian Thinkers. Yerevan, 1981, p. 79 (in Armenian) is unacceptable.

- b) Tatevatsi defends the basic theses of Aristotelian epistemology that human knowledge is acquired, because there are no innate ideas and moral principles in the soul.
- c) Tatevatsi's epistemology has a hierarchical and synthetic nature. He distinguishes three degrees of knowledge: sensual, rational and faiths, which differ in their tools, ways of knowing and capacities, and together ensure the integrity of human cognition,
- d) Tatevatsi distinguishes between natural and faith based forms of knowledge acquisition. These differ from each other for epistemological and moral reasons. Natural forms of knowledge acquisition include the sensual and intellectual degrees of cognition, which provide a mirror-like reflection of reality in the soul. Although the subject of knowledge is generally passive, general concepts (universals) in the mind are formed in part in virtue of the activity of the subject. Tatevatsi solves the problem of universals in the Aristotelian spirit, that is, from the position of moderate realism.
- e) Although Tatevatsi differentiates between natural and faith based forms of knowledge acquisition, separates philosophical and theological truths, he does not support the teaching of "two truths". Philosophical propositions are true if they are consistent with the truths of Revelation.

ՄԵՅՐԱՆ ՉԱՔԱՐՅԱՆ – Գրիգոր Տաթևացու իմացաբանական հայացքները – Սուրբ Գրիգոր Տաթևացու (1346-1409) իմացաբանական հայացքներն ունեն լավատեսական բնույթ. Նախ՝ նա չի կասկածում ձանաչելիի՝ արարված աշխարհի, առանձին իրերի իրական գոյությանը, երկրորդ՝ համոզված է, որ մարդն ունի բավարար իմացական միջոցներ՝ ձանաչելու գոլը։ Իմացության գերագույն նպատակը աստվածիմացությունն է, ուստի գիտելիքը արժևորվում է րստ այն բանի, թե ինչպիսի բնույթ ու միտվածություն ունի և որթանով է նպաստում հոգու փրկությանը։ Տաթևացին պաշտպանում է արիստոտելյան իմացաբանության հիմնարար այն դրույթը, որ մարդու իմացությունն ու գիտելիքը ստացական են, քանի որ նրա հոգու մեջ չկան բնածին գաղափարներ ու գիտելիքներ։ Նա առանձնացնում է իմացության երեք աստիձան՝ զգայական, բանական և հավատի, որոնք թեև տարբերվում են իրենց առարկաներով, իմացության գործիքներով, մեթոդներով ու կարողականություններով, սակայն միասին ապահովում են մարդկային իմացության ամբողջականությունը։ Թեև իմացության սուբյեկտն ընդհանուր առմամբ կրավորական է, այնուհանդերձ մտքի մեջ ընդհանուր հասկացությունները ձևավորվում են նաև սուբյեկտի ակտիվության շնորհիվ։ Ճշմարտությունը նա սահմանում է որպես մտքի և իրականության համապատասխանություն։ Տաթևացին թեև առանձնացնում է փիլիսոփալական ու աստվածաբանական ձշմարտությունները, սակայն չիպաշտպանում «երկու ձշմարտությունների» ուսմունքը։ Փիլիսոփայական դրուլթները ձշմարիտ են, եթե դրանք համահունչ են Հայտնության ձշմարտություններին։

**Բանալի բառեր** — Գրիգոր Տաթևացի, իմացաբանություն, իմացության միջոցներ, իմացության զգայական և բանական աստիճաններ, հավատ, գիտելիք, ճշմարտություն, «երկու ճշմարտությունների» ուսմունք, ունիվերսալիաներ

СЕЙРАН ЗАКАРЯН – Гносеологические взгляды ГригораТатеваци. – Гносеологические воззрения святого Григора Татеваци (1346-1409) носят оптимистический характер: во-первых, он не сомневается в реальном существовании познаваемого, сотворенного мира, отдельных вещей, во-вторых, он убежден, что человек обладает достаточными гносеологическими средствами для познания бытия. Высшей целью познания является познание Бога, следовательно, знание ценится по тому, какую природу и направленность оно имеет и насколько оно способствует спасению души. Татеваци отстаивает основное положение аристотелевской гносеологии о том, что человеческое знание приобретается, потому что в его душе нет врожденных идей и знаний. Татеваци выделяет три ступени познания: чувственную, рациональную и верующую, которые, хотя и различны по своим объектам, средствам познания, методам и способностям, в совокупности обеспечивают целостность человеческого познания. Хотя субъект познания в целом пассивен, общие понятия в сознании также формируются за счет деятельности субъекта. Он определяет истину как соответствие между мыслью и действительностью. Хотя Татеваци разделяет философскую и богословскую истины, он не поддерживает учение о «двух истинах». Философские утверждения являются истинными, если они согласуются с истинами Откровения.

**Ключевые слова:** Григор Татеваци, гносеология, средства познания, чувственный и рациональный уровни познания, вера, знание, истина, учение о «двух истинах», универсалия