

MIGRATORY CONSEQUENCES OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN ARMENIA

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Abstract

The socio-economic, political, and even cultural consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic are more than obvious. They affect the whole world, and are relevant in all spheres and levels of social and public life. Numerous anti-pandemic measures, mainly the closure of borders, restrictions on the movement of citizens, isolations hit the businesses and economies of different volumes and intensities. The spheres of tourism and services are special here and the ones where the organization of activities is based on the circulation of people and face-to-face interactions. The effective functioning of a number of social institutions was disrupted. Negative consequences were also relevant in the case of various migration flows. Having been actively involved in the migration for many years, the Armenian society is not immune to the effects of Covid-19. Based on the available literature, articles, reports, various publications and rich statistical data, the article presents in detail the impact of the pandemic on Armenian migration processes. The paper introduces the migration context of Armenia, the effects of the pandemic on the activities of a number of migrant and related groups. Conflicts of adapting to and overcoming the crisis, formal and informal tactics, approaches and practices are analyzed.

Keywords: *Covid-19 Pandemic, Migration, Labor migrants, Migrants families, Masculinity, Refugees, Vulnerability, Violence, Discrimination*

Introduction

Analysts, local and international organizations, research institutions and even ordinary citizens nowadays are somewhat optimistic about overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic (Murrey, 2022). There are opinions and grounded assertions that the world, which was suddenly struck by the pandemic and its negative, even tragic consequences, seems to be finally in the past (Charumilind et al., 2022). In the meantime, per a number of research works, analyses, reports and collected big data, it is clear that today in certain regions and countries there is not a single sphere of public life that hasn't been affected by a whole system of visible and invisible negative consequences of the pandemic

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(British Academy, 2021). The pandemic struck global and local economies (Chudik et al., 2020), slowed down the progress in at least the first period of its spread (Dobrov, Sisoiev, 2020). It temporarily froze certain sectors of the economy among which were service (Xiang et al., 2021), tourism (Lagos, Poulaki, Lambrou, 2021), hotel business (Aigbedo, 2021), wholesale and retail trade (OECD, 2022), a number of areas of industrial relations (Subasish, 2021), agriculture (Štreimikienė et al., 2021) etc.

It should be noted that the spread and impact of the crisis were not homogeneous. Some global market players, quickly adjusting to the new state, and some, simply taking advantage of favorable developments, rapidly recovered, with no many loses and even benefited (Mathurin, Campbell, Cotterill, 2022). In turn, the social consequences of the pandemic, borne particularly by vulnerable groups in society - workers in the wider service sector, the periphery of the economy and volatile segments (Matilla-Santander, Ahonen, Albin et al., 2021), with initially unstable status workers, low-income people, etc., emerged quickly (Han, Hart, 2021). The deepening of social polarization and the intensification of inequality with its prospective consequences were obvious symptoms of the pandemic (Etienne, 2022), (Dauderstädt, 2022).

The most important social institutions that guarantee the well-being of the public also were strike by the pandemic. The health systems of the countries faced the unprecedented challenges with the utmost effort (Romanelli, Azar, Sudat et al., 2021). In the short term and the long-term perspective, we should expect a temporary distortion of the educational system and the institutions as well as a manifestation of the negative consequences. We are talking about future inequality, impoverishment, and high probability of losing in unfavorable competition. Even the seemingly well-established process of democratic reproduction of political power in the states was endangered (Kennedy, Resnick, 2021). Under the legitimate shadow of the state of emergency and as Agamben's predicted concerned sprouts of autocratic rules (Agamben, 1998), populist attitudes and calls appeared (Hartwell, Devinney, 2021).

From the consequences aspect, the period of spread of the infection is especially unique. It was hard to imagine a more timeless trap for a world of modern, global, highly interconnected, intense mobility. Covid-19 affected global migration, which was prominent due to unprecedented volume, diversity, and distribution (International Organization for Migration, 2000). There is no any sphere in modern migratory and interrelated processes and developments that has not experienced the severe, unprecedented consequences of Covid-19 pandemic and appropriate restrictive steps and measures.

Firstly labor migrants in host societies, especially some of the most vulnerable groups, were hit.

In the host societies, due to historical, structural circumstances, they are mostly traditionally involved in the peripheral spheres of the economy, secondary parts of segmented labor market - mainly various types of services, then trade, which were disrupted due to the pandemic and restrictions.

The lives of migrants' relatives and family members waiting for support, money transfers in the homeland were also expectedly disrupted. The workers who left their jobs and had to return to their homeland here too were faced at a number of social

problems and contradictions, from which joblessness, adaptive issues, tensions and conflicts are the first.

Due to the the pandemic, thousands of refugees and persons of similar status, who were scattered in different host countries, found themselves in a vulnerable situation. Their life's organization was more than suitable to the spread of the disease and its tragic consequences. Armenia, having a huge migratory biography has experienced the full variety of migratory consequences of pandemic.

All migrant groups and their relatives indirectly involved in that activities, found themselves in a vulnerable situation and had undesirable socio-economic losses. The picture here is more negative because of the tragic losses and consequences of the 44-day Artsakh War.

Methodology

The main approach of gathering the necessary information and research materials for the presented work is the so-called desk research methodology.

The goal of the approach is the comprehensive study and secondary analysis of free information, analytical materials directly or indirectly related to the research problem (Largan, Morris, 2019). In order to identify and clarify the migratory effects of the pandemic, the authors have deeply studied and analyzed more than a rich library of scientific, academic works, international and local organizations reports and publications, materials from information platforms, journals and periodicals, statistical databases. Collected and analyzed materials, in turn, served as a basis for clear, logical further constructions and rich conclusions. The methodology provided an opportunity to present in detail the impact of the pandemic and its prospects for a number of fundamental and secondary manifestations of multifaceted migration activities.

World perspectives

Shortly after the first cases of SARS-CoV-2 were reported, even shortly after first deaths, anti-pandemic restrictions, a sharp decline and cessation of transnational movements with far-reaching consequences were surprisingly unpredictable.

The thousands Migrants of different categories, backgrounds and targets living far from home were the first who felt the problems in their skin. Thus, by the spring of 2020, shortly after the spread of the infection, more than 3 million migrants were locked down in their host countries, the vast majority of them in the Middle East, North Africa and then the Asia-Pacific region (Migration Data Portal 1, 2022). Compared to 2019, in the first half of 2020, the number of migrants with the right to enter and reside in countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation (OECD) decreased by over 46% (Migration Data Portal 1, 2021). To prevent the spread of the pandemic, especially in the early stages, the borders of many countries were closed for security purposes (Onyeaka et al., 2021). Transportation was drastically reduced, which impacted one of the most important players in the modern global economy that is labor migration. Many host countries, particularly developed countries, through the downfall in separate economic sectors showed the crucial importance of inbound labor (Migration Data Portal 1, 2021).

The service sector was targeted with its separate subdivisions that traditionally included migrants (International Labor Organization, 2021), wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing and industry sectors. There was an impact on healthcare as well. In many developed countries where most of the vast majority of the staff are qualified labor migrants, they gained unprecedented importance amid the pandemic (OECD 2020).

The pandemic forced thousands of migrants to return home (Mencutek, 2022). Crisis-driven repatriation creates additional social, and most importantly, economic burdens, dangerous tensions for the local economies and social-health systems that are already in dire straits.

The majority of labor migrants in the world are men (Migration Data Portal 2, 2021). Through migration, they continuously maintain one of the main guarantees of traditional masculinity, their own masculinity, the role of the guarantee of the family well-being. After their return, especially temporary labor migrants, end up in a large army of local unemployed people for at least until their next leave (Pedro, 2014). The man of the house lives with his family on savings of the family members.

The impossibility of outgoing work along with the logical prolongation of unemployment, causes not only the deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the family, the society, but also crisis of the distortion of the man's masculine identity (Pleck, 1981). Endangered, lost masculinity is reconstructed in other equal conditions with additional emphasis on the characteristics of a traditional, male, hegemonic, "macho" masculinity and the expression of it in everyday life. Manifestations of this are not unique, ranging from addictions to drunkenness, drug addiction, to risky behavior, aggression, violence against women, family members, and others (Reidy et al., 2014). Workers, especially long-term, such as permanent migrants, are less adaptable after their return. They are excluded from effective social networks, promising social capital, opportunities to invest in it, carrying less effective cultural and behavioral standards, which is a key precondition for social alienation. It is especially risky for the countries that have received the largest number of repatriates due to the pandemic, in which India is the leader, where 4.5 million people returned in 2020. Next is Ukraine, which in April 2020 received more than 2 million compatriots (Migration Data Portal 2, 2022). Meanwhile, not less challenging is the issue in the host countries, particularly for labor migrants. Included mainly in vulnerable spheres of industry, they lose their income, and, as a result, they lose their opportunity for a productive and a safe stay. Issues arise with the right of residence, legal norms, and regulations. Irregularly trapped migrants are also vulnerable to Covid-19 infection and the uncontrolled spread of the disease (Shah, Alkazi, 2022).

Thus, migrant workers live in large groups in small spaces, such as dormitories or apartments, which is an additional incentive for getting infected, increasing the death risks (Burton-Jeangros, Duvoisin, Lachat et al, 2020). Although we have seen the easing of restrictions on migrants and the equalization of the rights for aid with the locals, especially in Western countries, irregular migrants have unfortunately been more or less excluded from social services, especially health care. The cultural differences of migrants from the locals, the lack of communication, language skills, lack of social capital, the risk of having problems with the law, the relevant authorities, etc. play a big role in this matter (Peters, 2003). Thus, the multidimensional vulnerability of trapped

migrants increases. The vulnerable irregular migrant is one of the first victims of fundamental, direct or indirect human rights violations, discrimination, physical, mental and economic violence, especially in times of crisis (Boucher, 2019). Covid-19 is not a unique case. Host communities seek out and create culprits for the spread of the disease, the scapegoats. No less logical seem that is similar roles are foreigners - migrants, this time those with Asian physical characteristics (Bhanot, Singh, Verma, Sharad, 2021). The question is how much the situation was aggravated by US President D. Trump who called Covid – 19 a "Chinese disease" (Reja, 2021). Along with irregular migrants, large numbers of IDPs and refugees who have been relocated to different parts of the world over the past decade became particularly vulnerable. Many people live in migratory camps with poor sanitation, in densely populated shelters, etc., which is the "perfect" environment for the spread of disease, the complication, and high odds of death.

This migration crisis is not limited to the host countries. It has a clear negative effect on the economies, social structures, individuals, groups and members of the delivering countries. As far back as 2020, the World Bank forecasted a 14% decline in migration remittances in the near future (The World Bank, 2020).

In turn, remittances to low- and middle-income countries declined by \$ 508 billion by 2020 and \$ 407 billion by 2021. The reasons for the decline were the downfall of the economy as a whole, especially individual sectors, the slowdown in economic growth, unemployment, deflation of oil and oil products, inefficient fluctuations in exchange rates. Under other equal circumstances, countries with a significant share of remittances in GDP are more vulnerable. For example, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the most vulnerable among the former Soviet Union countries, where remittances in 2019 amounted to 28% and 27.2% of local GDP, respectively. Moldova is the leader in Eastern Europe with 16% (The World Bank 1, 2022). The sharpest decline in remittances were expected in Europe and Central Asia (16% and 8% respectively), East Asia and Pacific (11% and 4% respectively), Middle East and North Africa (8%) (ibid :). Later it became clear that the drop in remittances was less than expected. According to the same World Bank, remittances from low- and middle-income countries fell by only 1.6% in 2020 compared to 2019, reaching only \$ 540 billion (The World Bank 2, 2022). The decline was restrained. This was facilitated by effective fiscal measures in the host countries, which benefited large groups of migrants, the large-scale transition from informal, traditional to electronic money transfer systems, and the balancing of oil and oil product prices. It should be noted that the actual volume of migrant remittances is higher than in official reports, where it is almost impossible to assess the impact of Covid-19.

Despite the positive outcome, the decline of remittances in delivering countries carries a variety of negative consequences. Consumption of goods and services is decreasing, which has a significant potential to lead in poverty in the future. Expenses related to health, education are being delayed or neutralized as well as possible investments in effective social relations, structures, etc.

Armenia perspectives

Of course, Armenia is in no way immune to the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. It is the bearer and witness of the slowdown of economic growth, unemployment,

especially in certain production and economic spheres, in the increase of social inequality, etc. The consequences of the pandemic on migration also have a special position in this list.

Due to various social, economic and political processes from the end of the 20th century up to date, Armenia has a position in the modern global and especially regional movements. The Karabakh conflict and the Armenian massacre in Azerbaijan were the cause of an unprecedented influx of refugees and displaced people in the modern history of Armenia (Gevorgyan et al., 2009). In addition, the 1988 earthquake caused a large internal displacement of so-called environmental migrants. Among the migratory flows is the socio-economic outflow due to the collapse of the Soviet economy, deindustrialization, and de-modernizations. More than one million people left Armenia in the early 1990s, most of whom never returned (International Organization for Migration, 2002).

Worth mentioning is the seasonal or regular labor migration to Russia and other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, established about at the same period, and which continues to this day with varying intensity. These flows allow us to talk about Armenia as a delivering country. The 2000s are not particularly significant in terms of migration transformations. The migration biography of Armenia includes a large influx of Syrian Armenians, and then, as a result of the 44-day war, the people displaced from Artsakh.

Covid-19 and, its negative developments in the long run affect a number of groups involved in migration processes. These are:

- Labor migrants and their family members and relatives in Armenia.
- Migrants who have temporarily returned to Armenia due to the border closing and isolation, their family members.
- De facto Armenian refugees who moved to Armenia due to the civil war in Syria.
- Labor migrants relocated to Armenia from India in different periods.
- Foreign students at Armenian universities (mainly Yerevan State Medical University), majority are also Indians.

Outgoing labor migration along with its all consequences is one of the most important social phenomenon in the history of Armenia in the recent decades. Originated in the 1970s and 1980s of the 20th centuries, it was manifested in the 1990s with unprecedented momentum, guaranteeing the livelihood and well-being of a significant population of Armenia, reducing the social tension of the post-Soviet downfall, and its large-scale destructive consequences. Of course, due to many factors, in-depth processes, labor migration has to some extent exhausted its former potential. However, currently labor emigration still exists - it is a key precondition for the existence of families, groups of the population in various regions of Armenia. Thus, according to the CRRC-Armenia Research Center, in 2019, more than 53% of the population of Armenia expressed a will to go abroad temporarily (CRRC Caucasus Barometer-2019 1, 2020). It refers to labor migration. By the way, men are a majority here - 57% (CRRC Caucasus Barometer-2019 2, 2020). Temporary travel is especially appealing for the 18-35 age group. The absolute majority of them, 70%, intend to leave Armenia. The next middle-aged people are 36-55, most of whom - 53% - have also expressed a desire for temporary leave (CRRC Caucasus Barometer-2019 3, 2020). It is noteworthy that the vast majority of migrants

leaving Armenia, 79%, mention as a major reason for such decision a work-related problem: lack of work, insufficient salary, poor working conditions or simply a desire to earn more money. The main destination of temporary labor migration has always been Russia, where the majority of migrants (67.5%) visited during their last traveling (Pedro, 2014: 69).


The Covid-19 pandemic also had its own negative effects in Russia. The Russian economy shrank by 3.1% in 2020. The decline in the country's GDP was due to a 5% drop in general consumer demand. The pandemic had a negative impact on more than 6 million Russian companies. More than a third of enterprises lost more than 1.65 trillion rubles in the spring of 2020. In the same year, the total income of Russian businesses amounted to 1.4 trillion rubles, which was 67% less than the year before. First and foremost, as everywhere else, small, and medium-sized enterprises were affected. 1.16 million of such organizations were closed. The highest economic losses were reported in the spheres of hotel business, tourism, travel, restaurants, public catering - 24.1% decline, in the sphere of non-essential goods wholesale, public transport, cargo transportation - 10.3% decline, in industry - 3.9% decline¹.

By the end of 2019, there were 210,460 officially registered labor migrants from the Republic of Armenia (Ghazaryan, 2020), the absolute majority of whom, 44.1%, were engaged in various construction and renovation while 27.2% in the service sector (transport) 12.1% in communication, mainly in private enterprises and trade sectors (Gomtsyan, 2014: 223-225). All the above mentioned had the largest losses in this crisis.

Most of the regular, seasonal labor migrants traditionally go to Russia every spring and return at by end of the year. Due to the pandemic, scheduled flights in 2020 were suspended or postponed. Migrants temporarily returned to the homeland usually are unemployed, have no alternative job, and are waiting for the next lucrative trip. Prolonged idleness, along with the consumption of saved or brought funds carries risks of a number of negative consequences.

As mentioned above, in Armenia, as well, men (most of labor migrant in Armenia are traditionally men) lose their significant male role as home breadwinner, provider of goods, and money which is also due to migration (Arowolo, 2002). Attempts of asymmetric recovery can, in turn, exacerbate the effects of economic losses, lead to tension, hostility, various addictions, and domestic violence. The previous experience of migration, regardless of transnational connections and communications, here too distances the migrant from the locals, weakens his community ties, and reduces the local social capital, the participation level. This makes his return complicated making his efficient adaptation and reintegration impossible (Reidy et al., 2014). Labor migrants locked down in the host societies lose their jobs, their local income decreases. Home remittances to families are also being reduced. Of course, recently, the role of migration remittances for the Armenian economy has already diminished.

¹ Viral Totalizer: Who lost and who won from the COVID-19 pandemic. lenta.ru, 2021 (In Russian). URL: <https://lenta.ru/articles/2021/04/26/cov/>

Figure1. Share of Migration Remittances in Armenia's GDP (% of total)²

Migrant remittances comprised the largest share of Armenia's GDP in 2004 - 22.0%, and in 2013 - 19.7%. In 2020, migrant remittances comprised the 10.5% of the country's GDP (Trading Economics, 2021). However, this financial flow still plays a role for certain groups of the Armenian population. The undesirable fluctuations were distinct during the pandemic. In the first quarter of 2020, remittances reached \$ 479.8 million, which is 3% more than for the same period last year. Meanwhile, in the second quarter, remittances dropped significantly by 50.8%. From the third quarter, there was a gradual increase in remittances and by the end of the year this financial inflow was almost equal to the previous year. The decline in remittances disrupts the household's expense chains. Interconnected areas of the consumer market fail. Luckily, in 2021 remittances significantly exceeded even the entire inflows of 2019, reaching more than 1.5 billion.

Just like in different corners around the world, in Armenia as well refugees are vulnerable within the frames of the crisis of the pandemic. Particularly, we are talking about more than 22 thousand ethnic Armenians evacuated from Syria (Open Society Foundations Armenia, 2014). Unlike the refugees from Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and 1990s, most of the refugees from Syria were able to transfer their own funds and other capital to Armenia, which guaranteed a more or less decent, sufficient level of welfare for Syrian Armenians. Unfortunately, in the aftermath, the financial resources of these families were spent mainly on apartment rent. The pandemic, in turn, impacts those areas in which Syrian Armenians are mainly engaged. We are talking about service, leisure, tourism, hotel business, as well as catering, restaurants, and cafes.

The pandemic in Armenia is accompanied by deep economic, social and other traumatic outcomes of the 44-day war. Thousands of de facto refugees are being relocated to different parts of Armenia in a short period. According to the RA Migration Service - about 91,000 people are quickly settled in vacant rest houses, dormitories, private apartments, as well as rent apartments on their own. After the war, most of them return to their homeland, Artsakh. About 25,000 residents of Hadrut, Shushi and other settlements that have gone under the control of Azerbaijan remain in Armenia. In many cases, those displaced from Artsakh lived in large groups under limited housing

² Trading Economics (2021). Armenia Remittances, URL: <https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/remittances>

conditions, which raised the risk of contracting Covid-19. Both the Syrian Armenians and the people of Artsakh, not having enough social capital in Armenia, local informal networks, are expelled from extensive public relations. Even the chances of seeking medical help, if necessary, were questioned. The reason is that in the Armenian reality Covid-19 treatment was also organized informally. Nurses and doctors conducted paid visits to patients. The whole communication and process was being done through local social networks of acquaintances/ friends.

Of course, the Armenian government and the international organizations provided urgent humanitarian, social, financial aid to the displaced. In May 2021, the European Union provides 10 million euros aid to the war victims. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development provides about \$ 4 million. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provides \$ 350,000 to assist people relocated to the rural areas of the Republic of Armenia in organizing efficient agricultural activities (Petrosyan, 2021).

On the other hand, if we do not count those displaced from Artsakh and ethnic Armenians in-migrated from Syria, Armenia is not considered as a country of immigration. Nevertheless, we have recently witnessed a unique influx of migration, non-specific to Armenia. Many Indian citizens immigrate to find jobs in Armenia. This is most likely due to the simplification of visa requirements for Indian citizens in 2017. In 2015-2019, more than 4,000 Indians obtain Armenian residency right. Meanwhile, in the first three quarters of 2019, the number of people with that status reaches nine thousand (Avetisyan, 2019). Indians set up their own small enterprises in Armenia, open Indian cuisine restaurants, fast food outlets, Indian retail stores, and work in the service sector, mainly in their own compatriots' enterprises. They occupy the lower strata of the labor market (Shishmany, 2019). Indian labor migrants appear in a vulnerable position. Most speak only Hindi or Indian English, which complicates their further involvement in the local relations and various spheres of the society. In best-case scenario, they are limited to their own ethnic community.

The Armenian society is mono-ethnic (The Government of the Republic of Armenia, 2022). Unfortunately, not having an effective experience of hosting and coexisting with other nationalities, the locals show xenophobia towards the newcomers, which is manifested by prejudices, discriminatory ideologies, views, stereotypes, and attitudes that are specific to hosting societies (Zhang, Gereke, Baldassarri, 2022). In the meantime, Armenia has been accepting Indian students for decades, who mainly study at the Yerevan State Medical University.

As a result of the forced closure of the border in March 2020, to prevent the spread of the pandemic, Indians stayed in Armenia. This made their future vulnerable. Many of the labor migrants worked for a daily wage, did not have enough savings or opportunities for further efficient investment. They were mainly engaged in the catering and service sectors, to which the crisis had the most severe negative impact: reduced income and less opportunities for a prosperous life. Occupying the so-called peripheral segments of the labor market, this group lives in relatively large groups to optimize costs. This increases the likelihood of spreading the infection and the severe course of the disease. Indian students live in university dormitories, deprived of the opportunity to be isolated and live separately in case of illness. Here, more than in case of Syrian Armenians or people

displaced from Artsakh, the citizens of India are not included in effective local social networks, are far from having access to the necessary public goods, especially the informal health networks mentioned above. Of course, the Indian community in Armenia and especially in Yerevan organizes self-help during the pandemic, collecting money and providing the necessary medical aid, etc.

State anti - crisis measures

Like other countries of the world, the Republic of Armenia is taking a number of targeted measures to mitigate the negative socio-economic consequences of the pandemic to reduce the burden on the healthcare system, and to establish programs aimed at supporting certain groups. A state of emergency was declared on March 16, 2020 by Government Decision No. 298-N. At the beginning of the pandemic, the Government of the Republic of Armenia developed 19 assistance packages, some of which also concerned labor migrants in the Republic of Armenia (The Government of Republic of Armenia 1, 2020). By the decision N 357-L of the Government of the Republic of Armenia of March 26, 2020, the third measure to neutralize the economic consequences of the coronavirus was defined, which aimed to support small and medium enterprises engaged in processing industry, accommodation, catering, transportation, storage, tourism, in the spheres of service, healthcare, in which, among others, Syrian-Armenian, Indian-foreign labor migrants worked and carried out profitable activities (The Government of Republic of Armenia 2, 2020). Later, the 12th Coronavirus Economic Impact Neutralization Program launched focusing on individuals. The goal was to support people facing social issues, those for whom gas and electricity supply costs as of February 2020 were below the defined threshold (The Government of Republic of Armenia 3, 2020). Among others, Syrian Armenians (non-foreign labor migrants) were included in the 8th program aimed at neutralizing the economic effects of the coronavirus. Program beneficiaries were employees of the private sector of the Armenian economy, entrepreneurs engaged from March 13 to 2020 in the following areas: hotel, guest services, catering services, tourism services, beauty salons and hairdressing services, trade and spheres that did not involve the sale of food, medicine, alcohol, tobacco (The Government of Republic of Armenia 4, 2020). Some initiatives did not refer to labor migrants, foreign students, but only those with permanent residency in Armenia (International Organization for Migration, 2020).

Discussions and Conclusions.

The Covid-19 pandemic itself seems to be receding. Many countries report a decline of death toll. However, it is too early to talk about the complete elimination of the many deep, long-term negative, undesirable consequences of the pandemic. Covid-19 will surely have its undeniable social, economic, cultural affects in various spheres of the future of societies, from the seemingly ordinary person to the extensive political governance, relations, development of states. Industrial and production relations following their outcomes and products were shaken. Unemployment, impoverishment, and deepening inequality once again reminded their undeniable existence. At best case

scenario, the employee's involvement in the employment relations changed. Working from home, remotely fulfilling professional responsibilities questions the need of faraway multi-story institutions and the necessity to regularly go there. The tried and tested, traditional approaches of school education and mainly higher education, were reviewed. The directive of modernizing education, the issues of maintaining and increasing the minimum quality and the issue of accessibility of education are subject of ongoing debates and amid the challenges of pandemic and the global isolation. The health systems of all the countries in crisis were severely tested. State healthcare was in crisis and it focused efforts in overcoming the disease, by at least temporarily leaving aside the achievements so-called neoliberal medicine strived under conditions that are more peaceful. The processes of democratic reproduction of political power, which in fact had proved their viability and efficiency, were distorted. The welfare of all contradicted to the freedom of the individuals. This crisis was also marked by the heterogeneity of its impact. Particularly vulnerable situations groups appeared whose real, potential losses were unpredictable.

The work complements the multifaceted picture of the global pandemic and its undesirable, negative migration effects, which has already been addressed by a whole army of researchers and authors. Hence, it is shown that clearly all the groups and categories directly or indirectly involved in various migration flows are one of the first victims of the crisis and its outcomes. The situation of migrants, their daily life and social relations in the hosting societies are further complicated due to the lack or gap of effective status. In delivering societies, labor migrants often are in lack adequate alternatives to migration. Labor migrants' families and entire communities, especially in rural areas, are strongly dependent on remittances, which record undesirable fluctuations during economic crises. As a rule, the social groups waiting for them in different parts of the world are not wealthy, they are in a critical situation. Under these terms, even a slight decline in income threatens long-term impoverishment, an inevitable poverty trap.

Armenia and the Armenian society are not by no means unique in this respect. Having an extensive migratory biography Armenian migrant, the citizen of Armenia who depends on migration feels almost all the negative consequences of the distortion of the established circulation due to the pandemic. Migrant workers, members of their families living permanently in Armenia were suffered, family economies management, consumer behavior relevant chains transformed. In this respect, de facto Armenian refugees from Syria and especially those displaced from their homeland as a result of the Second Artsakh War have been the victims of the pandemic. The article newly reviewed the migratory status of the Armenian society. Labor migrants and students mainly from India are investigated in the context of the effects of the pandemic. The authors present a number of state anti-crisis measures, the beneficiaries of which are residents involved in migration and related activities.

Currently, alarmist predictions about future, more terrifying, deadly pandemics are being broadcasted. Humankind has been convinced that crises are multifaceted. The pandemic and its insurmountable challenges did not prevent the simultaneous processes of political crises and bloody wars. Regional and global crises affecting humanity are manifested, among other things, through the migration crisis. In turn, it deepens, complicates the already difficult situation of the receiving and delivering countries. In

addition, it is necessary to mention that the Armenian society and many social and other processes taking place here unfortunately are not in the focus of the world's leading sociology. While the local processes and developments, both theoretically and empirically, are uniquely interesting, they definitely deserve additional attention. The work presented here in this regard sheds additional light on local issues, presents Armenian society to the larger professional community.

Therefore, both Armenian and international migratory processes and increasing complexity of migrants in critical situations require no less serious, balanced organizational-managerial strategic approaches than those that societies take for health, nature protection and multidimensional security.

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ԱՐԱՍ ՎԱՐՏԻՎՅԱՆ, ՍՈՎՍԵՍ ԴԵՄԻՐՃՅԱՆ - Covid-19 համավարակի միգրացիոն հետևանքները Հայաստանում - Աշխարհում տարածված Covid-19 համավարակի սոցիալ-տնտեսական, քաղաքական, անգամ մշակութային հետևանքները ակներև են հասարակական կյանքի բոլոր ոլորտներում և մակարդակներում: Բազմաթիվ հակահամավարակային միջոցառումներ՝ պետական սահմանների փակում, քաղաքացիների շարժի սահմանափակումներ և մեկուսացում, մեծ վնաս հասցրեցին տնտեսավարողների գործունեությանը: Այստեղ առանձնահատուկ են տուրիզմի, սպասարկման և շատ այլ ոլորտներ, որտեղ գործունեության կազմակերպումը հիմնված է մարդկանց շրջագայության, շփումների վրա: Խաթարվեց սոցիալական մի շարք ինստիտուտների գործառնությունը: Համավարակի հետևանքները զգալի են նաև միգրացիոն տարատեսակ հոսքերի պարագայում: Հայաստանյան հասարակությունը, տասնամյակներ շարունակ ակտիվորեն ներառված լինելով միգրացիոն շրջապտոյտում, նույնպես անմասն չմնաց այդ գործընթացից: Տնտեսական ու վիճակագրական ծավալուն տվյալների հիման վրա հողվածում մանրամասն ներկայացվում է համավարակի ազդեցությունը հայկական միգրացիոն գործընթացների վրա: Ընթերցողին են առաջարկվում Հայաստանի միգրացիոն համապատկերը, համավարակի հետևանքները մի շարք միգրանտական և հարակից խմբերի կենսագործունեության վրա: Վերլուծվում են ճգնաժամային իրավիճակին հարմարվելու և այն հաղթահարելու նպատակով կիրառված պաշտոնական և ոչ պաշտոնական մոտեցումներն ու պրակտիկաները, այդ հարցում առաջացած հակասությունները:

Բանալի բառեր՝ Covid-19, համավարակ, միգրացիա, աշխատանքային միգրանտներ, միգրանտական ընտանիքներ, արականություն, փախստականներ, խոցելիություն, բռնություն, խտրականություն

ԱՐԱՄ ՎԱՐՏԻԿՅԱՆ, ՄՈՎՍԵՍ ԴԵՄԻՐՉՅԱՆ - *Миграционные последствия пандемии Covid-19 в Армении.* - Социально-экономические, политические, демографические, культурные и другие последствия охватившей весь мир пандемии Covid-19, более чем актуальны в качестве объектов изучения, в том числе в социологии. Многочисленные противоэпидемические меры, включая закрытие государственных границ, ограничение передвижения граждан, изоляция, нанесли удар по экономике и бизнесу на различных уровнях, включая сферу туризма и услуг, где организация деятельности основана на циркуляции масс и непосредственном их общении. Было нарушено функционирование ряда социальных институтов. Последствия пандемии актуальны и в случае различных миграционных потоков. Армянское общество, десятилетиями активно вовлеченное в миграционные передвижения, также ощутило на себе последствия Covid-19. На основе научной литературы и статистических данных в статье подробно представлено влияние пандемии на армянские миграционные процессы. Читатель знакомится с влиянием пандемии на деятельность различных миграционных и связанных с ними социальных групп. В статье анализируются формальные и неформальные подходы и практики адаптации к связанному с пандемией кризису, попытки его преодоления, связанные с этим конфликты и последствия.

Ключевые слова: Covid-19, пандемия, миграция, трудовые мигранты, семьи мигрантов, маскулинность, беженцы, уязвимость, насилие, дискриминация

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