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**War and Peace as “Text”
(about problems related to reading)¹**

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In the article, war and peace are analyzed from a new research point of view. They are considered as a multi-layered text that simply does not reflect reality, but, depending on the specifics of reading and perception creates it to a certain extent. This text is often read in the context of the duality of “anti-hero and hero, evil and good”, which is due to anthropological and moral and political factors. Moreover, when reading is accompanied by the reader’s “desired deviations of vision”, the preconditions for the transformation of reality or the formation of a new reality appear.

Conditionally separating the meta- and empirical levels of the text called war, it is shown that they affect the reader in different ways. At the meta-level, war is sometimes understood as an absolute evil that should be unconditionally avoided, and peace as a desirable ideal, an absolute good, to which one should unconditionally strive. Approaches that, in the context of specific geopolitical realities, often lead to catastrophic consequences. Meanwhile, at the empirical level of this text, the war is most often read as a chain of events, a chronicle of hostilities, discourses about which can force the reader to obey various regulations of the text.

Պատերազմը և խաղաղությունը որպես «տեքստ» (ընթերցման խնդիրների շուրջ)

Արմեն Սարգսյան

*Վ. Բրյուսովի անվան պետական համալսարան,
Երևանի պետական համալսարանի դոցենտ, փ. գ. թ.*

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Հիմնաբառեր՝ տեքստ, ընթերցանություն, պատերազմ, խաղաղություն, խաղաղասիրություն, ռազմականացում, խոսույթ, իրականություն, մետամակարդակ:

Հոդվածում պատերազմն ու խաղաղությունը վերլուծության են ենթարկվում նոր տեսանկյունից: Դրանք դիտարկվում են որպես բազմաշերտ տեքստ, որը ոչ միայն արտացոլում է իրականությունը, այլ, կախված ընթերցանության և ընկալելու առանձնահատկություններից, որոշակի չափով ստեղծում այն: Այս տեքստը հաճախ ընթերցվում է «հակահերոս և հերոս, չար և բարի» երկակիության համատեքստում, ինչը պայմանավորված է ինչպես մարդաբանական, այնպես էլ բարոյական ու քաղաքական գործոններով: Ավելին, երբ ընթերցանությունն ուղեկցվում է ընթերցողի «տեսողության համար ցանկալի շեղումներով», ի հայտ են գալիս իրականության վերափոխման կամ նոր իրականության ձևավորման նախադրյալները:

Պայմանականորեն առանձնացնելով պատերազմ կոչվող տեքստի մետա և էմպիրիկ մակարդակները՝ ցույց է տրվում այն, որ դրանք տարբեր կերպ են ազդում ընթերցողի վրա: Մետա մակարդակում պատերազմը երբեմն ընկալվում է որպես բացարձակ չարիք, որից պետք է անվերապահորեն խուսափել, իսկ խաղաղությունը՝ որպես ցանկալի իդեալ, բացարձակ բարիք, որին պետք է անվերապահորեն ձգտել: Մոտեցումներ, որոնք կոնկրետ աշխարհաքաղաքական իրողությունների համատեքստում հաճախ հանգեցնում են աղետալի հետևանքների: Մինչդեռ այս տեքստի էմպիրիկ մակարդակում պատերազմն ամենից հաճախ ընթերցվում է որպես իրադարձությունների շղթա, ռազմական գործողությունների տարեգրություն, որի մասին խոսակցությունները կարող են ստիպել ընթերցողին ենթարկվել տեքստի տարբեր կարգավորումներին:

Война и мир как «текст» (о проблемах чтения)

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Ключевые слова: текст, чтение, война, мир, пацифизм, милитаризм, дискурс, реальность, метауровень.

В статье война и мир анализируются с новой исследовательской точки зрения. Они рассматриваются как многослойный текст, который не просто отражает действительность, но, в зависимости от специфики чтения и понимания, в определенной степени ее создает. Этот текст часто читается в контексте двойственности «антигерой и герой, зло и добро», что обусловлено как антропологическими, так и моральными и политическими факторами. Более того, когда чтение сопровождается «желаемыми отклонениями зрения» читателя, появляются предпосылки для преобразования действительности или формирования новой действительности.

Условно разделив мета- и эмпирический уровни текста под названием война, показано, что они по-разному воздействуют на читателя. На метауровне война иногда понимается как абсолютное зло, чего следует безоговорочно избегать, а мир — как желаемый идеал, абсолютное благо, к чему следует безоговорочно стремиться. Подходы, которые в контексте конкретных геополитических реалий нередко приводят к катастрофическим последствиям. Между тем на эмпирическом уровне этого текста война чаще всего читается как цепь событий, хроника военных действий, дискурсы о которых могут заставить читателя подчиняться различным регуляциям текста.

* * *

*War is an immanent punishment
and immanent atonement.*

N. Berdyaev

Introduction

The research interests in war and peace, as well as discourses about them, should be considered not only current, but also not accidental in the modern world. The point is that future wars are often considered as “embryonic” in the context of relevant quasi-scientific, anti-scientific and possibly scientific discourses, and when they are “born” they sometimes simultaneously contribute to the development and dissemination of such discourses. A reality that makes anti-war efforts and talks more on the agenda in modern world, which is most of all, dominated by the trend of pacifism, rather than real peace initiatives. Moreover, in the modern world, although peace, inter-ethnic cooperation and tolerance are highly valued, wars continue their destructive existence. And this once again proves the relevance of the research on war and peace. Although the mentioned phenomena have been the subject of semantic historical, military, political, anthropological, psychological and other studies, still today there is no mutually acceptable approach regarding their nature and ontological foundations. Each science interprets or analyzes war and peace from its own perspective, but the problem is that these analyzes are often artificially adapted to serve quite various agendas. When a thinker writes about the ontological foundations of war as an insurmountable evil, many try to legitimize their warlike and xenophobic ambitions. When another thinker talks about the realism of eternal peace and the establishment of a rational society, many start to practice a pacifism that quickly “kneels down” from the brutalities of the impending war.

Judging by the title of this article, one can guess that it does not have a goal to give an exhaustive answer to the question of what war or peace is. Such initiatives are numerous, regardless of the extent to which they have achieved the goal. The article has a goal to retrieve the features of war and peace as a certain “text”, as well as to show the possible connections between it and the transformation of reality or the creation of a new reality. In order to achieve that goal, the article analyzes the main conceptual approaches to war and peace, their ontological foundations, using historical-comparative, logical and other methods. The first ones are considered as a multi-layered “text”, depending on the appropriate understanding, peoples create the reality in which they find themselves. That is, the article outlines the connections between the relevant “text” and reality, arguing that reality is sometimes derived from the relevant “text”, rather than that the text always derives from or reflects reality.

War and peace: from “text” to reality

In the modern world, as already mentioned, anti-war or pacifist initiatives have become more important on the agenda. However, the problem is that these, sometimes the “noisy” manifestations of peace-loving propaganda, do not ensure the desired peace and often transform into an adventure leading to self-destruction, the “umbilical cord” feeding the embryo of a new war. And this is primarily because the sanctified peace is understood as an overarching goal beyond spatio-temporal realities, in the context of which socio-cultural, military-political, geopolitical and other realities are ignored. The realities that make the ultimate peace sometimes not only problematic, but also somewhat unrealistic. It is no coincidence that the Nobel Prize winner in mathematics (2005) R. Aumann notes: “Peacefulness (now pacifism – A.S.) leads to war, because the state, where it becomes an ideology, begins to act as an aggressor, according to the rules of the game” (Aumann, 2011). The point is that if the defending party is overwhelmed by pacifism and does not provide the necessary resistance, and the aggressor is sure in the effectiveness of the applied methods, then the latter continues to follow them and makes new demands. Meanwhile, when he faces the decisive resistance, he has nothing to do but to revise his approach (Aumann, 2011).

No nation or state is immune from the disasters of war, which are made more likely by their attitudes towards war and peace and their activities. Wars become “legitimate” in people’s lives when they understand the war-peace notion from the positions of absolute duality or unique “genetic kinship”. If war is understood as the absolute opposite of peace, as a “peace-killing” evil, then peoples guided by the spirit of approaches that declare peace as the ultimate goal can deprive themselves of the opportunity to guarantee peace by being ready for war. In other words, the consistent propaganda of total demilitarization sometimes becomes a peculiar precondition for the enemy’s military invasion, making it easier to achieve his goals. The dogmatic longing for unconditional peace is usually accompanied by the specter of possible war, which can assert its destructive presence at an opportune moment. In this sense, it is difficult to accept the American thinker J. Dewey’s plea that the only way to stop wars is to praise peace. The point is that relatively peaceful periods in the course of history have been made possible not only, and perhaps not so much, by the praise of peace as by coercion. That praise, unfortunately, has often contributed to the “pacification” of the self-defensive instinct of the potential victim, rather than to the creation of a player or a peacemaker from an aggressive state pursuing its own political goals. In this sense, it is no coincidence that many thinkers who have shaped pacifist ideas, while condemning wars and the evils arising from them, still allocated a place in their ideological “house” of pacifism to the concept of “fair wars”, under which they do not understand only self-defense wars. Moreover, at the level of the theory of “fair wars”, the existence of moral dilemmas and conceptual contradictions is often documented (Ivanov, 2016, 55-58).

And on the contrary, when nations exaggerate the importance of “bridges” leading from war to peace, reject all pacifist discourses that do not tolerate war, perpetuating the “peaceful function” of war, they willingly or unwillingly contribute to such militarization of society, in the context of which neighborliness, international cooperation and sustainable development prospects are overshadowed. Realities that become fertile ground for the formation or development of discourses in the context of which nations are forced to redefine their relations with others, paying tribute to nationalistic and sometimes nationalistic sentiments. We would like to say that when the flags of pacifism are distracted by the “bullets” of the war of conquest, the need for nationalistic shields emerges. The same happens

when the “projectiles” of the self-defense war are destroyed in the “warehouse” of peace-loving initiatives that do not take into consideration any historical, political or other realities.

There are many approaches in the field of philosophical analysis that explain the “eternity” of wars on certain ontological grounds. In this sense, phrase of Heraclitus “War is the father of all, the king of all” (Asmus, 1976, 36) can be interpreted as a unique testimony of the ontology of war. Perhaps, the testimony of T. Hobbes is also among such famous approaches - Man Is Wolf to Man (Homo homini lupus est). Here the famous thinker stated that in the state of nature everyone is in the condition of war with everyone, and that man is endowed with innate aggressiveness, which makes “predatory” behavior of man somewhat inevitable. Of course, Hobbes saw in Leviathan, the state, the powerful force that could restrain this aggression and ensure coexistence. But without that power, without the state’s regulatory function and intervention, people will again find themselves in a natural state symbolizing violence and brutality. In this sense, Hobbes’s thoughts have a pessimistic character, because by “perpetuating” the importance of the state in the life of society, he seemed to say that man cannot help paying tribute to his innate aggressiveness by showing his “wolf” nature. The picture is different in German classical philosophy, where, for example, reading Fichte and Kant, one can see the spirit of optimism towards man and his improvement. If Fichte was convinced that one of the important missions of the state is to provide the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the development of the legal and moral consciousness of people, beyond which a person can and should demonstrate exemplary behavior even without the state or its intervention (in this context, he considered that (the “true” state must operate with an “algorithm” of self-destruction or proof of its redundancy), then Kant criticizes attempts to see “metaphysical” contradictions between morality and politics in his writing “On the Conflict between Morality and Politics”. He was essentially convinced that the contradictions between them are not fundamental, they are not ontological, but anthropological in nature. Of course, Kant does not claim that these contradictions will be irrevocably overcome in the near or distant future, but he is convinced that their possible failure will be due to the lack of human will to self-improvement. “Objectively (in theory),” writes Kant, “there is no conflict between politics and morality.” On the contrary, subjectively (in the selfish tendencies of people...) this contradiction exists and can always remain” (Kant, 2003a, 63).

Kant’s optimistic stance was in harmony with the Enlightenment belief in human reason. He had an idea that citizens guided by reason would make peace possible by following the logic of cooperation instead of confrontation (Kant, 2003b, 205-242). But Kantian optimism and Enlightenment faith in reason gave way somewhat in the 19th century. The establishment of the Jacobin dictatorship in post-revolutionary France and the failure of the ideals of the revolution led to the deepening of anti-enlightenment sentiments in the European reality of the 19th century. Enlightenment rationalism was replaced by post-Enlightenment anti-rationalism, in the context of which a well-founded doubt about the realism of Kant’s idea or project of “Perpetual Peace” became quite understandable, or perhaps legitimate. That doubt deepened in the 20-21st centuries, because in international relations, despite the declared humanitarian values and approaches, peace-loving initiatives or movements, the states were more consistently guided by the imperatives of real political interests and the logic of utilitarianism. In other words, it turned out that the reason was “dethroned” in the coveted “kingdom” of reason, deprived of its “royal title” as a decision-maker. As a result, it was entrusted with the function of serving the various interests of this or that entity, rather than the creator of a culture of cooperation or the “architect” of peace. The advocated reason of the Enlightenment turned into a kind of “handmaiden” of

interest, which did not go in front of interest (let us mention about Kant's famous idea about the relationship between philosophy and religion¹) to light its way to true peace, but behind it, trying to hide the traces of its violence. Conventionally speaking, if Kant was optimistic that in the context of the possibility and existence of eternal peace, wars can ever become the property of the past, and the true understanding of political interests will legitimize the latter, then the military theorist, major general of the Prussian army, Carl von Clausewitz (Opjexov, 2014, 62-66) had a different idea. Although he also wrote about the close connection between wars and politics, unlike Kant, he did not see the possibility of eternal peace. According to his conviction, war is the continuation of politics by other means, it is organized armed violence, which is called to serve political interests and in which the task is to impose one's will on the opponent (Klauzjevic, 2002). Clausewitz's views suggest that the "perpetuity" of wars is not anchored in elemental ontological foundations, but in the rationalization of political interests and the means by which they are realized. And drawing a gap between these interests and wars seems impossible, because, in other words, there is a necessary logical connection between them.

Of course, a very brief reference to existing conceptual approaches to the relationship between war and peace does not exhaust the entire depth of the subject. However, it is enough to understand that discourses on war and peace, when they become a component of political planning or the regulation of social and political life, can have a unique impact on the development of events, the future of peoples and states. The point is that War and Peace can be conventionally observed as a text, depending on the reading and understanding of which the "reader" can behave accordingly. An appropriate understanding of the mentioned text has the potential to reconstruct reality; it can predetermine in a sense both the outcome of a possible war and the prospect of a longed-for peace. What has been said will become more relevant if the issue is discussed in the context of the Artsakh Conflict.

It is known that during the First Artsakh Conflict in the 1990s and in 2020, when the second conflict started, as well as in the periods following them, it was/is possible to see such discourses in the Armenian reality, in the context of which the issue of war and peace was mainly presented in the prospect of a strict disjunction or, in other words, "either, or". Of course, there were other discourses, but the problem is that they were presented as the main ones in our country; they became the topic of the social and political agenda. Moreover, the advocates of war-readiness discourse were often deliberately portrayed by pacifists as war-mongers, those who are not ready for any concessions, anti-pacifists and so on. Relatively speaking, the socio-political life of Armenia was mainly represented by artificial and speculative divisions into peace-loving and anti-peace-loving, obscurantists who are not ready for any concessions and broad-minded people who are ready to make these concessions, those who suffer from military patriotic schizophrenia and people humanizing the world with artificial and speculative trends. Divisions, which, if considered beyond the logic of political interests, were somewhat derived from the appropriate understanding and reading features of the text called "War and Peace". Those for whom war is a misanthropic "anti-hero" in a text called peace, to be destroyed even in its infancy, will be inclined to oppose even any manifestation of "fare wars" in their mission of advocating peace. Conversely, those for whom peace is an unnatural or ghostly "anti-hero" in a text called war, never to be enchanted, will tend to view dogmatic pacifism in their mission to defend war as an expression of moral regression and decay of national health. In this regard, many can be inspired by

¹ Kant believed that if philosophy is the servant of religion, then it is not the servant who follows religion, holding its skirts in hand, but the servant who goes ahead of it, holding a candle in the hand and illuminating its path.

Hegel, because according to his belief, war preserves the moral health of peoples, protects them from decay. It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned “reading-perceptions”, if they have a sufficient percentage of followers, can stand out with the potential to create a new reality, because the transformation of reality is not the monopoly of truth, it can also be created on the basis of lies and delusions. Of course, in the Armenian reality, supporters of the alternative main discourse of the pacifist discourse do not pay tribute to the glorification of war when reading the text called war. Although war is an evil for them, only being ready for it can bring them closer to peace.

Thus, the approaches to war and peace that have gained some popularity among us from the beginning seemed to proceed from two fundamentally different assumptions:

- a/ War or being fully prepared for it is the only realistic way to achieve peace, which means that the will to peace cannot ignore the duty to be prepared for war.
- b/ For peace, one should prepare not for war, but for concessions: concessions, the existence of which is perceived as a guarantee of lasting peace. That is, from the beginning it seems that the proposition that concessions are the only possible guarantee of peace is accepted.

Although we have no problem in this article to analyze the main discourses and speculations related to the war-peace couple in the context of the Artsakh Conflict, we must state that the latter have contributed to the formation of nationalist and anti-nationalist discourses and conflicting public sentiments related to the resolution of that conflict. Such theses in which defeatism and compromise were presented as irreplaceable manifestations of political realism, which, of course, were “flavored” with other linguistic patterns and were presented as necessary prerequisites for the development of the region, to become perceptible and non-rejectable by the international community, were particularly popular.

The idea that it is not reality that makes us unhappy, but our attitude towards it, is known from ancient Roman philosophy. In other words, our perception of “well-being” is fundamentally derived from how we perceive and make sense of reality. If we interpret this thought coming from Roman philosophy a little loosely and in the context of the issues to be discussed in this article, then we can say that the “war and post-war” reality imposed on the peoples or in some sense authored by them has resulted and continues to derive from the fact what attitude they have shown and continue to show towards the reality or “text” called “war or peace”. If war is understood as an absolute evil, which should be avoided at all costs, and peace is perceived as an absolute good, which should be unconditionally pursued in an anti-militaristic spirit, then it becomes clear that in war and pre-war situations, they cannot present themselves as a collective “fist” against external aggression. And they will try to justify this disunity in the context of “political realism”, “humanism”, “civilization” and other ideas and arguments. We will consider the people unhappy citing the fact of the war, not thinking that the latter arose from the ideological and political reality that they made possible. In short, the “subjectivization” of reality legitimizes the reality in which this or that collectivity appears. If there is a reasonable suspicion among people that this or that peace-loving initiative will not objectively lead to peace, then it becomes clear that rumors of being ready for war can spread widely among them. However, it also becomes clear that if these speeches try to “apolegitimize” military-patriotic schizophrania, non-readiness for concessions and other extreme assessments, then the “agenda” of being ready for war can be marginalized, contributing not to the exclusion of the evil called war, but to its inherent (permanent) or overt continuation. Perhaps one of the evidences of all this is that the initiatives to create an “era of

peace” after the 44-Day War not only do not remove the notion of war from our reality, but also make the new war and the disasters caused by it more realistic.

All of the above mentioned is intended to remind the reader once again that the war can be considered as a unique text, the reading of which is not free from many complications, possibilities of perception and speculation. Realities that are in many ways determined by the characteristics of the “reader”. In this context, German thinker G. Lichtenberg is perhaps worth mentioning: “The book,” he writes, “is a mirror.” And if a monkey looks into it, it is impossible to see the face of the apostle” (Tapanov, 2004, 357). In other words, if we conditionally consider the war as a certain “text-reflecting book”, then it is impossible to adequately evaluate and interpret it if the reader’s vision is impaired by political interest or delusion, vulgar utilitarianism or self-destructive indifference, “warlike pacifism” or “peace rejecting militarism”.

Many have justified and supported the war, and many have acted as its ideological enemy. However, there are also those who considered the war as an evil, but consistently acted as pioneers of the willingness to “not toothless” fight against that evil. “Against the war,” Nzhdeh rightly writes, “the best representatives of humanity spoke with prophetic jealousy and anger, but even so it continues to maintain its existence, scorning the true speech of the wise, their golden dream” (Nzh’deh, 2006, 24). From these lines of Nzhdeh, it becomes clear that the Armenian thinker agrees with the words of the best representatives of humanity, but it does not mean that he pays tribute to abstract pacifism. In the spirit of Kant’s philosophy, he is convinced that wars will accompany mankind as long as man is a means to man, nation is a means to nation, and not a goal. It is true that Nzhdeh was also of the opinion that war is evil, but he did not support the thesis that its overcoming and the longed-for peace are possible only by generating peace-loving speeches. Even in today’s cannibalistic world, peace becomes realistic with the power that makes it possible, not with the other’s “peaceful” generosity or fake humanitarianism. In this regard, former US President T. Roosevelt has expressed the following thought: “I hate and despise the false philanthropy that conditions the progress of civilization by weakening the spirit of war and thereby encourages the underdeveloped to destroy advanced civilization” (K’isinjer, 2020, 265).

The theme of war and peace has also been in the center of attention of the representative of the religious wing of existentialist philosophy N. Berdyaev. Within the framework of his humanistic prudence, N. Berdyaev did not perceive war as an absolute evil that should be unconditionally avoided. The Russian thinker is convinced that war is an evil that is mainly born from a lack of spirituality, but it can sometimes act as a lesser evil when it liberates from a greater evil. He writes: “War, I repeat, is an evil, but not always the greatest evil, sometimes it is less evil when it frees from the greatest evil. War exists as a global phenomenon because there is not enough spirit. They do not believe in the power of the spirit, they believe only in the spirit of power. Instead of spiritual life and culture, they consider the rise of the state and power as a goal” (Bjepdjajev, 1952, 134-135). Moreover, the humanist thinker, unlike many dogmatic pacifists, is convinced that the evils of war should not lead to abstract pacifism, because sometimes war can be not only justified, but holy. He writes: “Exposing war as the greatest evil and sin, should not lead to abstract pacifism in all possible cases. In our world of evil, war may be a lesser evil. If a war of conquest and enslavement is an absolute evil, then a war of defense and liberation can be not only justified, but also sacred” (Bjepdjajev, 1952, 127).

It is noteworthy that in the periods preceding and following the second Artsakh war, many of us consistently developed and disseminated a “text”, in the context of which the task was set to unconditionally and consistently delegitimize an undesirable but possible war, such a method of “reading” was imposed, which was supposed to make inevitable compromises and sacrifices, presenting all this as if not the greatest, then the only real victory. And it is no coincidence that these or similar “texts” were meant to pave the way for the victory of abstract pacifism and the initiatives to create an “era of peace” in its context.

If we conditionally consider war as a “text” to be justified both at the reference and factual/empirical level, then we must state the following:

1. Depending on how we read the “text” called war at the “meta-level” and understand or make sense of this or that reference reflected in it or expressed by it, accordingly we make possible the formation of the corresponding reality - the reality that is somehow derived from a specific “text”. That is, if war is understood as an unconditional evil that must be avoided at all costs, then as a result, people often not only do not avoid war, but also, due to their unpreparedness, contribute to its continuation. In this sense, the “post-war” (since the signing of the agreement on November 9, 2020) Armenian reality is not an accident, because it is a unique “text” that came from a certain “meta-text” and if we want to change the first one, we must not only reinterpret, but also objectify the second one with practical steps. Therefore, it is not strange that Berdyaev considers war, on the one hand, as an indulgent punishment, and on the other hand, an indulgent atonement. It is a punishment because it has become possible due to the lack of our lack of spirituality, our materialistic orientations, our lack of consistent and creative approaches to serve the collective interest. But on the other hand, it is atonement, because it gives us the opportunity to expose our shortcomings, to realize them and, accordingly, to “repent” collectively.

2. Depending on how the war as a “text” is presented and perceived on an empirical level (for example, in the juxtaposition of the actual war operations), the construction of the reality arising from that text becomes possible. For example, as a result of not properly resisting the enemy’s informational attacks during war operations, the war and its course can be presented and perceived as a “text” about an inevitable defeat, which, when reading, the recipient can succumb to indifference and submit to the regulations of the “text” imposed on them. Moreover, not only the enemy’s pre-offensive information attacks, but also the intentional or unintentional propagandistic theses encouraging defeatism can play a role here. And this is especially so when we often fail to read and make sense of the “text” presented to us, like I. Kant says, that minor always needs outside interference¹.

Conclusion

The article analyzes war and peace from a new research perspective. They are considered as a multi-layered text, which does not simply reflect reality, but, depending on reading preferences, creates it to a certain extent. That text is often read in the context of the duality of “anti-hero and hero, evil and good”, which is due to anthropological, moral and political factors. Moreover, when the reading is accompanied by the “desired deviations of the vision” of the reader, the prerequisites for the transformation of reality or the formation of a new reality appear.

¹ I. Kant in his “An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?” states that Enlightenment is humanity’s exit from the minor state in which it found itself due to its own fault. And by minor, the German thinker meant the inability to use one’s own intelligence/mind without external interference (see I. Kant Works in six volumes, v. 6, M., Publishing House “Mysl”, 1966, p. 25-36).

By conventionally separating the meta and empirical levels of the text called war, it is shown that they affect the reader differently. At the meta-level, war is sometimes understood as an absolute evil to be unconditionally avoided, and peace as an aspirational ideal, an absolute good to be unconditionally pursued. Opposing approaches, which often lead to disastrous consequences in the context of specific geopolitical realities. Meanwhile, at the empirical level of that text, the war is mostly read as a chain of events, a chronicle of military operations, the discourses on which can make the reader follow the various directions of the text.

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