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FAILED DIALOGUE: THE 1988 GREEK-TURKISH DAVOS PROCESS IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORICAL TRAUMAS

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The meeting held in Davos in 1988 between Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal aimed to alleviate the long-standing tensions between the two countries. Its goal was to promote dialogue and reduce the likelihood of military and diplomatic clashes. Although initial optimism was evident, it quickly dissipated due to unresolved contradictions and deeply rooted historical issues. The Cyprus issue, minority rights, and disagreements over military balance in the Aegean Sea persisted, fueled by years of accumulated mistrust. Ultimately, the Davos process did not live up to expectations and is seen as a missed opportunity to overcome the historical burden.

Keywords: Davos Process, Greece, Turkey, Aegean issue, Andreas Papandreou, Turgut Özal, historical traumas, contentious issues, peace efforts, political dialogue.

International relations often become a stage where unresolved past conflicts and unforgotten traumas continually impact the present, obstructing the possibilities for future trust and cooperation. In this context, the attempt at Greek-Turkish dialogue, which began in 1988, is particularly noteworthy. Despite its pacifist messages, it was unable to overcome the barrier of deepened historical contradictions between the parties and ultimately failed:

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The historical burden of Greek-Turkish relations is cumbersome. The conflicts accumulated over the centuries, from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire to Greece's struggle for independence, the population exchange of the 1920s, as well as the Cyprus crisis and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea, have created a dynamic of mutual mistrust and endless competition in the political and historical realm. These historical events have continuously been reproduced in the political discourse of both countries, shaping public perceptions rooted in sensitive issues of national identity, vulnerability, and justice.

The dialogue initiated within the framework of the 1988 Davos Process aimed to alleviate tensions and develop pathways for cooperation and collaboration. However, the parties constantly faced the consequences of historical traumas. Each state interpreted its history from the perspective of its national interests, often absolutizing its righteousness and ignoring the painful past of the other. During the negotiations, any compromise proposal was perceived as an attempt to undermine national sovereignty and dignity. As a result, unresolved historical issues and their memory became real political obstacles, preventing the formation of the minimum trust needed to build a continuous and effective dialogue.

This article aims to analyze the 1988 Davos Process between Greece and Turkey as a failed attempt to resolve Greek-Turkish relations, and to demonstrate how historical traumas hinder the construction of modern international relations, even when the parties possess the political will and initiative for dialogue.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 opened a new bloody chapter in Greek-Turkish relations and exacerbated the already existing disagreements. As a result of these events, another sharp contradiction emerged - the Aegean issue.

Although the 'official' beginning of the Aegean issue is considered to be 1973, when Turkey granted its national oil company, TPAO (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), permission to begin exploratory work on the Aegean seabed in search of oil reserves, this issue had already been shaped in close connection with the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus crisis deepened the existing mistrust between Greece and Turkey, becoming a new source of tension in their bilateral relations. This also led to the intensification of competition between the two countries, with the Aegean Sea turning into a geopolitical battleground.

Greece viewed Turkey's oil exploration activities as a threat to its sovereignty. At the same time, Turkey, relying on its stronger geopolitical position, argued that it had a similar right to exploit natural resources.

The Aegean issue encompasses a range of interconnected elements, such as the boundaries of territorial waters, rights over the continental shelf, control of airspace, and the militarization of islands. These issues have collectively evolved into a single overarching dispute, which continues to obstruct the resolution of Greek-Turkish relations. The Cyprus issue, which remains at the core of bilateral contradictions, has had a direct impact on the Aegean issue, reigniting historical conflicts and creating new sources of tension in the Aegean region.

In the emergence of the Aegean dispute, in addition to the objective economic and political causes, the role of centuries-old Greek-Turkish contradictions and historical traumas was also significant. To emphasize this issue, the well-known researcher of the Aegean dispute, M. Aydın, notes: "In both Greece and Turkey, history is not the past; in fact, the past continues to live in the present."³

It is interesting that Turkish researchers mainly view the Aegean issue as part of 'Greek expansionism,' whose long-term goals included the conquest of Istanbul⁴, with all of Turkey's actions aimed at defending its own country⁵. For example, O. Çelikkol and S. Karabel state: 'Although Greece, after gaining independence in 1833, based its foreign policy on the principle of territorial expansion and greatly expanded its territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, it has largely succeeded in convincing the

³ Aydın M., *Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations*, 1997, https://www.academia.edu/2692168/Cacophony_in_the_Aegean_Contemporary_Turkish_Greek_Relations, p. 111. (Accessed 29.07.2025).

⁴ For Turkish scholars' assessments of the idea of establishing a Greater Greece, see, for instance: Yücel S., *Territorial Waters and National Air Spaces of Turkey and Greece as a Factor of the Neverending Problem of Aegean Sea*, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/84523?fbclid=IwAR3zr35ekSsAwHm1zG2RxA6c36rqyuoF-cwmS6hyU31csCKY9V1JC3NeBXI> (Accessed 29.07.2025).

⁵ The main subtopics of the Aegean dispute, along with Turkey's official positions on each, are presented in a dedicated article on the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These positions are consistently reflected in the works of scholars—historians and political scientists—who specialize in the issue. The article is available under the heading: *Main Aegean Sea Issues*, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/baslica-ege-denizi-sorunlari.tr.mfa> (Accessed 29.07.2025).

international community that it is the victim in bilateral relations, while the Turks are the aggressors»⁶:

Historian M. E. Yılmaz, discussing the deep-rooted causes of the Aegean issue, writes: "Upon closely examining the matter, it becomes clear that, like all the problems in Turkish-Greek relations, the Aegean issue, in addition to existing objective problems, or perhaps more so, reflects the deep distrust that has been formed in bilateral relations due to historical traumas. The Greeks, who lost the 'Hellenistic Empire' due to the Turks, were under Turkish domination for nearly four centuries and largely formed their national revival and identity based on anti-Turkish principles. The ongoing influence of this social psychology is evident both in the Aegean issue and other issues. On the other hand, the Turkish nation, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, became the target of Greek expansionism, and the Turkish liberation struggle⁷ was largely directed against the Greeks. From Turkey's perspective, the traumatic, deep distrust towards the Greeks stems from Greece's continuous territorial gains at Turkey's expense (such as in Cyprus) or the maneuvers aimed at expanding its sphere of influence (such as keeping the issues of minorities and the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople on the agenda). Therefore, it is worth reiterating that the Aegean issue is not only a matter related to the expansion of sovereignty over territories but also a problem of distrust"⁸. Considering all this, perhaps the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about the Greek-Turkish conflict were quite accurate when he described it as a conflict with a history spanning centuries, emotional, and contradictory to rationality.⁹:

Before addressing the 1988 Davos Process, it is necessary to highlight that during the 1980s, in contrast to previous periods, the personal role of political leaders gained significant importance in the development of Greek-Turkish relations. At that time, the political ideas and visions of the respective prime ministers, Turgut Özal of Turkey and Andreas Papandreou

⁶ Çelikkol O., Karabel S., 2017 Turkey-Greece Relations and the Disputes Emanating from the Seas, 2017, p. 15.

⁷ In our view, the term "Kemalist movement" is more appropriate for an objective characterization of the issue.

⁸ Yılmaz E., Turkish-Greek Relations in the post-Cold War era and the Aegean Issue, 2008, p. 39–40.

⁹ Heraclides A., The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity, 2011, <https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45693/1/GreeSE%20No51.pdf>, p. 2. (Accessed 29.07.2025).

of Greece, had a decisive impact on the foreign policies of both countries and their approach to solving bilateral issues.

After coming to power in 1981, Papandreou adopted a stricter stance towards Turkey compared to his predecessors. Regarding the Aegean issue, he believed that negotiations were completely pointless, as they undermined Greece's sovereignty. As a compromise, Papandreou agreed only to discuss the continental shelf issue in the International Court of Justice.

Papandreou's position towards Turkey became even more rigid in 1983, when the Turkish Cypriots, in the territories of Cyprus occupied by Turkey, declared the "independence" of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This caused great outrage and sparked an anti-Turkish wave in Greece. Confronting the Turkish threat once again became a priority in Greek foreign policy. In May 1984, during the first congress of PASOK, Papandreou openly accused the Turkish leadership of chauvinism and expansionism.¹⁰

In contrast, different processes were unfolding in Turkey. In 1983, the period of military rule in Turkey came to an end, and the country returned to a multi-party civilian government. In the very first elections, to the surprise of many, the "Motherland Party" (Anavatan Partisi), led by Özal, achieved a stunning victory. This victory was unexpected not only because Özal's party had not received support from influential military figures or President Kenan Evren¹¹, but also because within the newly formed party, Özal was the only relatively well-known figure in the public eye.

When discussing Özal, it is important to note that he was not a typical politician and differed significantly from Turkey's previous leaders. As an economist by profession, his primary focus was on liberalizing Turkey's economy and addressing the long-standing economic problems. Being a pragmatic figure, Özal understood well that for Turkey's economic development, it was essential to establish good relations with neighboring countries, the United States, and member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). Joining the EEC was considered one of Özal's key political objectives, although his efforts were primarily hindered by the complex issues Turkey had with Greece.

¹⁰ Heraclides A., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 2010, p. 118.

¹¹ Kalaycıoğlu E., *Turkish Dynamics Bridge Across Troubled lands*, N. Y., 2005, p. 132.

When Özal came to power, he inherited extremely tense relations with Greece from his predecessors, primarily due to the Aegean issue and, in particular, the declaration of "independence" by "Northern Cyprus" in 1983. It can confidently be stated that, in 1983, Greek-Turkish relations were at their lowest point since the 1974 conflict. The strained relations with Greece not only hindered Turkey's accession to the EEC but also required significant resources for military needs, which were compensated for at the expense of Turkey's economic growth. Therefore, taking all this into account, it is no coincidence that from the very beginning of his tenure, Özal declared the normalization of relations with Greece as his government's foreign policy priority.

On January 13, 1984, while presenting his political program in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) and addressing the issue of relations with Greece, Özal spoke about "extending a hand of friendship to Greece," "the long-term common interests of the two countries," and "establishing good relations based on trade, economy, and tourism."¹²

To demonstrate that there is no Turkish threat, Özal declares that Turkey has no territorial claims against Greece. To normalize relations with Greece¹³, he takes several steps:

1. Unilaterally lifts the visa requirement for Greek citizens visiting Turkey.
2. Takes steps to encourage bilateral trade, involving businessmen from both countries in this process.
3. Changes the policy regarding the property rights of Greek citizens in Istanbul, which had been in effect since 1964.
4. Calls for the restoration of dialogue between the two countries.
5. Expresses readiness to sign agreements with Greece, including a non-aggression pact (based on the Greek proposal of 1978).
6. Prohibits members of his government from making hostile statements towards Greece.¹⁴

However, Özal's actions remained unanswered by the Greek side. Papandreou, from the very beginning of Özal's rise to power, had

¹² Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, Edited by Baskin O., Salt Lake City, 2010, p. 585.

¹³ Özal described these initiatives as a "policy of the olive branch," emphasizing a conciliatory approach in foreign relations.

¹⁴ The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, Edited by Constan D., N. Y., 1991, p. 31.

characterized Turkey's parliamentary elections as being held under pressure and lacking transparency, while labeling Özal's government as subordinate to the military¹⁵. Greece, as a precondition for normalizing relations with Turkey, demanded the recognition of the existing status quo in the Aegean Sea, the withdrawal of troops from Cyprus, and the dismantling of the "puppet state" of Turkish Cypriots.

Seeing Greece's reluctance to initiate dialogue, Özal begins seeking support for his "Olive Branch" policy in the West. Frequently making speeches and giving comments to Western media, he emphasized that he found Athens' stance on his policy and the rejection of starting a dialogue incomprehensible.¹⁶ As a result of all this, Western political opinion begins to increasingly support Özal, while conversely, the pressure on Papandreou intensifies.

Papandreou was eventually forced to give in. A slight warming of bilateral relations is observed in 1986, caused by the increasing Western pressure on Papandreou and the economic problems complicated by the tension in Greek-Turkish relations and the resulting arms race. In January 1986, Papandreou and Özal agreed to meet secretly in Davos during the World Economic Forum to initiate a dialogue. Moreover, a joint breakfast between the two leaders was scheduled for February 2, but Papandreou canceled it at the last moment due to a leak in a Turkish newspaper regarding the meeting.¹⁷

The unresolved issues in bilateral relations and the lack of dialogue ultimately lead to a new escalation of the Aegean dispute and an increased likelihood of a Greek-Turkish war. Although the 1987 Aegean crisis once again flared up due to the continental shelf and the energy reserves it contained, the real reason, however, was considered to be different by the famous Turkish researcher and analyst, Baskın Oran. He noted that Greece had begun oil exploration work as early as the 1980s. Still, Özal had preferred to maintain calm on this issue to avoid jeopardizing the potential resolution of relations with Greece.¹⁸ As the real reason, Oran pointed to Greece's possible desire to increase tension to damage Turkey's process of applying to the European Commission for EEC membership in early 1987.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁸ Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, p. 587.

Additionally, Oran identified internal processes within Turkey as a significant contributing factor. He did not consider it a coincidence that at the time of the outbreak of this crisis, Özal was out of the country for heart surgery. During Özal's absence, Turkey's leadership was carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior military officials, who were dissatisfied with Özal's pacifist policy toward Greece and held a more hardline stance.¹⁹

Bilateral tensions ultimately eased through the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom. On March 28, Özal announced that as long as Greece does not carry out drilling operations, Turkey will hold back its ships.²⁰ This crisis and the real threat of a Greek-Turkish war essentially force both sides to soften their political stance towards each other, catalyzing a certain warming of Greek-Turkish relations. On April 6, 1987, Papandreou announces that he is ready to begin dialogue with Özal, but at the same time notes that he sees the solution to the continental shelf issue as lying with the International Court of Justice.

Despite all this, a noticeable improvement in bilateral relations occurred. It is known that the two leaders exchanged secret letters on several occasions, although the contents of these letters remain unknown. Moreover, in November 1987, Papandreou officially congratulated Özal on his victory in the elections, which would have been unimaginable during Özal's first electoral win²¹. It was then revealed that the two leaders were planning to meet in January 1988 in Davos during the World Economic Forum to resume their dialogue.

The Davos meeting between Özal and Papandreou took place on January 30-31. Following the meeting, a joint press release stated that it had been conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill. Both sides committed to doubling their efforts to avoid a recurrence of the recent Aegean crisis and to establish lasting peaceful relations.

In addition to these abstract statements, the parties also agreed to take specific actions by creating two committees: one for economic and one for political matters. The Economic Committee was tasked with identifying ways to foster bilateral cooperation in areas such as trade, tourism,

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Heraclides A., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 2010, p. 122.

²¹ Ibid., p. 123.

communication, joint ventures, and cultural exchange. The Political Committee, in turn, was tasked with facilitating the resolution of disputed issues between the two sides. The work of these committees was to be personally overseen by the prime ministers of both countries. In addition to these agreements, it was planned to establish a direct telephone line between the two prime ministers and to foster cooperation between political and military officials, journalists, and businesspeople from both countries.

The next step in the warming of bilateral relations was the Papandreou-Özal meeting held in Brussels on March 3-4. According to the final official communiqué of the meeting, the parties expressed their willingness to continue the process of bilateral relations normalization and to avoid actions and statements that contradicted the spirit of the Davos negotiations. The communiqué also contained several decisions:

1. Issues related to military exercises and military flights should be discussed.
2. The committee on missing persons in Cyprus should resume its work.
3. After the annulment of the 1964 decree²², the Turkish government, by Turkish legislation, should take the necessary measures to restore the rights of ethnic Greeks fully.
4. Considering the positive developments, Greece should sign the 1964 Ankara Agreement and its additional protocol before the scheduled EEC-Turkey Membership Council meeting on April 25, 1988.
5. The committees established in Davos should meet in Ankara and Athens on May 26, 1988, and the Prime Minister of Turkey should visit Athens at the invitation of the Greek Prime Minister from June 13-15, 1988.²³

As agreed, Özal arrived in Athens from June 13 to 15, 1988. During the visit, Özal was accompanied by a delegation of 170 people, mostly businessmen. However, despite the historical significance of the visit²⁴, it did not achieve real progress. Greek society expected certain gestures from

²² By this decree, Greek citizens residing in Istanbul were expelled, and all their movable property and personal belongings were prohibited from being taken out of Turkey. For more detailed information, see: Melkonyan R., *The Expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul in 1964*, Yerevan, 2018, pp. 177–194.

²³ Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, p. 589.

²⁴ The most recent visit by a Turkish head of state to Greece occurred 35 years ago.

the Turkish Prime Minister regarding the Cyprus issue, and the absence of such gestures led to disappointment.

The final note in the process of warming Greek-Turkish relations was the meeting of the Political Committee, held in Ankara from September 5 to 8, 1988. During this meeting, Greece once again proposed that the continental shelf issue be referred to the International Court of Justice as a compromise solution to the Aegean dispute. At the same time, Turkey continued to advocate for discussing and resolving all Aegean issues through negotiations. This, in essence, was the swan song of the Davos process.²⁵

The failure of the Davos process in resolving Greek-Turkish relations had several causes. First, it should be noted that the work of the committees established in Davos could not be considered satisfactory in any way. Progress in the fields of business and cultural exchanges was minimal. For a period, significant growth was recorded only in the tourism sector²⁶. The work of the Political Committee was even more modest. Apart from resolving a few minor issues, it essentially did not bring the parties' positions any closer on the more complex matters.

In addition to the modest progress in normalizing relations, it is worth noting that the Davos process significantly intensified the domestic political situation in both Greece and Turkey, ultimately weakening the positions of Özal and Papandreou as a result. Özal and especially Papandreou found themselves under severe domestic pressure due to the Davos process. In addition to the dissatisfaction within Greek society, Papandreou's approach to normalizing relations with Turkey faced considerable pressure, even from his PASOK party colleagues. On the other hand, Özal encountered disagreement among career diplomats and senior military officials regarding the Davos process.

The most vulnerable point of the Davos process was, in essence, its dependence on individuals. This process originated from the top, at the level of Özal and Papandreou, and was heavily dependent on the stability of their respective political positions. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Davos process was somewhat spontaneous, and the Greek and Turkish

²⁵ Heraclides A., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, 2010, p. 125.

²⁶ *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, Edited by Aydın M. and Ifantis K., London and New York, 2004, p. 80.

societies, unlike Papandreou and Özal, were not prepared for the normalization of relations. The most significant shortcoming of Özal and Papandreou, in essence, was the lack of a process to prepare their societies for the normalization of relations.

The first sign of the end of the Davos process was Papandreou's cancellation of his reciprocal visit to Ankara in August 1988²⁷. Under domestic political pressure, Papandreou began to give in. By the autumn of 1988, he considered the Davos process a mistake, taking the blame upon himself. It should be noted that Papandreou's political position in 1988, in addition to the Davos process, was significantly weakened by his illness, personal life difficulties, and the growing banking scandal in Greece, all of which contributed substantially to PASOK's defeat in the 1989 elections.

The Davos process, although initially seen as a turning point opportunity in Greek-Turkish relations, ultimately failed to meet expectations regarding the establishment of peace. One of the main reasons for the failure of the Davos process was the historical traumas and long-standing conflicts underlying the relations between Greece and Turkey. These countries carry a heavy historical burden, which was further exacerbated by the Cyprus issue.

These deep-rooted historical issues, unresolved for many years, had made Greek and Turkish societies highly sensitive to matters related to national identity and history, leading to the situation where the societies were simply unprepared to accept conditions that they believed could undermine their national interests. This socio-psychological state deprived the parties of the opportunity to take real steps toward dialogue and mutual understanding.

As a result of the failure of the Davos process, the parties missed a crucial opportunity to resolve bilateral relations in the long term, which could have been pivotal for the stable socio-economic development of Greece and Turkey. The moment when the leaders of both countries could have been guided by the prospect of achieving common prosperity was extremely important, but the historical burden and territorial conflicts hindered this.

²⁷ Aydın M., *Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations*, 1997, https://www.academia.edu/2692168/Cacophony_in_the_Aegean_Contemporary_Turkish_Greek_Relations, p. 121. (Accessed 29.07.2025)

This case demonstrates that even international processes emphasizing high-level political cooperation cannot succeed if the parties are not yet willing to unite their peoples for the sake of establishing peace. Its failure once again showed that, without deep political trust and broad public support, even agreements reached at the highest level can be unstable. The Davos experience also demonstrates that peacebuilding initiatives cannot yield sustainable results if the parties do not acknowledge each other's vital interests or are unwilling to make mutual concessions.

**ՁԱԽՈՂՎԱԾ ԵՐԿԽՈՍՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ. 1988 ԹՎԱԿԱՆԻ ՀՈՒՅՆ-
ԹՈՒՐՔԱԿԱՆ ԴԱՎՈՍՅԱՆ ԳՈՐԾԸՆԹԱՅՐ ՊԱՏՄԱԿԱՆ
ՏՐԱՎՄԱՆԵՐԻ ՍՏՎԵՐՈՒՄ**

Ռաֆիկ Խաչատրյան²⁸ Գագիկ Համբարյան²⁹

1988 թվականին Դավոսում կայացած հանդիպումը Հունաստանի վարչապետ Անդրեաս Պապանդրեուի և Թուրքիայի վարչապետ Թուրգութ Օզալի միջև ուղղված էր երկու երկրների միջև երկարամյա լարվածությունը մեղմելուն: Այն նպատակ ուներ խթանել երկխոսությունը և նվազեցնել ռազմական ու դիվանագիտական բախումների հավանականությունը: Թեև սկզբնական փուլում նկատվում էր լավատեսություն, այն արագ մարեց՝ չլուծված հակասությունների և խորքային պատմական խնդիրների պատճառով: Կիպրոսի խնդիրը, փոքրամասնությունների իրավունքների հարցերը և Էգեյան ծովում ռազմական հավասարակշռության վերաբերյալ տարաձայնությունները շարունակեցին պահպանվել՝ հենվելով երկար տարիներ կուտակված անվստահության վրա: Վերջիվերջո, Դավոսի գործընթացը չարդարացրեց հույսերը և դիտարկվում է որպես բաց թողնված հնարավորություն՝ հաղթահարելու պատմական բեռը:

Բանալի բառեր՝ Դավոսյան գործընթաց, Հունաստան, Թուրքիա, Էգեյան հիմնահարց, Անդրեաս Պապանդրեու, Թուրգութ Օզալ, պատմա-

²⁸ Ռաֆիկ Խաչատրյանը ԵՊՀ արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի թուրքագիտության ամբիոնի դասախոս է, պ.գ.թ., էլ փոստ՝ rafael.khachatryan@ysu.am, ORCID [0000-0002-7908-0562](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7908-0562):

²⁹ Գագիկ Համբարյանը Շիրակի պետական համալսարանի պատմության և իրավագիտության ամբիոնի դասախոս է, էլ փոստ՝ hambaryangagik@gmail.com, ORCID [0009-0001-5212-3585](https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5212-3585):

կան տրապիզաներ, վիճելի խնդիրներ, խաղաղության փորձ, քաղաքական երկխոսություն:

ПРОВАЛИВШИЙСЯ ДИАЛОГ: ГРЕКО-ТУРЕЦКИЙ ДАВОССКИЙ ПРОЦЕСС 1988 ГОДА В ТЕНИ ИСТОРИЧЕСКИХ ТРАВМ

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Встреча между премьер-министром Греции Андреасом Папандреу и премьер-министром Турции Тургутом Озалом в Давосе в 1988 году была направлена на смягчение давней напряжённости между двумя странами. Она была направлена на развитие диалога и снижение вероятности военных и дипломатических столкновений. Хотя первоначально был оптимизм, но он быстро угас из-за неразрешённых конфликтов и глубоко укоренившихся исторических проблем. Кипрский вопрос, проблемы с правами меньшинств и разногласия по поводу военного баланса в Эгейском море продолжали сохраняться, опираясь на годы накопленного недоверия. В конечном итоге, Давосский процесс не оправдал ожиданий и рассматривается как упущенная возможность преодолеть историческое бремя.

Ключевые слова: Давосский процесс, Греция, Турция, Эгейский вопрос, Андреас Папандреу, Тургут Озал, исторические травмы, спорные вопросы, попытка мира, политический диалог

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