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Review by: Nane Aleksanyan

In this Issue

In the global conditions of growing challenges of integration processes and world order, there was a sharp decline in the level of Russian governance and manageability of international relations. The previous mechanisms of international security turned out to be ineffective, regional and partly global, so regional instability increased sharply. This, in particular, led to the fact that national security turned out to be closely linked with international security. The international dimension of national security, which was never disputed by anyone before, has increased many times. From now on, any state can feel relatively safe only in the conditions of strengthening international law and world order that meets the interests of all countries of the world community. The consequences of European integration of post-Soviet countries for ensuring national security have encountered new risks and have turned out to be very contradictory. They create both new, previously unseen opportunities for the development and prosperity of various countries, and new, extremely dangerous challenges and threats. For Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which for objective reasons maintain the continuity of not only their regional, but also European interests, all these aspects are especially important and relevant.

European integration and democratization of the modern world irreversibly changes the hierarchy of the main actors of national security. Democratization of the political systems of the Eastern Partnership countries and their external environment, albeit inconsistently and contradictorily, does not allow anyone to trample democratic norms with impunity, ignore human interests and rights. The greatest attention is drawn to the search of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine for their national identity, definition of a national development strategy, as well as attitudes towards the very contradictory processes of globalization taking place in the world.

In ‘Transformation of Modern Wars in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan’s Hybrid War Against Artsakh’, Ruben Elamiryan analyzes the factors of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 from the point of view of hybrid technologies that led to ethnic cleansing and depatriation of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. The author analyzes the situation of post-war Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which was hybridized by Azerbaijan, thereby practically violating international humanitarian law and covering up all these crimes against humanity by Russian peacekeepers. According to the author, the military-political leadership of Azerbaijan is responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, which, unfortunately, was not condemned by Russia and the CSTO, and was not prevented by Russian peacekeepers. The author notes that there is still time for the UN, EU, Council of Europe and OSCE to prevent the forced displacement of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh from becoming irreversible, to protect the security and right to life of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as those who were abducted and illegally held in Azerbaijani prisons.

In his article ‘Second Karabakh War and the dynamics of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation’, Marut Vardazaryan analyzes Russian-Armenian relations in the CIS geopolitical space, where the interests of world centers of power collide, a struggle for political influence unfolds, as well as access to

sources of energy and other natural resources. According to the author, a significant circumstance complicating the interaction of post-war Armenia and Russia, as well as with other CIS countries, is the presence of a military threat from Azerbaijan and external risk factors of instability, which are intensifying with the opposition of the USA and the West to Russia in the context of increasing rivalry among them. The author argues that the nature of the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus and its development at this stage are distinguished by dynamism, the preservation of hotbeds of armed conflict and military-political tension here after the Second Karabakh War, the clash of a number of interstate and interethnic interests in this region, the unstable and contradictory nature of the formation between Armenia and Azerbaijan with ongoing rivalry and struggle at the interethnic, regional and global levels for the redistribution of spheres of influence and control over the strategic transport communications of the region.

In 'Self-exclusion as a security strategy of small states', Narek Galstyan analyzes the security factors of small states and their further institutionalization. The author examines the situation when, as international relations develop and become more democratized, countries of the world, including great powers, are forced to act guided not only by considerations of the balance of power and narrow national interests, but also by international legal norms that affirm the equality of large or small sovereign states. Modern small states have more opportunities than ever to rely on the norms of international law. On the other hand, the process of globalization presents new challenges for small states, which risk being marginalized as a result of the restructuring of world economic relations. The deepening processes of the formation of supranational institutions and norms of international law, the strengthening of the role and importance of CSOs and non-state actors present new opportunities and new challenges for small states.

In the article 'The Image of the US Army in American movies: The Soft Power of American Cinema', Yuliana Melkumyan, Nvard Melkonyan and Sofi Javadyan examine the influence of American cinema on the world, more numerous and diverse, as the process of creating a global mass culture based on American ideals with the help of popular Hollywood cinema. Moreover, in order to understand the origins of this process, the authors examine and analyze in detail the image of the US Army in American films. Summarizing American historiography, the authors conclude that although the general research base in the field of mass culture has been studied enough, it is still of interest to researchers from different parts of the world, since the phenomenon of Americanization has already managed to cover the entire world. One of the main spheres of mass culture is American cinema, through which the whole world learns how people live, what they think, what they use and what is happening in the United States of America. Hollywood is one of the key mechanisms for forming the image of the US Army, but also for promoting American public diplomacy and soft power. In this sense, American cinema is the most popular type of mass culture in the international community, which has penetrated into the most remote corners of the planet.

In 'International political orientation of Armenia in terms of neoclassical realism: Neoclassical realism and Armenia's international orientation', Dachi Korintel'i focuses

on the study of the interaction between the international system and the internal dynamics of the Armenian state. The author argues his approach with the fact that it is important to overcome the shortcomings of neorealism, since neoclassical realism tries to create verifiable models for explaining Armenia's foreign policy strategy and international political orientation. In this context, the Armenian state acts as a kind of set of intermediate variables, which includes various errors in the retransmission of impulses of the international system into a foreign policy response based on a complex process of internal interpretation of this impulse by the state and various actors. Unlike neorealism, neoclassical realism claims to be a comprehensive research approach that allows us to explain the reasons why Armenia reacts to its international environment in completely different ways. Neoclassical realism sees its mission in constructing, first of all, a theory of foreign policy, rather than a theory of the system within which Armenia and other South Caucasus states interact.

In the article 'Strategic prospects for using international experience of foreign investment in Armenia: How effective is regulation of attracting investors for economic growth?', Gohar Ghambaryan, Vardan Mkhitaryan, and Anzhela Ayriyants offer a new perspective on solutions for developing trade and economic cooperation between Armenia and various countries. In the context of post-war Armenia, managing the complex nature of international investment, the specifics of regulating direct and indirect foreign investment, as well as the processes that lead to an increase in their volumes in the national economy, should become an integral part of the public policy of Armenia. The globalization of the world economy has created an urgent need for serious transformations in the Armenian economy, the dynamics of which are largely determined by the rate of economic growth, and the latter can only be ensured under conditions of an active influx of foreign investment into the Armenian economy.

In 'Dimensions of the shadow reforms of Yuri Andropov's bureaucratic management: lessons from the myths of the totalitarian leadership of the USSR', Gevorg Harutyunyan focuses on the study of the historical development of public administration reforms and, especially, in the context of the ongoing large-scale anti-corruption campaign, the study of the party and government activities of Yuri Andropov, whose name is associated with decisive attempts to combat violations of Soviet legality and bribery. According to the author, it was Andropov's personal qualities and his inherent conservatism that allowed him to radically change his fate in a totalitarian environment. In a relatively short period of time, he not only restored his lost authority among the party and state elite, but also made a political career. The results of Andropov's domestic policy were quite contradictory. His reforms were mainly limited to establishing discipline and order in all spheres of society and were in fact limited to this. As a result, they produced temporary and rather modest results. On the one hand, discipline in the party and the state apparatus was strengthened in a short period of time. Some crisis tendencies in the economy were stopped, and a rise in labor productivity was observed in a number of sectors of the national economy. But all these measures produced only temporary results and were unable to fundamentally change the economic and political situation of the USSR.

This volume of the journal includes three book reviews on the crises of European integration, the war against Ukraine and the EU, as well as polarization, shifting

borders and fluid governance in the OSCE region. The modern world political process in its essential content is presented as a confrontation of various political forces on issues of world order, the current and future world order, the Russian war against Ukraine and the EU, causing crises of European integration. The problem of world order is the problem of strengthening international law and world order, linking economic and political interests of various countries of the world, as well as preventing threats to human civilization as a result of the growth of global problems of our time. The current political confrontation over the world order is the main content of the current stage of the broad historical process. This process of political polarization and shifting boundaries, the use of which allows us to approach the historical process from the side of changes occurring in the sphere of world order. Such changes are due to the diversity of forms of government, differences in the levels of development of states, and the clash of interests of leading countries in the OSCE region.

Ashot Aleksanyan

TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN WARS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJAN'S HYBRID WAR AGAINST ARTSAKH

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Abstract

The Third Artsakh war has dramatically transformed the security environment in the South Caucasus. Being a result and indicator of changing world order, it unleashed the parameters of the newly-developing formats of conflicts, confrontations, and wars, called hybrid warfare. From this perspective the paper studies the parameters of hybrid warfare against Artsakh launched by Azerbaijan. Application of hybrid warfare against Artsakh is not a new phenomenon and has been practiced by Azerbaijan at least during the last 10-15 years. However, the results of the 44-day war have provided new framework, opportunities, and instruments to intensify hybrid operations, striving to maximize the results.

Hence, the paper discusses the Azerbaijani strategy of hybrid war against Artsakh by analyzing the main strategies, tactics, instruments and tools used by Azerbaijan against Artsakh, specifically, after 44-day war.

The paper argues that after the Third Artsakh war of 2020 Azerbaijan has launched a full scale hybrid operation to provide ethnic cleansing of Artsakh and receive 'Nagorno-Karabakh without Armenians'. The operation was based on the following components: information-psychological campaign/influence operations (against Armenians in Artsakh), economic and energy aspects, ecological issues, blockade, international campaigns, support to split Armenian power (in Armenia and Armenian Diaspora), sabotage against critical infrastructure and population, and so on. Concluding the paper launches a discussion about Azerbaijani engagement with Armenia after the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh of Autumn of 2023.

Keywords: Hybrid war, Artsakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Strategy, Ethnic Cleansing.

Introduction

The Third Artsakh war has dramatically transformed the security environment in the South Caucasus. Being a result and clear indicator of changing world order, it unleashed the parameters of the newly-developing formats of conflicts, confrontations, and wars, called hybrid warfare, for instance, in form of the blockade of Lachin

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corridor, which resulted in ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. From this perspective the research is focused on the study of projection of the parameters of hybrid warfare against Artsakh by Azerbaijan. Application of hybrid warfare against Artsakh is not a new phenomenon and is being practiced by Azerbaijan at least during the last 20 years. However, the results of the 44-day war have provided new framework, opportunities, and instruments to intensify hybrid operations, striving to maximize the results. Even more, Azerbaijan's hybrid war has not stopped after the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh and forcibly displacement of over 100 thousand Armenians living in the unrecognized state. It continued against the Republic of Armenia with application of new and 'traditional' sophisticated mechanisms. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to reveal and analyze the Azerbaijani grand strategy against Artsakh, by discussing the main strategy, tactics, instruments and tools used by Azerbaijan against Artsakh, specifically, after 44-day war.

The hypothesis is that Azerbaijan has launched a full scale hybrid war, which includes the following components: information-psychological campaign, influence operations (against Armenians in Artsakh), economic and energy aspects, ecological issues, blockade, international campaigns, support to split Armenian power (in Armenia and Armenian Diaspora), as well cyber operations, sabotage against critical infrastructure and population, etc.

Thus the paper tests the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh as a strategic hybrid operation, which started long before the 3rd Artsakh war and continued afterwards, ended up with the depopulation of Armenians of Artsakh. In the meantime, the paper attempts to project the Azerbaijani tactics towards the Republic of Armenia and develop potential scenarios of Azerbaijani behavior.

It starts with the case of the Third Artsakh war and discusses its impact on the transformation of geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and beyond. The author demonstrates the linkage between this geopolitical shift and increased area of 'grey zone', which on a further stage allowed the Azerbaijani authorities having much larger space for maneuver, which, in turn, led to more intensified hybrid operations against Artsakh and Republic of Armenia. The paper continues with a deep and comprehensive research of the phenomenon of 'hybrid war', tracing the concept from its 'birth' in 2007 to contemporary times. The research demonstrates the evolution of the concept, as well as shares the most sensitive debates around its novelty and ways of application (Elamiryan 2022). The research continues with the case-study of Azerbaijani operations against Artsakh and Armenia after the 44-day war, which led to the ethnic cleansing of the non-recognized state.

In the 'discussion and conclusion' section the paper applies the theory of hybrid wars of Azerbaijan's operations and justifies its strategy as a hybrid war. Finally the paper argues that after the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh, Azerbaijan applies hybrid war strategy towards the Republic of Armenia, by weaponizing every aspect of interactions and making the latter to compromise its strategic interests.

The research applies the methods of desk and discourse analysis, uses case-study method, as well as discusses and analyzes high-level declarations, speeches, and interviews.

The paper contributes to the academic debate on the development of hybrid wars in the process of the contemporary transformation of world order. On the example of Azerbaijani strategy it argues that hybrid wars can be applied to overcome international law and create 'grey zones' to use force and/or threat of use of force, when the international community does not stand firm to protect the international norms.

Third Artsakh War and transformation of geopolitical environment in the South Caucasus

On 27 September, 2020 Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, initiated a new war against Artsakh. The conflict was 'frozen' after the first Artsakh war of 1992-1994 with Trilateral ceasefire agreement of May 1994, signed by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (Ceasefire Agreement 1994). The peace talks were held under the umbrella of the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, the United States and France. Despite the fact that during these years the ceasefire regime was periodically violated, and Azerbaijan often demanded that the negotiations were shifted under the auspices of the UN, nevertheless, the OSCE Minsk Group remained the only format for peace negotiations (OSCE Minsk Group). Armenia has never questioned the format of negotiations.

The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs periodically visited Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert (the capital of Artsakh), and also organized direct meetings between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. During the last 15 years, negotiations have been conducted around the so-called Madrid Principles (2007) and the updated Madrid Principles (2009): 1). non-use of force or threat of force, 2). the right of peoples to self-determination, and 3). territorial integrity of states; as well six conflict resolution principles (OSCE 2009).

The conflict escalated in April of 2016 with the April war, ended by the interference from Moscow with not much substantial change on the ground (The Four-Day War Has Diminished 2016). The peace talks continued under the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship, more or less continuing the logic of the updated Madrid Principles. The situation on the ground remained rather unchanged after the Armenian Velvet Revolution of 2018. However, the Third Artsakh War and the Trilateral Statement of the President of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of Armenia, and the President of Russia on November 10, 2020 (the Statement) on the ceasefire has changed the security environment not only for Armenia, Artsakh and Azerbaijan, but the regional security architecture in general, or, to be more precise, have clearly demonstrated an already changed reality by making it more obvious (Poghosyan 2022).

Among others, in the context of this paper, few closes deserve specific attention: Article 3 stated the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. Article 5 mentioned the establishment of a peacekeeping center for ceasefire control, which "shall be deployed for the purpose of increasing effective control over the implementation of arrangements between the Parties to the conflict." Later this became the trilateral observation center of Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in Aghdam, a region which Azerbaijan received after the 44-day war. The article 9 stated that "all economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked." Moreover, the security of new

communication routes should have been provided by the Russian side (Prime Minister of the RA 2020).

The results of the Third Artsakh war has opened the pandora box for increasing major power competition around Nagorno-Karabakh and the wider region. In particular, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan by means of “hard power” and demanded full participation in peace negotiations along with Russia, without the US and France (Mianji 2020).

Being one of the most important security issues not only in the South Caucasus, but in the entire post-Soviet space as a whole, if successful, the new format would have meant a complete transformation of the security environment in the region, reducing the role of the West. However, back then Russia and Armenia sought to oppose Turkey's involvement, each with their own reasons. The Russian Foreign Minister made this clear in June 2021, stating that if Turkey becomes part of the negotiation process around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran, as a regional actor, should have the same privileges as Turkey (MFA of the RF 2021).

On the other hand, at that moment Turkey continued to strengthen its positions in Azerbaijan, probably with the aim of further expansion in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The dualism of the situation laid in the fact that Russia perceived the region as part of its special and even exclusive interests, while Turkey returned to the region, strengthening its ‘capabilities’, in particular, through an alliance with Azerbaijan. As a result, we have already been seeing the transition of South Caucasus from exclusively post-Soviet to the Middle Eastern agenda. Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs made this clear in June 2021, stating that if Turkey enters the peace-building process in Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran, as a regional power, should have the same privileges, as Turkey (MFA of the RF 2021).

On the other hand, Turkey continued strengthening its positions in Azerbaijan, most probably, with the aspiration of further expansion both in the South Caucasus and further to the Central Asia.

There were several views on Russia's position in the South Caucasus after the Third Artsakh War. Some argued that Russia has lost some influence because Turkey get involved in a military conflict, which did not happen since the Sovietization of the region in the early 1920s. Indeed, in Aghdam, the occupied part of Artsakh, Turkey even received a formal military presence (together with Russia) to monitor the ceasefire, which though stopped its activities in April of 2024 (ARMENPRESS 2024).

On the other hand, Russia had deployed a peacekeeping contingent of about 2,000 troops to Artsakh and expanded its military presence in Armenia to help Armenia contain the growing territorial ambitions of Azerbaijan. Moreover, with the successful implementation of the Trilateral Statement of November 10, Russia would have gained control over important transport routes in the south of the South Caucasus.

Thus, looking back to the end of 2020, one could claim that the Third Artsakh war has significantly changed the power balance in the South Caucasus and beyond, particularly, strengthening Russia's and Turkiye's positions, weakening the positions of the West (or fully removing from the peace process), but also creating a very fragile power balance on the ground, which, as the later history showed, collapsed very shortly with slight refocusing of Russia's attention towards Ukraine. The new status quo

significantly contributed to the transformation and implementation of an updated Azerbaijani strategy towards Artsakh and the Republic of Armenia, *inter alia*, in the form of hybrid warfare. The new reality has triggered a new wave of hybrid war against Artsakh and the Republic of Armenia, ended with ethnic cleansing of the non-recognized state and ongoing conflict with the Republic of Armenia.

Understanding the concept of hybrid warfare in contemporary international relations

The concept of hybrid appeared almost twenty years ago with the publication of Frank Hoffman's publication entitled "Conflict in the 21st century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars" (2007). Hoffman argued (2007, 7-8) that:

There are a broadening number of challenges facing the United States, as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) noted in 2005. These include traditional, irregular, terrorist and disruptive threats or challengers. This has created a unique planning dilemma for today's military planners, raising a choice between preparing for states with conventional capabilities or the more likely scenario of non-state actors employing asymmetric or irregular tactics. However, these may no longer be separate threats or modes of war. Several strategists have identified an increased merging or blurring of conflict and war forms. The potential for types of conflict that blur the distinction between war and peace, and combatants and non-combatants, appear to be on the rise. Indeed, the NDS itself suggested that the most complex challengers of the future may seek synergies and greater impact by combining multiple modes of war.

As this paper reveals, future contingencies will more likely present unique combinational or hybrid threats that are specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities.

Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of war.

According to him "Hybrid Wars" blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. The term "Hybrid" captures both their organization and their means. Organizationally, they may have a hierarchical political structure, coupled with decentralized cells or networked tactical units. Their means will also be hybrid in form and application." Hoffman thinks that hybrid wars are based on application of wide range instruments, including both conventional and irregular means, "formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder" (Hoffman 2007, 28-29).

There is a large debate if the concept of ‘hybrid war’ is new (Cîrdei 2017). The argument is that there are such concepts as ‘Fifth Generation Warfare’, ‘Compound wars’, ‘Unrestricted Warfare’, ‘Asymmetric Warfare’, ‘Grey Zone Operations’ and so on, which incorporate the ‘hybrid warfare’ elements.

Murray and Mansoor (2012, 3) in this regard argue that:

Hybrid war does not change the nature of war; it merely changes the way forces engage in its conduct. However, it is waged, war is war. Much as the term “combined arms” describes the tactical combination of infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and other branches of service in battle, the term “hybrid warfare” is a useful construct to analyze conflicts involving regular and irregular forces engaged in both symmetric and asymmetric combat.

This paper uses the term ‘hybrid war’ as, in our opinion, it comprises not only key elements of war, but also structures, agents, form of organization, and decision-making. Another debate around the concept of ‘hybrid war’ was evolving with regard to the so called “future of war”. Though Hoffman (2007, 43) argued that “the rise of Hybrid Warfare does not represent the defeat or the replacement of “the old-style warfare” or conventional warfare by the new. But it does present a complicating factor for defense planning in the 21st Century,” on the other hand, some scholars, especially before the 2022 Conflict in Ukraine, argued (Wither 2016) that hybrid war was replacing conventional ones. In particular, Third Artsakh war and later the Ukrainian conflict of 2022 clearly demonstrated that conventional wars have not left the contemporary international relations. It is important to mention the evolution of the concept, too, which started from more military-focused and developed to a much more engaging one. For instance, J. Vuković, D. Matika and S. Barić (2016) write that:

The research, based on the two study cases, confirmed the hypothesis that the hybrid way of warfare has a significant impact on the development of new capabilities of military organisation. Military organisations, in order to meet their basic tasks, are being forced to adapt to constant changes in the international strategic environment and the complexity of threats (“synergy of threats”), which together form a hybrid consisting of conventional and unconventional forms of warfare.

Murray and Mansoor (2012, 3) also write in quite similar understanding of ‘hybrid war’ in military domain:

Hybrid warfare also plays out at all levels of war, from the tactical, to the operational, to the strategic. In particular, military organizations must not ignore the political framework and its narrative within which all wars occur. At the strategic level, nations might choose to support insurgent movements with conventional forces to weaken an adversary, much as the French did when they allied with the Americans in 1778 to weaken the British. At the operational level, a commander might use guerrilla forces to harass enemy lines of communication or prevent the enemy from massing forces, as General Nathanael Greene did in the Southern campaign in 1780–1781 in the American Revolution. Finally, regular and

irregular forces might occasionally join tactically, as they did at the Battle of Cowpens in 1781.

They continue and mention that much as the term “combined arms” describes the tactical combination of infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and other branches of service in battle, the term “hybrid warfare” is a useful construct to analyze conflicts involving regular and irregular forces engaged in both symmetric and asymmetric combat (Libiseller 2023).

However, they go beyond of attaching ‘hybrid war’ only a tactical level and argue about political implications of hybrid wars: “In the world of hybrid war, it is not enough to destroy the enemy’s armed forces; to win, the indigenous, home-front, and international audiences must believe that the war is over. In other words, military success must lead to a commensurate political outcome as perceived by the affected populations” (Murray and Mansoor 2012, 10). Although it is still about military component only.

Quite similar approach is demonstrated by Wither (2020), when he discusses ‘hybrid war’ in the military domain: “New generation warfare emphasizes the use of nonkinetic techniques that promote social upheaval and create a climate of collapse, so that little or no military force is necessary. The armed forces have a supplementary role in this strategy. Special forces may conduct reconnaissance, subversion and espionage while, if necessary, large-scale conventional military exercises close to a target state’s borders seek to coerce and intimidate. Ideally, the use of armed force remains below the threshold that might trigger a conventional military response.”

Finally, it is important to mention that Murray and Mansoor (2012, 294) describe some main aspects of hybrid wars, especially accentuating the issue of its duration: “It would seem on the basis of the chapters in this study that success in such cases has rested on several crucial factors. The first and perhaps the most important lesson is that overwhelming superiority in resources and manpower can be but is not always decisive in such conflicts. Equally important is the will power to expend those resources over substantial periods of time because the historical cases suggest that there are no “silver bullet” solutions in these conflicts. In other words, blitzkrieg is not in the vocabulary of hybrid war.”

The evolution of the concept of ‘hybrid war’ can be traced in the edited volume entitled “Hybrid warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations” (Nilsson et al. 2021), where the authors extend the pure military understanding of the concept:

HT&HW – twenty-first-century style – differ from traditional threats and warfare more in intensity and degree than in kind. The exception is the virtual or digital realm, which empowers new tools and lowers the entry cost of using them. HT&HW denote adversaries or antagonists who aim to achieve outcomes without a war, to disrupt, undermine or damage the target’s political system and cohesion through a combination of violence, control, subversion, manipulation and dissemination of (mis)information.³ Hence, they target opposing societies, not combatants.⁴ HT&HW imply the simultaneous presence of a range of possible adversarial means, from threats of war to propaganda and everything in between. They therefore

include multiple instruments of power and influence, though with an emphasis on threats, non-military as well as military, operating below the threshold of open war. The identification of HT&HW does not allow for a clear-cut distinction between different forms of actors, be they state or non-state; soldiers or civilians; organized violence, terror, crime or war in a traditional sense. Regardless of the actor from which the threat originates, it has become customary for such actors to combine and tailor a mix of conventional and irregular means to achieve maximum effect (Nilsson et al. 2021, 3).

Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2017) continue the above logic and define hybrid war as “as the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects.” They argue that:

Hybrid warfare is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum. Therefore, as a minimum national government should conduct a self-assessment of critical functions and vulnerabilities across all sectors, and maintain it regularly. Hybrid warfare uses coordinated military, political, economic, civilian and informational (MPECI) instruments of power that extend far beyond the military realm. National efforts should enhance traditional threat assessment activity to include non-conventional political, economic, civil, international (PECI) tools and capabilities. Crucially, this analysis must consider how these means of attack may be formed into a synchronized attack package tailored to the specific vulnerabilities of its target.

Additionally, Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2017) argue that in hybrid warfare actors can “synchronize its military, political, economic, civilian, informational (MPECI) instruments of power to vertically and horizontally escalate a series of specific activities to create effects. It also shows how a hybrid warfare actor can either vertically escalate by increasing the intensity of one or many of the instruments of power, and/or horizontally ‘escalate’ through synchronizing multiple instruments of power to create effects greater than through vertical escalation alone.” According to them the actors can create synchronized packages, which might vary based on the operational needs: “The instruments of power used will depend on the capabilities of the hybrid warfare actor and on the perceived vulnerabilities of its opponent, as well as the political goals of the hybrid warfare actor and its planned ways to achieve those goals. As with all conflicts and wars, the character of hybrid warfare depends on the context.”

Finally, Johnson (2017) writes about hybrid wars impact not only the military domain, but also international relations. He argues that this erosion appears in five forms:

The first is political, such as the subversion of our political economy by means of misinformation, cyber sabotage or espionage.

The second takes the form of being diplomatic, namely the attempt to break or divide allies.

The third takes the form of military means, using local irregular forces, one's own troops in disguise, sabotage and assassination, proxies, brinkmanship or terrorism. The fourth is the social dimension, using media campaigns to demoralize our populations.

The fifth is economic attack, using sanctions, the purchase of our assets, the buying up of resources or even interference with the prices that our consumers pay.

He summarizes “that the military instrument appears to be less relevant or appropriate than diplomatic, economic or political measures.” Thus ‘hybrid war’ is a multifaceted concept which has significantly evolved since first used in 2007. It encompasses military and non-military elements, which are forming targeted packages based on the requirements of specific cases. Hybrid warfare can be both hierarchical and network-centric, covering all the spectrum from strategic to tactical levels.

Ethnic cleansing of Artsakh as a hybrid operation

The Trilateral Statement and the results of the 44-day Nagorno-Karabakh war, despite all tragic consequences, brought some hope for a long-term settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given that starting from 1994 Azerbaijan was claiming that the self-determination of Artsakh was the main problem Armenia and Azerbaijan, some believed that the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (specifically in the form of transfer of territories around Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to Azerbaijan and deployment of Russian peacekeepers) will bring peace and, hence, prosperity to the South Caucasus.

Though the text of the Statement was drafted for immediate intervention to stop the war, it had quite specific clauses to prepare a ground for a further peace-building process. Article 1 stated that “as of 00:00 Moscow time, 10 November 2020, a complete ceasefire and cessation of all military operations in Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone is hereby declared.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, shall stop at their current positions”; it stated about the deployment of peacekeepers as guarantor's peace and stability; in the meantime, the Statement specified that “all economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked” (Prime Minister of the RA 2020). Thus the Statement, if implemented, would have allowed starting building mechanisms to provide a peaceful and prosperous environment between Armenians and Azeris. However, very soon it became clear that the Statement is not going to work due to insufficient political will, maximalist demands from Azerbaijan, and its leadership desire to maximize the gains from the results 44-day Nagorno-Karabakh war, as they see it with the lenses of zero-sum gain. In particular, already in mid-December 2020, a month after the Statement, in violation of Article 1, Azerbaijan initiated an offensive and attacked Armenian positions in Hin Tagher and Khtsaberd villages, which had strategic location on Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh: Hin Tagher and Khtsaberd 2020).

This was the first, but not the last violation of the Article 1 of the Statement. In particular, two major Azerbaijani assaults against NK took place in March and July, 2022, when Azerbaijani troops overtook strategic Kartanglukh heights in Nagorno-

Karabakh's Armenian-populated areas and important locations in mountainous areas in the Lachin region and Nagorno-Karabakh's north, respectively (International Crisis Group 2023).

Thus, the military activities of Azerbaijan were directed towards both strengthening and improving strategic military positions after the Statement was signed. On the other hand, in addition to military gains, the military oppression of Azerbaijan covered at least two more domains – trust towards Russian peacekeepers among, particularly, Armenian of NK, and sense of safe life in their homeland – two significant and interconnected components.

The deployment of Russian peacekeepers in NK were greeted with great hope by both the authorities and population, as they were seen as guarantors of stability in non-recognized state. For instance, an extensive billboard with Putin's picture was placed at the main road leading to the capital city of Artsakh, Stepanakert. Russian language was announced as the second official language (International Crisis Group 2023). Even some rumors spread that NK might become a part of Russia (Grigoryan 2022). However, the Azerbaijani offensives largely undermined the trust towards Russia (Council on Foreign Relations 2024). However, the gone trust meant no trust towards their safe and sustainable life and future in NK. In addition, this agenda was supported by provocations and strikes against civilians, which very often were attacked in presence of Russian peacekeepers (JAMnews 2021).

In the meantime, Azerbaijan kept targeting the territory of the Republic of Armenia to, presumably, keep it busy and make sure it does not interfere in NK issues (International Crisis Group 2023). Very soon Azerbaijan started attacks towards the NK critical infrastructure, *inter alia*, gas and electricity supplies.

Below is an extract from International Crisis Group report for March 8, 2022: "Damage to pipeline causes gas crisis in NK. Nagorno-Karabakh had no natural gas for almost a month after the only pipeline that delivers gas from Armenia to Stepanakert was damaged near Azerbaijani military positions. The damage occurred during an unusually cold season" (International Crisis Group 2023). The cuts in gas supplies had become a 'new normal' since afterwards. Very soon cuts in electricity supplies became part of the Azerbaijani approach, too (Azatutyun.am 2023).

Interestingly, despite some problems internet connection worked quite well over the whole period from November 2020 to the end of ethnic cleansing. The reason might be that Azerbaijan quite extensively used internet connection and social networks for propaganda and influence operations campaigns and did not want to lose that channel.

Finally, the Azerbaijani agenda towards the NK actively explored the international stage. In particular, Aliyev and other officials were constantly blaming both Armenia and the leadership of NK in not following and avoiding to implement the Statement. Specifically, they were targeting the NK army and demanding to provide its disarmament (Hajiyeva 2022).

In the meantime, in violation of the Article 9 of the Statement in July 2021 Aliyev introduced the so called 'Zangezur corridor': "An Azerbaijani presidential decree, establishes the "Eastern Zangezur" economic zone, which comprises several districts (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Zangilan and Jebrail) of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone bordering Armenia. The term "Zangezur", first used by Azerbaijani President

Ilham Aliyev in mid-July, has irritated Armenia, which sees it as a claim on its territory" (International Crisis Group 2023).

However, the worst started in December 2022, when Azerbaijan started the NK blockade, which lasted till September, 2023 and ended with the ethnic cleansing of over 100 thousand Armenians from the non-recognized state (Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor 2023). Despite the multiple calls for de-blockade, coming from the international community, including the ICJ decision (International Court of Justice 2023), the Azerbaijan not only continued and intensified the blockade but also successfully implemented the ethnic cleansing of the NK.

Discussion and conclusions

Becoming more and more popular in contemporary international relations and security studies, the paper demonstrates that hybrid war occupied central role in Azerbaijani strategy towards Nagorno-Karabakh to gain full control over the non-recognized state, as well as provide its ethnic cleansing. The application of military and non-military measures allowed the Azerbaijani authorities to prepare the necessary measures gain full control of the NK and provide ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population. By exercising tools of hard power, influence operations and psychological turbulence, diplomatic and economic efforts, spreading fear and mistrust towards safe existence in the homeland, as well as under silence from international community, Azerbaijan managed to wholly depopulate NK, where Armenians lived for thousands of years. In particular, after the November 10, 2020 Trilateral Statement, the Azerbaijani authorities launched targeted operations of occupying strategic heights and locations, undermining the prestige of Russian peacekeepers, undermining faith towards the future among Armenians of the NK. The agenda was further developed by attacks towards critical infrastructure, namely gas and electricity supplies, specifically during cold winter time, and continued and supported by the full blockade, making people starving to death. This allowed creating the necessary ground to break the will for further struggle among the Armenians of the NK and leave their homeland, as soon as there is a chance.

Finally, Azerbaijan led a two-layer 'game' with the Republic of Armenia. On the one hand, it used force and threat to use force for multiple times, occupied some internationally recognized territories of the country. On the other hand, it quite actively participates in the peace talks and promises economic benefits for the Republic of Armenia, if there is a peace deal.

Ben Connable (2017) argues that "it is unrealistic to imagine irregular wars ending on clear, finite terms, so American strategist should stop trying to shoehorn irregular war planning into an ill-fitting end, ways, and means paradigm designed for conventional war." He suggests that "U.S. and its allies should consider similar modifications to the strategic design process writ large, with the intent of improving military and governmental effectiveness, reducing costs, and avoiding the kind of political backlash that often undermines long-term military operations" (Connable 2017).

Given the above, the uncertainties and turbulence around Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process leaves no space not to suggest deeply and comprehensively studying the Azerbaijani modifying ends, ways and means, adopting Armenia's strategies to the reality of hybrid wars.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.010>

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Conflict of interests

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR AND THE DYNAMICS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Abstract

The article examines the dynamics of development of relations between Armenia and Russia after the Second Karabakh War. Armenian-Russian relations are considered in the context of a comparative analysis of regional processes. In the context of the cooling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia managed to implement a key policy of containment, as well as maneuver between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, this policy became ineffective when Turkey actively intervened in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

The article analyzes the factors that negatively influenced the revision of Russian foreign policy to the detriment of Armenia. The article substantiates the hypothesis that Russia was able to stop military operations in the Second Karabakh war in time to prevent the strengthening of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan. From the point of view of Russian interests, the most effective way to solve this problem was to deepen relations with Azerbaijan through a strategic alliance at the expense of Armenia.

Keywords: Armenian-Russian relations, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Second Karabakh war, Turkey, Syunik corridor, Azerbaijan, Iran, CSTO.

Introduction

The second Karabakh War was the prelude to the Russia-West conflict. During the years of D. Trump's presidency, the USA activated the Iranian vector of the regional policy, and the South Caucasus once again became important for Washington. The White House clearly understands that the US has important, but not vital, interests in the South Caucasus, and from that point of view, it is more imperative to focus on the relations with Russia, Turkey and Iran (O'Brien 2024; Beckley 2021).

Armenia did not understand that for Russia the Nagorno-Karabakh problem will not be as important as the Ukrainian issue, which is considered more strategically important. And under the conditions of sanctions against Russia, the factor of Turkey

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and Azerbaijan has become more important. Russia planned that, on the one hand, the development of regional cooperation with Turkey would not allow Western forces to influence the ongoing processes, and on the other hand, Russian armed forces would be stationed in Artsakh, as a result of which the influence of the Kremlin on both sides of Azerbaijan and Armenia would increase. That is why, without supporting its ally in the second Karabakh war, the Kremlin suspended military operations at the right moment, preventing the strengthening of Turkish influence. Thus, since the mid-2010s, the Kremlin has adopted a strategy of strengthening its position in the South Caucasus at the expense of its weakest link, Armenia. The most effective way to achieve this was to deepen relations through a strategic alliance with Azerbaijan at the expense of Armenia. The safety of such a strategy was also explained by the fact that the Kremlin was confident that from a geopolitical point of view, Armenia did not have the opportunity to maneuver and change orientation, so it needed to come to terms with the road map drawn by him. However, this forecast did not come true. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation, Russia's influence in the South Caucasus has decreased and Turkey's role has increased. After all, the Kremlin failed to prevent the depopulation of Artsakh. In the current situation, the Syunik corridor remains Russia's last effective tool for maintaining its influence in the South Caucasus. Having become the main beneficiary of this corridor, Russia is coordinating its steps with Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this context, Armenia is in the most difficult situation, since it has to resolve ontological issues. Russia does not care how the Armenian society perceives its policies, since it is ready to use economic, political and military tools if necessary. However, it is clear to everyone that over the past 30 years, Armenian-Russian relations are in the worst condition. Although officially Armenia is still a member of the CSTO, the Armenian society does not trust its ally, and now Armenian-Russian relations have entered a period of transformation, and all future governments of Armenia will have to take these sentiments and approaches into account.

It is clear that when Moscow planned to start its military operations in Ukraine, it had to secure its rear. Why did Moscow decide to become a global actor in the 20s of the 21st century? First of all, the strengthened and already more developed China became the competitor of the USA in different continents, whose economic rise was followed by the sharp increase in military potential (Dodds 2023; Sahar 2023). Beijing became an alternative to the helomonist power of the USA, increased its diplomatic and economic presence in different regions of the world. Over time, China became dissatisfied with PAX Americana, where the USA was the main judge and had the position of the final decisionmaker. China's power has prompted various regional actors to revise their regional tactics. Beijing began to support all regional initiatives that weakened American hegemony. In addition, after the collapse of the USSR, the USA did not correctly calculate its potential and got involved in conflicts of no vital importance to it in different corners of the world, where it wasted billions of dollars and thousands of Americans died. However, the fact is that as a result of the American invasions the situation in those countries destabilized and this circumstance was used by China, Iran, Russia and Turkey (Shokri Kalehsar 2021). This moment is important. Examples include Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. At the same time, it should be noted that if previously only a few states in the world had powerful military potential and

weapons of mass destruction, after the Second World War, a number of regional states managed to create combat-ready armies equipped with modern ballistic missiles, air, sea and land weapons.

As for Russia, Moscow, developing its economic ties with Europe and receiving support from Beijing, modernized its military forces, the first experimental field of which was Syria.

At the same time, events in Crimea and Donbas were interpreted in Moscow as weakness of the West, and it was decided to neutralize the American influence in Eastern Europe. In our opinion, by presenting an ultimatum to NATO and the West in December 2021, Moscow was sure that it would be rejected and that military operations were inevitable (Banai 2023). Before that, Moscow decided to strengthen its rear and “solve” the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the solution of which was beneficial to both the West and Turkey and Azerbaijan. In the Kremlin, they understood that in the event of sanctions against it, Turkey will become the only window to Europe and the South Caucasus will turn into a transport corridor connecting the East with the West. Back in 2019, we drew the attention of Armenian expert circles to this circumstance. When the “Southern Gas Corridor” was launched in Baku in May 2018, the importance of the “Ganja Corridor” increased, through which the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Supas oil, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, optical cable connecting Western Europe with the Caspian region, as well as the E-60 European highway pass.

If we take into consideration the fact that Caspian and Central Asian energy sources can be exported to Europe bypassing Russia, then naturally it is not desirable for the West to have Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh controlled by Moscow, because the “Ganja Corridor” is only 50-60 km away from Artsakh, and in case of destabilization of the situation, the safety of these communications may also be endangered. Along with a number of factors, this circumstance contributed to the West being interested in the quick resolution of the Karabakh conflict (Vardazaryan 2023).

As for Moscow, the latter needs the support of Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan in its region on the eve of confrontation with the West. For that, it was necessary to adopt an interim decision, as a result of which both the Russian army will appear in Artsakh and Azerbaijan will get back the territories adjacent to Artsakh and a part of the former Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, the Velvet Revolution that took place in Armenia in April 2018 was not the best option for Moscow, but the new RA authorities initially did everything to dispel Moscow’s mistrust. In the interviews given in the Western media, N. Pashinyan repeatedly stated that there will be no change in the geopolitical vector (Vardazaryan and Vardazaryan 2019). In the relations with the Russian Federation, its behavior as an ally was demonstrated by the RA’s position and vote at the United Nations on the Crimea problem, the involvement of the Armenian forces in the mission carried out by the Russian Federation in Syria. Here we consider it necessary to emphasize that in the current Russian-American tense conditions, even Russia’s closest allies Belarus and Kazakhstan did not dare to take such a step.

Did the new authorities of the RA have slip-ups in their relations with Moscow? Of course, yes. But it came more from lack of experience than from unprofessional

diplomacy. From that point of view, we can mention the hasty arrest of the CSTO General Secretary Yu. Khachaturov and the RA Second President R. Kocharyan.

A part of the Armenian political circles tries to blame only the Armenian side for the deterioration of the Armenian-Russian relations, not analyzing its deep reasons.

Let us remind that unlike Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, Azerbaijan was never considered by Moscow as an enemy state. Even the affiliation to GUAM in 1997 and the closing of the Gabala Radar Station were not perceived with dismay in Moscow. Azerbaijan was never included in any of the integration processes put forward by Moscow, pursued a policy independent of Russia, and especially during the presidency of V. Putin, Russian-Azerbaijani relations became closer.

After the 1994 ceasefire, the best option for Moscow was the freezing of the NK conflict, which enabled the Kremlin to exert pressure on both Yerevan and, if necessary, Baku. L. Broers, director of the Caucasian programs of the British Organization Conciliation Resources, called this policy “pivotal containment policy”, within the framework of which Russia, which is the “pivot”, maneuvers around Armenia and Azerbaijan, sometimes implementing an inconsistent policy. However, that policy became ineffective and meaningless when Turkey was actively involved in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and provided large-scale political and military support to Azerbaijan (Meister 2024; Colibăşanu 2023).

In the interviews given to the Russian mass media, N. Pashinyan stated that everyone in Armenia and the Diaspora is sure that the Russian Federation has all the means to restrain Azerbaijan and prevent the tension in the region from growing. Russia also has all the means and tools to prevent Azerbaijan’s attack on Armenia or Karabakh, and it will act in that way, because it is Armenia’s strategic ally, our centuries-old brother and friend.

In Yerevan, they did not understand, as in 1920, as well as now, that the Ukrainian issue will have more significance for Moscow, than the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. And it is no coincidence that, to the surprise of Yerevan, during the September 2020 war, Moscow, like the other co-chair countries of the Minsk Group, took an emphatic neutral position. And this is when Turkey began to support Azerbaijan in a demonstrative way, and even transferred fighters from Syria to Karabakh. However, among the Minsk co-chairs, only Moscow managed to stop the military operations. What does that indicate? Not having the opportunity to fight on several fronts at the same time, considering Ukraine important and predicting that the RF will have to enter into a fight with the collective West, the Kremlin focused on the issue of the control of the South Caucasus with Turkey, reserving the role of a senior partner (Bartolini 2024). At first glance, it may seem that Moscow and Ankara planned all their moves and the main beneficiary of the second Karabakh War is Russia, which managed to freeze the conflict, deployed peacemakers (in fact a military base) in the “territory” of Azerbaijan, and a significant part of the territory of Artsakh actually appeared under control of the Russian military forces. The tripartite statement of November 9 was unclear enough and in Moscow it was believed that the authority gained was enough to not focus on the issue of the status of the peacemakers. At the same time, on the eve of the military confrontation against Ukraine, on February 22, 2022, the Declaration on Allied Cooperation was signed between Russia and Azerbaijan with the agreement of Ankara.

It should be reminded that before that, Baku had signed the “Shushi Declaration” with Turkey, according to which Turkey would provide military support to Azerbaijan if necessary.

The cooperation with Turkey, despite some existing contradictions, which sometimes turn into military strikes, nevertheless enables Moscow to maintain its presence in Syria without wasting large resources. However, in this case, it is important for Moscow that by cooperating with Turkey, it limits the possibility of maneuvering for the USA and the EU (Smith 2023). In the South Caucasus, it also derives from the interests of Turkey, and for that reason, it accepts the presence of the Russian Federation in the strategic Middle Eastern zones. Both in 1920 and 100 years later, Turkey’s anti-Western position is more important to Moscow than the overall Christian political platform. Currently, the Kremlin prefers conservative and anti-Western Islam to the liberal West. The presidents of Russia and Turkey agree on changing the world order created by the West and are in favor of a multi-polar world order. This circumstance explains the mutually approved policy for Erdogan with Moscow, the clarification of the spheres of influence and the diversification of policy. It is important for the region how much the elements of cooperation and competition between the two countries will be combined.

It is clear that Nagorno-Karabakh alone could not withstand the Turkish-Azerbaijani attack. And how should Armenian-Russian relations develop after the defeat? From this point of view, the editorial review of RIA News, date October 1, 2020, are noteworthy. It is noted that as a result of the Karabakh War, Russia may lose its influence in the South Caucasus, because the defeated Armenia, disappointed with Moscow, will turn to the West, and Azerbaijan, having seen the effective Turkish assistance, will freeze its ties with the Kremlin. As a result, Turkey will become stronger, and becoming the most influential force in the South Caucasus, it will also initiate the expulsion of Russia from Syria and Libya (Özdal 2023).

But in the Kremlin, this concept was considered harmful and wrong. By not helping anyone in that war, Russia will restore its influence in the region by quickly stopping it if necessary. In order to maintain its influence, Moscow is not even bothered by the fact that Turkey does not recognize Russia’s approaches to Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is further noted that although Turkey bought half of Georgia and formed the “two states, one people” concept with Azerbaijan, Tbilisi, which does not have diplomatic relations with Russia, cannot ignore the Moscow factor (Özdal 2023). Moscow believes that the strengthening of Turkey’s position in the region is acceptable, but not at the expense of Russian interests. They consider the approaches of Turkey as wrong, that if they were able to reach an agreement with Moscow in Syria, then the same parity approach should be in Artsakh. Moscow is not interested in excessively strengthening Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus, because Turkey is a member of NATO and if it cooperates with Moscow as a national state under Erdogan, what guarantees will the Kremlin have that the power in Ankara will not be transferred to the NATO-oriented forces in the future? However, Moscow considers that Turkey is not interested in stopping the 17-year Moscow-Ankara cooperation. This is also evidenced by the statement of the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, D. Peskov, that Moscow is in full contact with Ankara regarding the Nagorno Karabakh situation (Avdaliani 2022).

It turns out that Moscow thought that they should strengthen their positions in the South Caucasus at the expense of the weakest link, Armenia. And before carrying out that step, it was necessary to launch an information campaign against Yerevan, the main goal of which was to show that such a situation was formed through the fault of the authorities who “betrayed” Moscow (Avdaliani 2022). From this point of view, Ye. Prigozhin’s statement that “Soros”, which feels so free in Armenia, intervened in the conflict, and Turkey has the right to intervene in the Karabakh conflict without violating the borders of Armenia, is remarkable.

A. Dugin also believes that the activities of Soros and N. Pashinyan’s government were problematic for Moscow in the South Caucasus, and, as for Turkey, it will not take hostile steps towards Russia in this region (Dugin 2023).

The Kremlin understands well that Turkey has no alternative but NATO in terms of security in the near future, and in the event of the alignment of the interests of that country and the West, Russia’s influence will decrease for Ankara. At the same time, from the point of view of the authority and interests of the Russian Federation, it followed that Armenia would not completely lose Artsakh, and in that case, Yerevan, not completely satisfied with the Kremlin’s policy, would have to keep the alliance with Moscow. In Yerevan, they could not understand in time that in the new situation, the interests of the Russian Federation began to coincide more with those of Azerbaijan. In 2018, a conference entitled “Azerbaijan is Russia’s only ally in the South Caucasus” was organized in the immediate vicinity of the Artsakh borders. Representatives of the “International Eurasian Movement”, “Izborsky Club”, “Yedinaya Rossiya” (United Russia) and the Russian Democratic Party could not participate in the event without Moscow’s direct consent. Here, on October 19, 2018, A. Dugin announced that the most effective way to increase Russia’s influence in Armenia is to deepen strategic alliance relations with Azerbaijan at the expense of Yerevan.

For Moscow, the increase of the role of Azerbaijan is connected with the launch of the “North-South” Corridor. By bypassing the Suez Canal, India should connect with Russia through Iran. The agreement on the creation of the “North-South” Corridor was signed between the governments of Russia, Iran and India back in September 2000. The western section would pass through Azerbaijan and the Astra-Resht-Kaghzvan section would be built for that purpose.

Although Yerevan joined the agreement in 2004, it was actually left out of all the projects.

In 2023, in Astara, the Russian authorities announced that they will build a logistics center on the Iran-Azerbaijan border (Vinokurov, Ahunbaev and Zaboev 2022). Now it becomes clear why the “Zangezur Corridor” is also necessary and why the problem of Artsakh received such a solution. A. Dugin noted that the results of the 44-day war were not due to the Baku-Ankara alliance, but Putin gave his consent for Azerbaijan to restore its territorial integrity by force. The main decision was made in Moscow and it depends on Putin who will own Karabakh (Kremlin 2020).

Then the head of the “International Eurasian Movement” states that after the 44-day war, any leader of Armenia will have to unconditionally implement the tripartite declaration of November 9. However, according to A. Dugin, after the second

Karabakh War, N. Pashinyan helps Moscow more than anyone else, because he will no longer have a single chance for a maneuver, and if does anything incorrect, he will immediately be deprived of power. Moreover, he notes that V. Putin has started to protect and support N. Pashinyan in Armenia, with whom Moscow has started to conduct a constructive policy. At the same time, A. Dugin announces Moscow's expectations regarding Baku's inclusion in the CSTO and EAEU¹.

Thus, Armenia found itself in a rather difficult situation. After the second Karabakh War, Yerevan is militarily defenseless. Officially, it is an ally of Moscow and a member of the CSTO. Moscow and the CSTO declare that Azerbaijan is also a brotherly and friendly country for them, and a more acceptable country from the point of view of the political administration. We should not forget that on the eve of Ukrainian military cooperation, it also signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Russia.

As for Turkey, the latter is a politically and economically vital country for Moscow after February 24, 2022.

However, the Kremlin's analysis is not always correct. The situation changed after the Russian-Ukrainian military operations. As a result of them, Moscow's influence in the post-Soviet space was decreasing, and it is no coincidence that the issue of the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict smoothly began to move to the West.

Moscow's last step as an "ally" was the depopulation of Artsakh, which has always been loyal to the Russians in the region. The September 2023 One-day War showed that Moscow does not want to risk the lives of its soldiers and go to confrontation with Baku. With the de facto expulsion of Armenians from Artsakh, the question of the expediency of the presence of Russian peacekeepers there was also lost. However, the question of Russian peacekeepers leaving Artsakh is still not officially discussed. On January 7, 2024, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation made a statement that "the Russian peacekeeping force continues to carry out tasks in 18 observation posts of the Karabakh economic region of the Republic of Azerbaijan."² Already this wording means a revision of the tripartite agreement of November 9. The nine-month blockade in anticipation of getting the Meghri Corridor and the depopulation of Artsakh, the capture of its political and military leadership, raised doubts in the RA political circles and public opinion about the possibilities and desires of Moscow to fulfill its ally duties. It will not be an exaggeration to mention that the Third Armenian Republic was formed as a result of the Artsakh War and for more than 30 years, the Armenian people handed over all their economic powers to the strategic ally and suffered many deprivations, believing that as a result they received a security guarantee. After the war, some issues arose in the Armenian society, which were never clarified. For example, could Azerbaijan, without the awareness or consent of the Kremlin, start military operations first against Artsakh, and then directly against the RA? Or did Moscow use its all tools to prevent that war? These questions do not bother

¹ Aravot. 2021. "Revelations from Dugin: "We have accomplished our task. Now it is time for Baku to join the CSTO and the EAEU"."[Otkroveniya o Dugina: «My svoyu zadachu vypolnili. Seychasy prishlo vremya Baku vstupat' v ODKB i YEAES»]. Accessed April 30, 2024. <https://ru.aravot.am/2021/04/16/354685/>.

² Ministry of Defence of the RF. 2023. "Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh." Accessed April 30, 2024. https://eng.mil.ru/en/russian_peacekeeping_forces.htm.

the Kremlin at all, because after February 2022, the priority for Moscow is Ukraine, and the issues in the South Caucasus region can be resolved jointly with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenian-Russian tension was also created in the first years of ANM's rule, but later Moscow revised its approaches and Yerevan became Moscow's closest ally in the South Caucasus. However, the situation is different now, and even if the crisis in Armenian-Russian relations is overcome, mistrust towards Russia will remain after the depopulation of Artsakh. However, Moscow is not concerned about this, because they believe that from a geopolitical point of view, "Yerevan has no other way" and Moscow has enough effective methods to punish it. For example, by expelling ethnic Armenians from Russia, freezing economic ties, stopping gas supplies, and finally carrying out military pressure with the help of Azerbaijanis.

In Yerevan, they are trying not to aggravate relations with Russia, thinking that if Moscow is not an ally, at least Armenia should not acquire a new enemy in the face of Russia. At the same time, it is clear that from the security point of view, the West cannot assume the role of Russia. Russia, in its turn, which is under sanctions, does not want to aggravate relations with Yerevan, because it is not sure whether by harming Armenia it can return it to its sphere of influence, or whether these pressures can have the opposite result, because new actors have already appeared in the region.

In the current situation, the easiest way for Moscow to justify itself is to resort to manipulations. For example, who said that in Armenia they expected Russian soldiers to fight instead of Armenians? In Yerevan, it was believed that Moscow could fulfill its ally duties by supplying weapons, which also did not happen. Or that N. Pashinyan recognized Nagorno- Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan and did not give Moscow the opportunity to act. It is so, but the Russian President announced it first in his interview after the tripartite agreement on November 9³. And could Armenia, abandoned by its ally, get involved in the war again, this time losing Syunik and waiting for the next "rescuers".

Until then, official Yerevan never made any territorial claims to Azerbaijan. In addition, if the RA leadership recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan, does this circumstance cancel Moscow's guarantees given to the Armenians of Artsakh by the Russian Federation? In our opinion - no. If we approach with the same logic, then Moscow recognizes the Transnistrian region as a part of Moldova, but it has deployed its peacemakers there as well. However, not having the opportunity or not having wish to fulfill its responsibilities as an ally, Moscow considers every contact of Yerevan with the West as a hostile step. For example, when in May 2021 and especially in September 2022, Azerbaijani troops carried out an aggression against the RA and hundreds of soldiers were killed, Moscow was silent. The Russian side had about 2 months to react to the September battles, but even the bombing of the border base of the Federal Security Service of the RF did not change the situation. Moreover, the Russian side preferred to reject that fact and call it fake news.

The RF and the CSTO delayed the response to Yerevan's official appeals and eventually described it as a "border incident" on the grounds that the Armenian-

³ Anadolu Ajansı. 2023. "Putin says Karabakh 'irrevocably' became part of Azerbaijan in 2022." Accessed April 30, 2024. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-says-karabakh-irrevocably-became-part-of-azerbaijan-in-2022/3018909#>.

Azerbaijani border was not clearly defined. When European civilian observers arrived in the region at the request of Armenia, Moscow reacted very harshly, accusing the USA and the EU of inciting geopolitical conflicts (Council of the EU 2023). Arriving EU civil observers recorded the Azerbaijani aggression and the Armenian occupied territories (EEAS 2023).

Not wanting to aggravate the situation again, Yerevan tried to explain to Moscow that before applying to the EU, many applications addressed to Moscow remained unanswered and this action was a deliberate step by the Armenian side, and not a matter of geopolitical choice. Another manipulation took place during the CSTO 2023 November summit, when Russian Foreign Minister M. Lavrov announced that the organization is ready to send observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border regions, but Armenian colleagues said that this decision will be important only if the actions of Azerbaijan are condemned (Reuters 2023). Lavrov then responded that they explained to their Armenian colleagues that if it comes to condemnation, rhetoric, or expressing views, then everyone has the right to do what they want (Reuters 2023; MFA of the RF 2023). In other words, for Moscow and the CSTO, the territorial integrity of its ally, the bombing of the city of Jermuk, which is 13 km from the border, and the hundreds of victims should have remained unresponsive.

The latest disappointment of the Armenian authorities was the 2024 briefings of M. Zakharova, the representative of the MFA of the RF, where she stated that Russia is not aware of any facts of ethnic cleansing by Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabakh (FIP 2024). She claims that the Armenian side did not present any facts in this regard. It is not possible that the Russian side does not know how the UN clarified the concept of “ethnic cleansing” after the events in Yugoslavia.

It is obvious that the official point of view and rhetoric of the MFA of the RF created a new gap between Armenia and the RF, because the Armenian authorities are still actively fighting for the elimination of the consequences of the genocide and ethnic cleansing carried out by Azerbaijan against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh (MFA of the RA 2023).

Thus, the 44-day war and the depopulation of Artsakh dramatically changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus. First of all, the influence of Turkey increased significantly. Many people in Moscow do not want to understand that the defeat of the RA, an ally of Russia, is also their defeat. The Kremlin's passive and neutral position is predictable for Turkey and Azerbaijan. The actual diplomatic support of Moscow was theirs (Karlinsky and Torrisi 2023; Lantsov 2022).

For Armenia, its previous security system collapsed and the neutralization of existential threats became a matter of agenda. After the 44-day war and in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was necessary to diversify the RA's foreign policy. After the second Karabakh War, it became clear that Russia needs the neutrality of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the region, which has its price. Actually, Nagorno-Karabakh was sacrificed to the Middle Corridor, and now it is the turn of the “Zangezur Corridor” - Russia. If Russia fails to control the Meghri region, Moscow will lose one of its most important factors in relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russian border guards are actually already in Syunik. Syunik has become an important zone of West-East confrontation.

On the one hand, the West is against Azerbaijan opening a road to Nakhichevan through the territory of Iran, on the other hand, it demands that the Meghri road not be controlled by the Russian border guards. Taking into consideration the sanctions, the tense situation in the Middle East, the activation of the Houthis, the control of Syunik, the shortest route to China and India, is becoming a vital issue for Moscow. That is why Yerevan is trying not to aggravate the situation, because it is clear that if Moscow sees strategic risks for itself, it is ready to become active on this front as well. Much depends here on the Russian-Ukrainian and situational developments in the Middle East. That is why, from a deep point of view, Armenia and Russia are trying to solve the problems between them, but it is quite clear that the problem should be solved with the participation of Middle Eastern actors, and increasing the role of the West will aggravate the situation (Smith 2023; Banai 2023).

Fundamentally, Yerevan did not function effectively in the past three years. In fact, Yerevan failed to diversify its foreign policy and there is no real balancing. Armenia cannot rely on other power centers, because it has not seriously clarified its strategic interests with them, and therefore it is not realistic to expect help from the West (Beckley 2021; Shokri Kalehsar 2021; O'Brien 2024). We had a situation where we could not find guarantors of Armenian-Azerbaijani peace, neither in Moscow, nor in Brussels, nor in Washington. The three power centers are not going to give clear security guarantees to Yerevan. Yerevan also hesitates that if it chooses the western platform and it does not justify itself, the consequences of that step can be devastating and in what form they will return to the Russian platform in the future. At the same time, they understand in Yerevan that what Azerbaijan wants, Moscow also wants. Yerevan's announcements cannot restrain either Russia or the West. Azerbaijan and Moscow do not yet have a peace agenda until they control all communications. Currently, the situation is complicated by the fact that there is talk of concluding a large interstate agreement between Moscow and Tehran. In other words, serious repositioning processes are expected in the region. During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Iran had the opportunity to improve relations with the West and work in a different format, but chose a different strategy by allying with Moscow. If Yerevan had deepened relations with Moscow and Tehran, that strategic cooperation would not cause new challenges for us, and now Tehran may change its principled approach regarding the Syunik Corridor. At the same time, in case of Russian-Iranian rapprochement, the importance of Turkey and Azerbaijan for the West will increase.

Conclusion and discussion

1. Thus, in the post-war years, Yerevan did not manage to restore the balance of power and diversify its foreign policy. Yerevan adopted the wrong approach by being open to all intermediaries and placing responsibility on all of them.
2. When the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation started, Russian influence in the South Caucasus decreased and Moscow's economic, political and technological dependence on Turkey increased. It became clear when the Kremlin announced that it was refusing to go ahead with the grain deal. R. Erdogan "convinced" Moscow to reconsider its decision within two days.

3. In fact, until today, Yerevan believes in regional rather than Western integration and has not actually taken any steps that would not meet the interests of Russia and Azerbaijan.
4. The southern part of the RA is at the center of the conflict between the geopolitical interests of Russia, China and the West, and is one of the links of conflicts arising one after the other on China's logistics roads (Taiwan, Baloch people, Houthis, Arab-Israeli conflict, etc.). Now the main beneficiary of the Meghri Corridor is Moscow, for which the control of that section is vital.
5. A situation has been created when none of the world's power centers is going to give security guarantees to Yerevan. Currently, compared to Moscow, the West has better tools of diplomatic and economic control over Turkey and Azerbaijan, but Yerevan cannot have special expectations in this matter, because they have not combined their interests with it.
6. In Yerevan, they are wary that rapprochement with the West may cause many new challenges for the RA. For Yerevan, the West cannot replace Moscow in matters of vital importance such as security, energy, economy, etc. Ultimately, the security architecture of the South Caucasus depends on the results of Russian-Ukrainian and Middle Eastern political developments. That is why Yerevan is trying to get out of the sphere of conflicts of power centers and take a neutral position as much as possible.
7. Brussels' opportunities to maneuver in the South Caucasus increased when Georgia received EU candidate status at the end of 2023. It implies that Tbilisi will have to reduce the intensity of cooperation with Moscow.
8. Armenia now has to choose between bad and worst. However, it is already clear that after the loss of Artsakh and the events surrounding Syunik, Armenian-Russian relations underwent a transformation that cannot be restored in the near future. All governments of the RA cannot ignore this factor in their relations with the Kremlin.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at
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The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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SELF-EXCLUSION AS A SECURITY STRATEGY OF SMALL STATES

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Abstract

This article analyzes the strategy of self-exclusion in the foreign policy of small states, considering their goals and expected results of this strategy, that is, the main conditions for its implementation, the main determinants, and also identifies and characterizes its varieties and practical manifestations. In this context, global transformations also cause changes related to the positions and roles of small states in world politics and international relations. At the same time, global transformations change the understanding of the security of small states, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of studies in this area. Together, these factors become the rationale for the relevance of studying the security problems of small states in modern conditions. In conclusion, the results of the analysis are summarized, the features of the strategy of self-exclusion, common features and differences in its varieties are shown.

Keywords: small state, great power, foreign policy, security, self-exclusion, neutrality, non-alignment, strategic autonomy.

Introduction

In previous articles (Galstyan 2021, 61-70; Galstyan 2019, 8-14) the main factors underlying the foreign policy behavior and choice of strategy of small states have been examined and analyzed by us. We have also proposed an approach to classify these strategies. We have distinguished and typified two of them, strategies of compilation and opposition. Continuing the analysis, we will consider the third group of strategies - self-exclusion. Here, too, we will take as a starting point the ability of the small states to withstand threats from the external environment (and, naturally, first of all, from the great powers) and to ensure the maximum possible autonomy from the great powers in matters of foreign and domestic policy. In our opinion, the logic of self-exclusion in that regard and the difference from other groups of strategies is that *through self-exclusion, the small states seek to stay out of the competition of other states (first of all, great powers), and, which is very important, while refusing to join them in those*

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initiatives that provide for the obligation of counteraction to a third party and the obligation of mutual assistance in the event of aggressive actions by any third state. This definition, on the one hand, takes into consideration only the initiatives of other states, not referring to the case when the counter-action is initiated by the small state, for example, in the case of being attacked by another state (self-defense). On the other hand, this definition includes all possible countermeasures (military, economic, diplomatic, information-psychological, etc.) considering the fact that power competition in the modern world combines different spheres (for example, hybrid wars).

The primary goal of this analysis is to highlight the fundamental features of the self-exclusion policies. For this purpose, we will make an attempt 1. to specify the final result and conditions of that group of strategies, 2. from the policies attributed to small states in the literature, to separate, characterize and classify those fitting the self-exclusion.

Accordingly, we should, a) separate and define, describe the policies of small states, available in the professional literature, which correspond to the above-mentioned characteristic of self-exclusion, that is, they can be included in that group of foreign security strategies of small states. In parallel b) we have to show the characteristics, the conditions of which the policies of small states should comply in order to be considered self-exclusion and then, c) we will group, classify and typify these policies, based on their most essential commonalities and differences. Finally, c) we need to highlight the reasons that force, motivate the small states to adopt this or that policy in line with the strategy of self-exclusion.

Definitions and characteristics of neutrality

As we have already mentioned (Galstyan 2021, 62-63), in the professional literature there are various sets of strategies applied by the small states towards the great powers, which mention those that fully or mostly correspond to the above-mentioned key features of self-exclusion: not to undertake counter-actions against any state and international-legal obligations providing for (mutual) support to any state and not to join actions pursuing such a goal. In other words, self-exclusion implies a refusal to undertake certain international-legal obligations and actions (steps, policies).

Neutrality (Hey 2003a, 5) is described in the professional literature as a foreign policy characterized by mentioned features of small states' policies, which, however, does not have a single definition and explanation. On the contrary, different authors, emphasizing various aspects of neutrality, give diverse definitions of it. For example, neutrality, according to Raimo Väyrynen, is a pacifist and consensual foreign policy direction, striving to play the role of a bridge between the great powers (Väyrynen 1971, 96). According to Anne-Sophie Dahl, the idea of neutrality is based on strategic independence from or strategic proportional relations with competing power centers (Dahl 1997, 185). Jean-Marc Rickli defines neutrality as a foreign policy principle which has a goal to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the small states, based on non-participation in international conflicts (Rickli 2010, 182). Graham Evans and Jeffrey Neumham consider neutral a state that does not directly or indirectly

support any of the conflicting parties by any actions or statements (Evans and Neumham 1998, 366). According to Laurent Goetschel's formulation, neutrality is a principled belief, the political core of which are the interest-based normative ideas about foreign and security policy, and the legal requirements arising from that essential are causal beliefs (Goetschel 1999, 117-118). Daniel Frei, in his turn, considers neutrality an expression of national-state sovereignty, as the right of states not to participate in hostilities (Frei 1967, 14-15).

The last idea - neutrality as the right not to participate in military operations, in our opinion, does not fully and accurately reflect the essence of neutrality. First, in the case of neutrality, not participating in hostilities (directly or indirectly-mediated) is not a right, but an obligation. Second, non-belligerence means not being a warring party, but it does not necessarily mean neutrality, not supporting (directly or indirectly) any of the warring parties. Accordingly, this support can be on one's own initiative (for example, the involvement of a third party in a "proxy war" in order to influence the result of the war) or forced (for example, under the pressure of one of the conflicting parties). Such cases are not few in history. For example, as it is known from history, the USA officially became a belligerent in the Second World War after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and before that, without directly fighting the Axis powers, it provided technical and economic support to the Allies. In a number of local wars of the Cold War period (Korean, Vietnamese, Angolan, Afghan, etc.), the USA and the USSR and their allies did not openly fight directly against each other, but supported one of the warring parties. In the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a number of NATO member states were not officially warring parties, but provided economic, technical and political support to Ukraine. Thus, these cases of direct non-belligerence cannot be considered neutrality, a manifestation of self-exclusion, because they do not meet the above-mentioned characteristics of self-exclusion, in particular, the condition of not joining actions aimed at countermeasures or assistance.

Neutrality should also be distinguished from demilitarization. The latter means the withdrawal or disarmament of the armed forces from any territory, and in case of retention, it is assumed that these armed forces must have exclusively limited defensive capabilities. It does not necessarily imply the provision of external guarantees of independence and territorial sovereignty to that state. And if demilitarization refers to the entire territory of a state, then it is expected that the state should thereafter conduct a *policy of neutrality or non-alignment* (Evans and Neumham 1998, 119). In other words, neutrality can be a possible or expected, but not necessary consequence of demilitarization. In this case, we should observe the concept of neutralization, which we will refer to later. But, as some authors note, "neutralized" states are rarely demilitarized (Evans and Neumham 1998, 367, Black 1968, xiv).

Summarizing the written above, we can notice that the definitions mentioned above (but also those not mentioned here) emphasize one or the other aspect of our definition of self-exclusion strategy, but not all at the same time. Therefore, it is expected that these features should also be reflected in one or another foreign security strategy, which can be considered as types and varieties of self-exclusion strategy. For this reason, it is necessary to examine such strategies mentioned in the professional literature as well.

Forms and types of neutrality

In the professional literature, we find several external security strategies corresponding to the above-mentioned definition of self-exclusion to a greater or lesser extent. It should be noted that neutrality in general is often mentioned as an external security strategy typical of small states (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2017, 6; Vaicekauskaitė 2017, 12-13). One can also see discussions about some types of neutrality. But we are interested in the studies in which as many types of neutrality as possible, discussed theoretically and demonstrated in practice, are presented and examined.

Thus, Lassa Oppenheim, considered the founder of the modern concept of international law, has outlined the following (*historical*) types of neutrality (Oppenheim 1912, 368-371):

- Perpetual or permanent – a state (for example, Switzerland) has been “neutralized” by a special international treaty, which defines the obligations and rights of that state in times of peace and war. Accordingly, these legal regulations imply not only the obligation not to support any of the warring parties, but also the obligation not to allow any of the warring parties to use its territory. As we will present below, focusing on the example of Finland, even permanent status does not guarantee perpetuity of neutrality.
- General and partial - in the case of partial neutrality, a part of the state's territory is “neutralized”, and that state is obliged to be neutral in matters related to that territory. In the case of general neutrality, no part of the state is “neutralized” by an international treaty, but it conducts a neutral policy.
- Voluntary (simple, natural) and conventional - in the case of voluntary, state's neutrality does not derive from any international-legal obligation, and at any time the state can abandon the neutral position and support any of the warring parties. An example of this is Sweden, which, as we will show below, renounced neutrality and joined NATO after a long time of neutrality. Contrary to that, conventional neutrality is an international-legal obligation. The neutrality of “neutralized” states is always conventional, while “non-neutralized” states may also be bound by an international treaty during a particular war (as the USA in the 1793 Franco-British War), and during another war the same state may be bound by an alliance treaty and, on the contrary, support any of the warring parties.
- Armed – a neutral state takes military measures to protect its neutrality, for example, when there is a threat of one of the warring parties using the neutral state's territory or violating other rights of the neutral state. Switzerland's neutrality is considered an example of armed neutrality.
- Benevolent – according to Oppenheim, in this outdated form of neutrality, which is no longer applicable, the state does not participate in the war, but in all other matters it had a biased attitude towards one of the warring parties. As shown by the behavior of a number of European neutral states in the context of the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this form of neutrality is still relevant.

- Absolute (perfect) and qualified (imperfect) - a non-perfect neutral state directly or indirectly, actively or passively supported one of the warring parties, based on some agreement signed with it before the war. However, as a result of the development of international law, this version of neutrality, according to Oppenheim, is no longer applicable, in contrast to the perfect one, according to which a neutral state does not support any of the warring parties in any way.

Archie Simpson, in his turn, mentions four *modern* types of neutrality: *de jure*, *de facto*, temporary neutrality and non-alignment (Simpson 2018, 124-125). Accepting perhaps this most comprehensive typological approach reflecting the modern types of neutrality, it is necessary to examine them and also add some types or subtypes.

Thus, neutrality, as state's legal status (neutral state), can be considered the "purest" of all types. The main commonality of all its varieties and, at the same time, the difference from other types of neutrality, is the legal fixation of neutrality. Examples of this are the 1793 Proclamation of Neutrality by the USA in the Franco-British War, the recognition and guarantee of Switzerland's neutrality by the 1815 Vienna Assembly, by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, then in 1933 by the League of Nations, the recognition of Finland's neutrality by the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Austria's neutrality in 1955 by the Declaration of Independence, the declaration of Moldova's neutrality by the 1994 Constitution, the recognition of Turkmenistan's neutrality by the UN General Assembly in 1995.

Having analyzed the mentioned cases of neutrality, we can make a number of theoretical conclusions.

First, determining the legal status of neutrality can refer to a specific case (for example, the neutrality of the USA in the Franco-British war), be occasional, not permanent, manifest as *Ad hoc "impartial non-participation"*, and be permanent, equally apply to peace and war situations (all other examples). We will look at the occasional neutrality separately a little later, and about permanent neutrality, it should be noted that Leos Müller considers it to be the birth of the concert system of the 19th century, when great powers guaranteed the neutrality of a small state through an agreement. In the cases of Switzerland and Belgium, permanent neutrality was intended to reduce the tension between the great powers and the possibility of their clash in the territory of the neutralized state. In the case of Switzerland, neutralization "from above" was later transformed into a long-term policy of neutrality on the international stage, and national identity at the national level (Müller 2019, 6).

Efraim Karsh defines permanent neutrality as a consistent policy of non-alignment in peacetime aimed at forming the foundations of neutrality in wartime. In order to internationally legitimize its permanent neutrality, a neutral state seeks to institutionalize that status through national legislation or international treaties. The latter usually stipulate restrictions for a neutral state to use its armed forces exclusively for self-defense, not to sign a military alliance with other states, allowing them to use its territory for military purposes. In times of war, a permanent neutral state is obliged not to take part in the war and not to support any of its parties. The other party to the treaty (usually the great powers), in its turn, undertakes to respect the neutrality of that state, its territorial integrity and to support it in case of external attack (Karsh 2012, 27).

Second, the Finnish case shows that even permanent neutrality cannot be considered eternal. Finland's neutrality referred to Soviet-Finnish relations, and in de jure form it was maintained throughout the Cold War, and continued as de facto neutrality two decades later. However, that status was replaced by NATO membership in April 2023.

Third, the commonality of all presented cases is the legal fixation of neutrality, the mechanism of which is the already mentioned neutralization. The final result of the latter, as a rule, as noted by some authors (Evans and Neumham 1998, 367-368), is the international-legal status of permanent neutrality - neutrality in times of peace and war. Some authors consider neutral a state whose political independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed on a permanent basis by an agreement between the great powers, provided that the smaller state will use its military capabilities exclusively for self-defense and not against any other state, and will not undertake actions contrary to its international-legal obligations (Black 1968).

As some authors note, neutralization has been successfully tested several times in international practice, such as the independence and neutrality of Belgium in the relationship between Great Britain, France and Germany, the Suez Canal and Siam issues in the context of the Franco-British conflict, or the cases of the neutralization of Austria and Finland in the context of Soviet and Western camps confrontation during the Cold War. That idea was also discussed in the context of the relationship between Russia and the West in the cases of Ukraine and Moldova in post-Soviet space (Müller 2019, 6).

Fourth, two types of neutralization can be distinguished: international (fixed, recognized by international bilateral (Finland) and multilateral (Switzerland) treaties) and national (fixed in national legal norms, then recognized by other states (Austria, Moldova), and in some cases (Turkmenistan) recognized in multilateral international documents). The second type of neutralization is also called self-neutralization by some authors (Evans and Neumham 1998, 366-367). A number of authors note that the status of permanent neutrality based on self-neutralization is less clear than the version based on an international treaty (Black 1968, xiii).

Fifth, in some cases, as some authors note, de jure permanent neutrality may be incompatible with membership in intergovernmental organizations (Evans and Neumham 1998, 367). According to Paul Luif, the obligations of a neutral state are not limited to not joining military alliances or not allowing foreign military bases to be located on its territory. Even in peacetime, a neutral state should conduct such a foreign policy that will keep it away from the prospect of being involved in any future military conflicts, while not rejecting participation in international cooperation (Luif 2003, 98-99). Such a problem arose in the cases of both Switzerland and Austria, but received different solutions. Thus, Switzerland joined the UN only with the results of the 2002 referendum, although the result of the 1986 referendum on a similar issue was negative¹. Switzerland also applied for the EU membership in 1992, but in the same

¹ Cook, Don. 1986. "Swiss Reject Membership. Voter Turnout Tied to Neutrality." *The Washington Post*. 16 March. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/03/17/swiss-reject-membership-in-un/696489a2-d7c1-4eb9-81cf-f4f07061f3f5/>.

year, due to the refusal to join the European Economic Area in a referendum², the Swiss government suspended and finally canceled EU membership negotiations in 2016, preferring to conclude bilateral agreements with it³. Criticism of Austria's accession to the EU was more rationalized, that is, in case of accession to the EU, the economic dependence of a neutral state on other members will be so great that this state will not be able to freeze relations or leave the EU if its other members are involved in the war.

However, as Luif notices, upon accession to the EU in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden were not only exempted, but also committed themselves to full and active participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (Luif 2003, 102), while even Denmark, not being a neutral state, did not participate in defense cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy until June 2022. Moreover, as a result of integration with an organization like the EU, a neutral state cannot practically maintain neutrality towards warring parties. For example, Austria, as a full member of the EU, and even Switzerland, as a state that is not a member of the EU, but is economically integrated with it, have joined the sanctions packages adopted by the EU against Russia as of 2024⁴. This indicates that Oppenheim hastily considered "benevolent neutrality" as an outdated, non-applicable form.

And, finally, the *sixth*, if examples of not permanent, occasional neutrality can refer to all states regardless of their position in the international hierarchy, then *all cases of permanent neutrality refer exclusively to small states*.

The next type of neutrality is state's (long-term) neutral policy (de facto neutrality), when neutrality is not based on international law, but is accepted by the international community. Müller mentions "long-term neutrality" as a long-term foreign policy strategy typical for small states with limited military capabilities. As an example, he cites the Netherlands and Denmark, to which at the end of the 18th century Sweden and the USA also joined. Müller notes the main difference between long-term neutrality and occasional neutrality: a. declaration of neutrality as a long-term foreign policy strategy, b. the desire to institutionalize neutrality as part of international law, institutions or cooperation, and c. continuous strengthening of defense capabilities to make neutrality tenable, even when these states do not participate in great power wars (Müller 2019, 5-6).

Modern examples of de facto neutrality are Ireland and the Vatican, as well as Finland and Sweden until 2023 and 2024, respectively. However, only in the case of Finland and Sweden can we see all the distinctive features mentioned by Müller, while in the case of Ireland and the Vatican the third feature - the continuous strengthening of

² Miserez, Marc-Andre. 2012. "Switzerland poised to keep EU at arm's length." *Swissinfo.ch*, December 2, 2012. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-politics/switzerland-poised-to-keep-eu-at-arm-length/34083578>.

³ Goulard, Hortense. 2016. "Switzerland withdraws application to join the EU." *Politico*, June 15, 2016. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://www.politico.eu/article/switzerland-withdraws-application-to-join-the-eu/>.

⁴ Reuters. 2023. "Austria backs EU Russia sanctions after Ukraine removes Raiffeisen from blacklist." *Reuters*, December 17, 2023. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/austria-backs-eu-russia-sanctions-after-ukraine-removes-raiffeisen-blacklist-2023-12-16/>; The Federal Council. 2024. "Ukraine: Switzerland implements the EU's 12th package of sanctions." *Swiss government – Homepage*, January 31, 2024. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-99902.html>.

its own defense capabilities - is missing: Ireland has limited military capabilities, and the Vatican armed forces consist of only a small number Swiss Guards.

The authors note that Sweden's neutrality policy began to take shape in 1840, not on the basis of any international agreement, as in the case of Finland, Switzerland or Austria, but on decisions of the Swedish government and parliament. Throughout the Cold War, Sweden adhered to two principles: non-alignment in times of peace and neutrality in times of war. After the Cold War, the formulation of "policy of neutrality" in official rhetoric was gradually replaced by "non-participation in military alliances", in parallel, however, Sweden actively participated in European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation on security and defense issues (Lassinantti 2001, 102, 103). Moreover, the Nordic states – Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – actively cooperate within the framework of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) (Elínardóttir and Thorhallsson 2020, 124).

The next type of neutrality is refusal to join military-political alliances (non-alignment) and to direct or indirect support of their actions (neutralism), demonstrating equidistant behavior towards the warring parties (Evans and Neumham 1998, 365). Non-alignment, on the one hand, unlike *de jure* or *de facto* neutrality, does not imply permanent or long-term neutrality in all existing and possible future wars, but, unlike non-belligerence, it presupposes that the position and actions of the non-aligned states in (possible) wars between third states comply with one of the above-mentioned conditions of self-exclusion - non-support of any of the warring parties. Therefore, non-alignment, in contrast to the already mentioned non-participation, can be considered a variant of neutrality.

"Non-alignment" is a much younger concept than "neutrality". During the Cold War, non-alignment was institutionalized in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement. Its initial philosophy was determined by the bipolar world order of the Cold War itself - not to get involved in the struggle of groups led by the USSR and the USA. As some authors note, during the Cold War, unlike *de jure* and *de facto* neutral states, the states of the Non-Aligned Movement did not try to stay on the sidelines, "hide" from the competition of great powers, but sought to ensure their independence by conducting more autonomous diplomacy on issues of alliance competition and jointly increase their voting power in international organizations (Evans and Neumham 1998, 377). In other words, as some authors note, the states of the Non-Aligned Movement did not want to be (self)neutralized, turning into a *de jure* or *de facto* neutral state, but wanted not to be bound by any obligations specifically in the context of the conflict between the USSR and the USA (Black 1968, xiv). That is, non-alignment was a refusal to join or support competing Cold War factions that, unlike neutralization, was driven solely by internal motives rather than external coercion, and did not involve any external guarantees of security other than preserving the principles of "peaceful coexistence" adopted at the Bandung summit in 1955.

The criteria for non-aligned state were defined at the 1961 Summit of the Movement - to pursue or strive for an independent foreign policy based on the coexistence of states with different socio-political systems, to support movements for national independence, not to join multilateral military alliances formed in the context

of conflict between great powers, not to sign a bilateral alliance with a great power or to join a regional alliance that serves great power conflict (Fischer 2016, 9).

As Thomas Fischer and co-authors note, neutrality and nonalignment have a number of similarities and differences: as de jure and de facto neutral states, non-aligned countries were also obliged not to enter into military-political alliances, but, unlike neutrality, non-alignment is not legally defined and does not imply either the rights and obligations of neutrality, or duration. Fischer points out that during the Cold War in Europe, both permanently neutral and non-aligned states pursued a policy of non-alignment in relation to NATO, the Warsaw pact, the EC and the Comecon, but if the political concept of neutrality is of European origin and spread, then non-alignment is Afro-Asian-Latin American, while in Europe it was represented by Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Malta (Fischer 2016, 8, 9), and currently only by Azerbaijan and Belarus.

In his turn, Efraim Karsh, *firstly*, considers neutrality to be a legal concept arising from the concept of war, and neutralism to be a political concept not enshrined in international law and not related to the concept of war. Non-alignment, by his definition, refers to relations between states that are not in war, but in power competition in peacetime. And in the case of a war between the power centers, the non-aligned states, like the rest, will either declare neutrality or be drawn into the war. At the same time, non-alignment, in contrast to permanent neutrality, does not exclude war as an instrument of foreign policy of a non-aligned state, if this suits its interests. *Secondly*, permanent neutrality, according to Karsh, does not exclude political bias towards one of the warring parties, excluding, however, practical support for it to the detriment of the other side, and neutralism presupposes impartiality in relation to the warring parties, but not excluding, however, practical support for the side that the non-aligned state considers right (Karsh 2012, 28-29). However, as we mentioned above, some states with a status of permanent neutrality today show not only “acceptable” political bias, but even “inacceptable” practical support, applying economic sanctions to one of the warring parties.

In general, there are several caveats to note regarding non-alignment as a strategy of self-exclusion. *First*, non-alignment does not mean non-participation in all international conflicts. A party to the conflict may be the non-aligned state itself (for example, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, which have declared non-aligned political status and are members of the Non-Aligned Movement).

Second, in certain situations, a non-aligned state may decide to support one of the competing great powers during a conflict between them (for example, Cuba's support for the USSR during the Cold War).

And *thirdly*, as world practice shows, neutralism, in contrast to de jure and de facto neutrality, may include some military and diplomatic obligations with other states. The policies of some non-aligned states call into question their declared non-aligned status. In other words, as Talukder Maniruzzaman points out, non-membership in a military alliance does not in itself guarantee the security of a given state, so non-aligned states may adopt other security strategies in specific situations (for example, the non-aligned India's pacts with Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), USA (1951) and USSR (1971), Egypt-USSR treaty, Yugoslavia treaties with Greece and Turkey, Malaysia and Singapore are parties to the Five Power Defense Agreement of 1971, together with Australia, New

Zealand and the United Kingdom), which may even conflict with the stated policy of non-alignment (Maniruzzaman 1982, 36). Similarly, according to the 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance and the 2021 Shushi Declaration between Non-Aligned Movement member Azerbaijan and Turkey, the parties are obliged to provide assistance to each other in case of external attack, Declaration of Allied Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia of 2022 also provides for mutual obligations in security issues. Although these mutual assistance commitments do not directly imply automatic mutual military assistance, they call into question the political status of Azerbaijan's non-alignment, taking into account Turkey's membership in NATO, Russia's membership in the CSTO, and the active regional policies pursued by these two countries in general. For its part, Belarus, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is a member of the CSTO, so Belarus has obligations for mutual assistance with other states of this alliance, and as a member of the Union State, it also has obligations for mutual assistance with Russia.

In other words, although non-alignment can be considered a variant of self-exclusion strategy, it is only in case of some countries and only in some conditions, that is, in private cases.

The last type of neutrality, the situational position of a state not to participate in any particular conflict (non-belligerence) and to exhibit equidistant behavior towards its parties, is also known as *Ad hoc*, temporary or occasional neutrality. Historical examples of such neutrality can be found in the 17th-19th centuries, during the First and Second World Wars, for example, the above-mentioned non-participation of the United States in the French-English War, the non-participation of Spain in the Second World War, the non-participation of Iran in the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Occasional neutrality, according to Karsh, implies neutrality only in a specific case, without limiting the behavior of the state either in peacetime or in another war. That is, a state may be neutral in one war, but participate in another or support one of the conflicting parties (Karsh 2012, 26-27). Moreover, as Müller rightly notes, a unilateral declaration of neutrality during a war does not mean that this state will remain neutral even throughout this war. And in general, the purpose of such behavior was, on the one hand, to limit the conflict, and on the other, to gain economic or strategic benefit from it (Müller 2019, 5). There is another important circumstance here: occasional neutrality is not limited to small states. Large and middle powers can also exercise situational neutrality in specific situations and on specific issues.

Typological approaches to neutrality are, of course, not limited to the above. There are even approaches adapted to the peculiarities of the modern technological era. For example, Hitoshi Nasu mentions four "technological" types of neutrality: *Apologetic*, *Egalitarian*, *Benevolent*, and *Deontological*. According to Nasu, *apologetic* neutrality stems from the difficulties of neutral states in defending their rights and fulfilling their obligations in the face of periodic great power wars. The main is the technological difficulty of limiting the ability of belligerent states to obtain support from neutral states and to detect the participation of neutral states in hostilities. As a result, neutrality is subject to subjective interpretation based on the political interests of states, which can significantly weaken the normative power of the neutrality law. *Egalitarian* neutrality assumes that even technologically underdeveloped states are capable of

providing a high level of technological autonomy and control over technological activities on their territory. This makes it possible to expand the balance of interests of neutral and belligerent states within the framework of the neutrality law, including non-material means of supporting military actions. In the case of *benevolent* neutrality, the neutral state, for political, economic or ideological reasons, tends to secretly support one of the warring parties. The availability of technological means to conceal the provision of support may contribute to this trend. Finally, *deontological* neutrality assumes that a neutral state has sufficient means to protect its rights and fulfill its responsibilities, while having a high level of technological autonomy and control. It also assumes that belligerents have the technological capacity to detect assistance that violates neutrality obligations (Nasu 2022a, 134-138). Using the example of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, Nasu shows that the modern law of neutrality can turn into benevolent neutrality when third parties do not see significant restrictions in supporting the warring parties. According to the author, this prospect is further strengthened by Russia's alienation from Western economies due to sanctions, which has reduced the importance of maintaining trade relations with Russia and therefore strict adherence to neutrality rules (Nasu 2022b).

Reasons and conditions of self-exclusion

The expected end-result of all small states' security strategies, including self-exclusion, was perhaps best formulated by Allen Sens: "The political life of small power is a struggle for political, economic, and social autonomy as much as it is a struggle for national survival or territorial integrity" (Choi 1995, 27).

An analysis of publications devoted to the external security strategies of small states shows that it is important, firstly, to identify the reasons and conditions for the adoption of these strategies, and secondly, to consider them in a spatiotemporal relationship, not separately from each other and not in isolation from historical and political context. In general, followers of the school of realism look for the reasons for the foreign policy strategy of states, including the choice of self-exclusion, in external systemic-structural factors (for example, in the polar structure and order of the global and regional systems). Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, even conditioned the legal and political status of neutrality on the legal and political structure of international society at a given historical moment, arguing that any fundamental change in that structure would affect the rules of neutrality (Morris and White 2011, 105; Simpson 2018, 123-125; Simpson 2021). In their turn, followers of social constructivism prefer internal factors: identity, norms, value orientations, determining, for example, the choice of external security strategy of Switzerland and Finland discussed above (Jesse and Dreyer 2023, 25-32). But, as we have already noted (Galstyan 2019, 8-14, 15), both (realistic) external systemic-structural and (constructivist) internal factors are of significant importance in choosing a security strategy for small states. At the same time, each of these groups of factors is not enough to explain the strategic choice of small states. For example, Luif notes that changes in the international system significantly influence the foreign policy of small states, but do not always determine it. Using the example of Austria, he argues that only a joint consideration of external

systemic and internal causes can fully explain the foreign policy behavior of small states (Luif 2003, 112-113). Jeanne Hey, summarizing the results of studies of the foreign policies of various small states, also concludes in favor of this approach. In particular, she notes that leaders play a significant role in the formulation and implementation of small states' foreign policies, but their choices and opportunities are determined by external and internal factors, such as, for example, the regime's security and economic needs, culture, political ideology, geography, external pressure, changes in regional and global systems. In other words, leaders in this sense are the electors of foreign policy strategies, existing possible options that arose as a result of the above-mentioned factors (Hey 2003b, 194).

As Asle Toje rightly points out, the possibility of a small state choosing neutrality arises in a competitive system, and neutrality will be preferable to the alliance strategy, if the likelihood of punishment from one of the competing great powers for this choice is low, or small state's neutrality is preferable to competing great powers (Toje 2011, 47).

Francis Domingo notes that the basis of the strategy of neutrality is the belief that a state should rely solely on its internal capabilities, without looking for external allies. According to him, the effectiveness of this strategy, typical of European diplomacy, largely depends on the authority of the given state, and permanent neutrality will be impractical if the state has a strategically sensitive location (Domingo 2014, 49). Some authors point out that to ensure neutrality, the consent or approval of the great powers close to the small state is necessary. And once the neutrality of a small state becomes disadvantageous to the great powers, the viability of this security strategy will be called into question (Choi 1995, 22). The survival of a neutral state depends on its ability to prove its commitment to neutrality and not pose a threat to the great powers. The success of this strategy depends on whether a small state can convince a great power that it benefits from the small state's neutrality, that it can satisfy the demands of the belligerents without the use of force, or that the use of force against a small state would be too expensive compared to the expected benefits. The survival of a neutral state depends on its ability to prove its commitment to neutrality and not pose a threat to the great powers. The success of this strategy depends on whether a small state can convince a great power that it benefits from the small state's neutrality, that the latter can satisfy the demands of the belligerents without the use of force, or that the use of force against a small state would be too expensive compared to the expected benefits (Choi 1995, 22; Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2017, 6-7; Maniruzzaman 1982, 26-28).

Some authors consider neutralism - the variety of self-exclusionary - as a strategy of newly created and relatively weak states, which can expand their possibilities of achieving maximum independence, as well as foreign policy flexibility and maneuverability of (Evans and Neumham 1998, 365-366). According to Götschel, the political core of neutrality has two functions: realistic (guaranteeing state's political independence, preserving its traditional trade relations during war, maintaining internal social unity and solidarity and international equilibrium, etc.) and idealistic (the state's refusal to project its armed forces beyond own boundaries, the obligation to limit and regulate the use of force in international relations, to justify the policy of neutrality within the country and in foreign relations, etc.) (Goetschel 1999, 117-120).

It is noteworthy that, as the examination of types of self-exclusion has shown, the adoption of neutrality strategy can be either a voluntary choice or the result of external coercion. This circumstance, combined with the way neutrality as a norm is enshrined (de jure or de facto), according to Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C. Hofmann, significantly determines the positions of political elite and public, predicting stability and continuity of the neutrality policy (see also Table 1). The authors argue that if neutrality is imposed from the outside and is not legally enshrined, then at the first opportunity, for example, as soon as the source of external coercion is eliminated, the ruling elite will abandon the imposed neutrality. If neutrality was elite's voluntary choice and the motives for this choice have not disappeared, then it is likely that neither the elite nor society will seek to abandon this norm. And if a society views neutrality as a norm conducive to state success and national survival, it will be reluctant to give it up, regardless of whether neutrality was imposed from the outside or the result of a voluntary choice (Beyer and Hofmann 2011, 291).

Table 1. Matrix of nature of norm embeddedness (Beyer and Hofmann 2011, 291)

Norm embeddedness	Norm adoption		
		voluntary	coerced
	De jure	Likely that norm is constitutive to both the public and political elite	Likely that norm is regulative to both the public and elite at first, but can change over time
De facto	Likely that norm is more constitutive for public than political elite	Likely that norm stays regulative for both public and elite	

From this we can conclude that, firstly, when considering cases of self-exclusion, it is necessary to take into account the historical and geopolitical context, and, secondly, changes in these systemic and structural conditions may give rise within a given society to the question of rethinking the country's security strategy.

The above-mentioned theoretical conclusions about the reasons and conditions for adopting a self-exclusion strategy are also justified in practice. Thus, Beyer and Hoffman's approach, we believe, can help explain, in particular, the behavior of neutral European states during the Cold War, after its end, as well as in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2022 and its changes over time. And in this matter, the analyzes of Fisher and Steven Murphy can be useful. In particular, Murphy sees one key commonality among the European neutrals and the non-aligned "Five" (N-5: Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland) - to compensate for their relative weakness and smallness, they have traditionally strived for economic, political and social shelter. But based on the significant differences between these countries, Murphy divides them into two groups:

- The "Trio" - Ireland, Sweden and Finland, the first of which prefers to describe its policy as "military neutrality" - non-membership in military alliances, and the other two replaced permanent neutrality with "military non-alignment" after the end of Cold War in the 1990s.
- "Duo" – Austria and Switzerland, which continue to maintain their permanent neutrality even after the end of the Cold War (Murphy 2021, 153-154).

In their turn, Fischer and co-authors emphasize the differences between neutral states in terms of legal basis, historical origin, internal context and state's geostrategic position. Accordingly, the authors identify differences even within the "Trio" and "Duo". In particular, while in the case of Switzerland neutrality is a universal approach, in the case of Austria it is a direct result of superpowers conflict during the Cold War, based on Austria's geostrategic position between two conflicting systems. And although the neutrality of Sweden and Finland was a product of the Northern European context, the core of Finnish neutrality was the preservation of sovereignty and independence, and in the case of Sweden - the promotion of national interests in the context of maintaining a strategic balance in Northern Europe. Sweden and Switzerland, as the authors note, were less susceptible to Soviet pressure than Austria and Finland. What Austria, Sweden and Finland had in common during the Cold War was that their neutrality was directed outward - to the challenges of the outside world, while Switzerland's neutrality was deeply rooted in identity. After the end of the Cold War, Switzerland was the only country from the "quartet" that did not join the EU. And while Austria and Switzerland continued to support the concept of permanent neutrality in their foreign and security policies, Sweden and Finland no longer applied it in their official doctrines, while simultaneously discussing the possible prospect of NATO membership (Fischer 2016, 9-10). Moreover, in 2022, in the wake of changes in the geostrategic environment in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as we have already mentioned, Sweden and Finland ultimately completely abandoned the policy of de facto neutrality and became NATO members.

The case of Moldova is also noteworthy: as Tom Long notes, Moldova declared de jure permanent neutrality after the war over Transnistria, so as not to be drawn into a new war with Russia's active participation. Later, Moldova received significant economic, political and security support from European structures and states. However, the retention of Russian troops and Russian support for Transnistria's de facto independence still maintain a high risk of unfreezing this conflict, so Moldova is in no hurry to revise its neutrality strategy (Long 2022, 110). Perhaps this is why, in contrast to de facto permanently neutral Finland and Sweden, in de jure permanently neutral Moldova there was no unity around the rejection of neutrality either between the elite and society, or within each of them⁵.

Using the above-mentioned matrix approach, we can conclude that

- The strength and continuity of Switzerland's neutrality is due to the fact that this norm was adopted voluntarily, legally enshrined and became an integral part of the security identity.
- Sweden's adoption of neutrality was also voluntary, but did not receive legal formalization, remaining a permanent de facto neutrality for a long time. As a result, even in conditions of changes in the external environment, the public was more inclined to maintain, and the elite, on the contrary, was inclined to abandon neutrality. This is evidenced by the fact that, until recently, Sweden's NATO membership was largely an elite discourse, while there was no broad

⁵ Al Mayadeen. 2024. "Moldova not seeking NATO membership due to low public support: PM." *Al Mayadeen English*, March 14, 2024. Accessed April 13, 2024. <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/moldova-not-seeking-nato-membership-due-to-low-public-suppor>.

public consensus on that matter. Research shows that, unlike neighboring Finland, which accepted neutrality coercively, where the political discourse of NATO membership has always dominated, the Swedish ruling elite found it quite difficult to change public opinion from the permanent de facto neutrality in favor of an alliance strategy (Michalski, Brommesson and Ekengren 2024, 150-156).

- It is assumed that if the adoption of neutrality is the result of external coercion and is enshrined in law (Austria, Finland, Moldova), then, most likely, in the presence of appropriate new conditions in the geopolitical environment, the ruling elite and the public will be inclined to abandon neutrality. Throughout the Cold War, Austria and Finland maintained permanent de jure neutrality, but after the collapse of the USSR, Finland replaced it with permanent de facto neutrality, in 2022, shortly after the start of Russian-Ukrainian war, Finland abandoned the policy of neutrality, but Austria continues maintain de jure permanent neutrality. It can even be assumed that the Austrian elite and public believe that neutrality contributes to state's development and survival and has even become a component of identity, as in the case of Switzerland. Perhaps Moldova's ruling elite and public also continue to see more benefits in permanent de jure neutrality than in replacing it with alliance strategy. In other words, only the elite and public of Finland saw in the changes in the geopolitical environment favorable conditions for a complete abandonment of the strategy of self-exclusion. It is expected that in the case of a favorable change in the geopolitical microenvironment, Moldova will be inclined to abandon neutrality and adopt an alliance strategy.

Conclusion and discussion

Summarizing the results of the analysis in accordance with the research problems defined in the introduction, we can make the following conclusions:

- The end-goal of self-exclusion is to ensure the strategic autonomy of the small state, the (expected) end-results are - to ensure the maximum possible independence and maneuverability in relations with the great powers.
- The reasons for adopting a self-exclusion strategy are a combination of external systemic-structural (for example, the polar structure and order of global and especially regional systems) and internal constructivist-structural (for example, identity, norms, state capabilities, beliefs of the ruling elite, its abilities and skills, public support etc.) factors, which should be considered in a spatiotemporal relationship. An example of the significance of these correlations is the relationship between the source of the norm of self-exclusion (external coercion or voluntary acceptance), the form of its fixation (de jure or de facto) and the foreign policy behavior of the state.
- Necessary conditions for the effectiveness and viability of a self-exclusion strategy are: 1. not to accept such obligations and not to join such initiatives that involve actions against any state and (mutual) assistance to another state, 2. international (primarily regional) competitive (bipolar or multipolar) system, 3.

at least the consent or approval of neighboring great powers to small state's neutral status, 4. small state's ability to prove loyalty to its neutral status in relations with the great powers, to prove the benefits of this status for the great powers and the inappropriateness and high cost of coercion compared with the expected benefits, 5. small state's ability to protect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity with its own capabilities, without relying on external help and support.

- The following types of self-exclusion can be distinguished: permanent neutrality, in one case as state's long-term permanent legal status (neutral state), in another case as state's long-term permanent policy, occasional neutrality as state's situational, temporary position in non-participation in any particular conflict (non-belligerence) and manifestations of equidistant behavior towards the parties to the conflict (Ad hoc neutrality), as well as neutrality as a refusal to join military-political alliances and from direct or indirect support of their actions (neutrality/non-alignment).
- The above-mentioned varieties of self-exclusion can be grouped into two groups: authentic or pure and inauthentic or impure. Authentic types of self-exclusion are permanent- eternal or long-term neutrality with its variants: de jure-contractual, de facto-voluntary, general, absolute, and inauthentic types are non-alignment, neutralism and occasional neutrality.

The analysis also identified a number of issues and problems that could inform further research into self-exclusion, or at least should be taken into account in such research. These issues include:

1. Authentic forms of self-exclusion - permanent-long-term neutrality with its varieties, are more characteristic of Europe, while in other world parts the inauthentic forms of self-exclusion are more common, especially non-alignment-neutralism and occasional neutrality.
2. "Traditional" definitions of forms of self-exclusion have some internal limitations that make the applicability of these concepts controversial for the study of foreign policy of states in modern realities.
 - The first limitation is that all these definitions relate primarily to the military aspect of power competition - participation in military actions, whereas, as we said above, power competition includes and combines non-military aspects too: economic, diplomatic, information-psychological, etc.
 - The belief that after the end of the Cold War the strategy of self-exclusion has lost its relevance and states will no longer accept it is not justified. While a number of states continued to follow this strategy after the Cold War, the current confrontation between Russia and the West is reviving the political and scientific debate about self-exclusion strategy for the sake of small state survival. Moreover, some authors even put forward new concepts of self-exclusion adapted to the technological era, or even revive concepts of neutrality that were considered outdated-inapplicable (e.g., benevolent neutrality).

- Another limitation concerns the concept of non-alignment: at first glance, this concept, born during the Cold War and built on the realities of that period, is an anachronism. First of all, the object of non-alignment during the Cold War - bipolar systemic antagonism - no longer exists, therefore, there is no problem of joining the coalition of one or another pole. However, in the current confrontation between Russia and the West, global or regional changes may "revive" the applicability of this concept. Secondly, as we see, a number of states of the Non-Aligned Movement are members of military-defensive and political-economic bilateral and multilateral alliances. This circumstance forces us to rethink and reformulate the concept of non-alignment/neutralism, either by tightening its definitions, or, like neutrality, by identifying types within it.

3. There is no universal formula for the reasons for adopting a self-exclusion strategy, or at least there are more variables in this formula than it might seem at first glance. Undoubtedly, external systemic and structural factors are of significant, even paramount importance in determining a security strategy, but when choosing a specific strategy aimed at countering external challenges, internal factors, primarily the security identity and beliefs of the ruling elite, are no less significant. However, even the use of the Matrix of norm embeddedness to consider practical examples showed that in order to obtain accurate data and conclusions, a separate consideration of each case is inevitable.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.037>

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The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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THE IMAGE OF THE US ARMY IN AMERICAN MOVIES: THE SOFT POWER OF AMERICAN CINEMA

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Abstract

The formation of the army's image has acquired newfound significance in our time. Paradoxically, alongside the spread of humanist ideology, the number of violent conflicts worldwide is increasing. These stimulate the need for propaganda aimed at shaping the image of the army and enhancing the attractiveness of service. As one of the world's largest military forces, the US army has engaged in a diverse array of conflicts with over 750 military bases in approximately 80 countries (Kohli 2020). A diverse range of tools is employed to shape the image of the US army, including media, recruitment campaigns, social media, public events, etc. Among these tools, movies have their specific role. While traditionally intended for entertainment, movies have been used for over a century as a means to shape public opinion. This article delves into the main attributes of the US Army as a social institution, analyzing its four fundamental characteristics: the Militia Tradition, Mobilization Miracles, Man-Mindedness, Maritime Influence, the weapon and the enemy as distinctive attributes. Additionally, it features the seven core values of the US Army: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. The article provides a detailed analysis of how various components of movie production tools communicate the attributes and core values of the US Army and contribute to shaping its image, examining a high-viewership movie "Interceptor" (2022). The goal of the study was to find out the image of the US Army that "Interceptor" projects and to identify the verbal and visual communicative means it uses for this purpose. The content analysis made it possible to distinguish verbal and visual elements of the movie,

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encompassing human voice, mise-en-scène, as well as film editing techniques, to identify and highlight the messages and ideas conveyed about the attributes of the US Army.

Keywords: US Army, image of the army, attributes of the US Army, values, film industry, characters, mise en scène, montage techniques, enemy.

Introduction

Soft power plays an increasingly important role in the modern world, gradually replacing hard power in the context of globalization. The interconnectedness of the economies of various regions makes the use of forceful pressure on other actors in the international arena irrelevant, which is why it is so important for key players to develop and promote the soft power of their state. The most perfect embodiment of soft power at the moment is the United States of America, which, by promoting its values and ideas, has built a modern mass culture based on Americanization, which in turn is successfully broadcast through American cinema.

After the Cold War, some theorists believed that the US armed forces would evolve into “international police forces” anticipating conflicts to be resolved through international peacekeeping efforts. However, the emergence of newly independent states introduced potential conflicts, rendering global security vulnerable and the environment unpredictable and uncertain.

As one of the world’s largest military forces, the US army has engaged in a diverse array of conflicts and missions, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and military operations (U.S. Department Of Defence 2020). With over 750 military bases in approximately 80 countries (Kohli 2020), the sheer magnitude of the army and its activities requires communication not only with the internal audience but also with the external one.

Every year, the Reagan Institute asks about Americans’ level of trust and confidence in a variety of public institutions. In 2018, 70% expressed a great deal of trust and confidence in the military. This confidence declined by 7 points in 2019 and another 7 points in 2020, then falling 11 more points to a low of 45% in 2021. That trend appears to have plateaued, with 46% reporting a great deal of confidence in the military in 2023, consistent with the previous year (Reagan National Defence Survey 2023).

Although the US Army maintains a higher rating than the other social institutions, it is crucial to recognize that perceptions of the army can change due to various factors. Negative incidents or scandals related to the military can directly impact public trust. In this context, the US military places great emphasis on continuous efforts in image building and maintenance.

Actively engaged in global conflicts to protect national interests and assert its geopolitical stability agenda, the US military acknowledges the paramount role of positive public perceptions. These perceptions contribute to fostering a respectful attitude towards the state, the army, and the soldier, ensuring personal participation and public support, facilitating effective communication between the public and the army,

and demonstrating the power of the state. Public perception of the military plays a crucial role in recruitment, morale boost, and gaining public support for military operations. Ideas and perceptions about the army can also serve as a source of inspiration for young individuals to enlist and pursue a career within the military (Şerban 2024).

A diverse range of tools is employed to shape the image of the US army (Melkonyan 2004). The film industry stands as one of many tools shaping public perceptions of the army. Films, with their ability to create emotional connections, possess a powerful potential to influence audience perceptions. According to a study published in *Communication Research Reports*, movies have the power to influence attitudes and beliefs on various topics, including politics, social issues, and science. This stems from movies' ability to forge emotional connections with the audience, making the perception and retention of information easier for them (Kubrak 2020).

This article examines a high-viewership movie, "Interceptor" (2022), and provides a detailed analysis of how various components of movie production tools, such as characters, dialogues, *mise en scène*, and montage techniques, communicate the attributes of the US Army and contribute to shaping its image.

Army as a Social Institution

The army is established to safeguard the state and national interests, maintains traditional functions, such as protecting against military threats, promoting national values, and ensuring sovereignty (Dahl and Moretti 2008; Schiff 2008). As a social institution, it forms a normative structure within society with established practices, traditions, and behavioral patterns (Nickerson 2024). Scientists identify the following functions of the army: 1) External Functions: Ensures border integrity, state sovereignty, addresses universal challenges, and aids victims of aggression and allies; 2) Internal Functions: Preserves ruling social group power, prevents internal social conflicts, increases citizens' willingness to protect homeland, instills moral behavior skills, and psychological preparedness in youth (Siebold 2001; Kernic 2023).

Over time, the army's features evolve, adapting to different historical contexts. While military strength is crucial, the army remains a guarantor of statehood and sovereignty, even in times without a permanent enemy or active warfare (Hambardzumyan 2020; Edmunds 2006; Levy 2010).

The Components of the US Army Image

The reputation of the army and people's trust in the armed forces are shaped through the PR technologies used in the armed forces (Melkonyan 2015). Three main characters should be reflected in the image of the armed forces: the image of the Armed Forces in the past; the current image of the Armed Forces; the prospective image of the Armed Forces - outlining the reforms the state is making to have a more powerful and combat-ready army in the future (Mantovani and Müllhaupt 2021).

The "4 M's" of the U.S. Army are:

Militia Tradition includes citizen-soldiers who, as a rule, are not professionals but are ready to protect their communities if necessary. Additionally, the military is subject to civilian leaders, who are accountable to the people (Stentiford 2002).

Mobilization Miracles: The ability to mobilize a huge army in a short period of time requires huge resources and proper coordination. Before the World War II, a small army formed a fighting force of more than eight million people in about 4 years (Hillsdale College 2019).

Man-Minded: The well-being of soldiers has always been important in the US Army. The effectiveness of the military force is directly related to the physical and psychological condition of the personnel. US Army organizes medical services, entertainment, morale, and character-building activities for the soldiers.

Maritime Influence: The formation of the US army is based on the geographical position of the country. As long as its naval and air defense lines are intact, there is no need for a large army to protect the country's shores from foreign invasion (Davis and Shapiro 2003).

In his "The Soldier of the 21st Century", J. Hosek states that traditional wars have been replaced by terrorism, cyber and irregular wars, which are complex and unpredictable. For this reason, the US Army has begun to give importance to Cyber Soldiers for surveillance and reconnaissance in the territory of the enemy, a strategic asset of Information Warriors, which can be used to gain a competitive advantage over the enemy, Peace Operations, requiring soldiers skilled in conflict resolution, negotiation and building relationships with local communities, Rapid Response Force, conducting combat operations, peacekeeping and disaster relief, Low-Manning Vessels, operating in conditions extremely dangerous for human crews and reducing the need for large naval forces (Hosek 2003).

All of the above-mentioned characteristics form the basis of today's US army, which, considering predicted threats and the need to modernize the army, comes up with a new strategy: to have the most powerful army in the world by 2030. To meet the looming threat, the military is transforming by developing its ability to unite its influence on land, air, sea, space and cyberspace (U.S. Army 2022, 2024).

The US Army has defined seven values, which soldiers learn in Basic Combat Training and are guided by them throughout their service. These values are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. They help to reinforce the Army's reputation as a professional, ethical and effective fighting force and to attract qualified personnel (U.S. Army 2024).

Movies as a means to shape the image of the army

Since the late 19th century, movies have evolved into a powerful blend of science, technology, and art, distinguished by their collaborative nature. Unlike many art forms, cinema involves a team comprising a director, screenwriter, cast, sound engineer, and actors, etc., and the quality of the film depends on their artistic contribution and interaction (Burch 2014; Peters 1961; Fishburne and Rine 2021).

Through dynamic visuals, temporal shifts, sound, and narrative, movies enable audiences to immerse themselves in diverse life experiences. This virtual reality

engagement triggers emotional involvement, driven by two processes: projection, where the audience attributes its feelings to characters, and identification, where the audience empathizes with characters (Turner 2000).

Movies employ special tools to convey meaning, ideas and values, including cinematography, *mise-en-scène*, sound, narrative, and editing (Brown 2022; Nafisah 2010; Bordwell and Thompson 2008). There are several film editing techniques, including cut - immediately following one shot with another, often to add tension and pace; jump cut - abruptly moving from one shot to another, creating disorientation or tension; match cut - combining two shots with similar element, such as color or movement; cross-cut - showing two or more different scenes back and forth, creating tension; montage - a series of shots in rapid succession conveying a large amount of information in a short period of time (Sikov 2010).

American movies typically reflect the ideals and culture of the United States, which later becomes integral to one's identity (Tal and Gordon 2016). Directors and cinematographers design numerous military, war, or conflict scenes to ensure that the audience recognizes and gets excited (Padilla and Laner 2001). The US Armed Forces has played a huge role in shaping the image of the US Army through movies: over 1100 titles on TV received Pentagon support, and from 1911 to 2017, more than 800 feature films have received financial backing from the Department of Defense (Fishburne and Rine 2021). A film might not overtly advocate for war, and it may not necessarily revolve around war, yet it can still serve a special agenda to instill habits or reactions at the unconscious level. For instance, the film "Transformers" (2007) received support from the US Army (Löfflmann 2013). Movies like "Black Hawk Down", "Top Gun", "Act of Valor", "Captain America", "Avengers: Endgame" feature renowned actors such as Tom Cruise, Ben Affleck, Brad Pitt, among others. These actors, with their image and popularity, contribute to increased viewership, expanding the movie's audience to individuals who may not usually be inclined to watch films of this genre (Martin 2023; Robb 2004). Another technique used to popularize a movie is the integration of a famous composer for the movie soundtracks, as seen with Hans Zimmer's music in "Black Hawk Down" and "The Thin Red Line", etc.

Using true stories in U.S. Army movies brings authenticity and often resonates more deeply with audiences, as demonstrated in films like "Saving Private Ryan", "American Sniper", "We Were Soldiers", among others.

Collaborating with authentic military advisers to ensure accuracy in portraying military tactics, procedures, and culture is another way. For instance, based on the non-fiction book by Jake Tapper, "The Outpost" collaborated with military advisors (Gilchrist 2020).

"Interceptor": the methodology of content analysis

One of the latest movies shaping the image of the US Army is the Australian-US co-production film "Interceptor" (2022), an action thriller directed by Matthew Reilly in his directorial debut, from a screenplay co-written by Reilly and Stuart Beattie. The movie has gained significant popularity as one of the most-watched films on Netflix (Hassall 2012).

The film has gained mixed reactions, with 44% of the 45 reviews from critics on Rotten Tomatoes being positive. They state the film will appeal to an audience fond of pointless action films, yet there is nothing new in it for them (Rotten Tomatoes 2022). Some critics lauded the film's fight scenes and pacing, while others criticized it for lacking originality and the cast's overacting. B. Lee from The Guardian rated the film "3 stars" and described it as "absurd yet entertaining" (Lee 2022). Despite such reviews, "Interceptor" grossed \$124 million in the US and Canada and \$248 million internationally during its release. As of June 2022, it held the top spot on Netflix worldwide, crossing 35 million watch-hours. The film's budget amounted to 15 million US dollars (Chande 2022).

The goal of the study was to find out the image of the US Army that "Interceptor" projects and to identify the verbal and visual communicative means it uses for this purpose (U.S. Department Of Defense 2020).

The content analysis made it possible to distinguish verbal and visual elements of the movie, encompassing human voice, *mise-en-scène*, as well as film editing techniques, to identify and highlight the messages and ideas conveyed about the attributes of the US Army. Each episode has been comprehensively interpreted, unveiling both their connotative and denotative meanings and messages.

The plot and characters of "Interceptor"

The events in the film unfold on two fronts. While the main focus centers on a military base situated in the Pacific Ocean, another military base in Alaska becomes a target for unknown militants. Simultaneously, a shocking development occurs in Russia, where 16 nuclear weapons are seized. The film's narrative revolves around the main character, JJ Collins, who, after being dismissed from her position at the Pentagon, returns to the Pacific missile defense base to avert the nuclear threat facing the country.

Collins' military career was curtailed when she spoke out against sexual harassment by a superior officer, leading to threats, ridicule, and expulsion from the base. A. Atanesyan identifies the problem of sexual harassment as one of the major challenges for the women in the US Armed Forces (2022). The reason behind her return was that only she could prevent the looming nuclear threat. The peace of the base is disturbed when a group of terrorists infiltrates the facility. Determined to protect her friends and prevent global catastrophe, JJ confronts armed terrorists. The film is full of intense action sequences, heroic deeds by Collins, special effects, and tense scenes, portraying the American military as heroic and innovative (Interceptor 2022).

Techniques employed to communicate the image of the US Army in the movie "Interceptor"

The film "Interceptor" has a total duration of 92 minutes. Every minute is used to communicate different components of the image of the US Army. Even a few shots conveying the emotional torments of the protagonist are linked to one of the image components (U.S. Army 2024).

In the movie “Interceptor,” references are made to both the four characteristics of the US Army and the seven values of the US Army ethos. At the film's outset, the protagonist is featured in her US Army uniform adorned with numerous insignias, visually communicating honor, tradition, belonging, and identity (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Protagonist JJ Collins (“Interceptor”, 3:41 minute)



Analyzing the four characteristics of the US Army in the film, it can be asserted that the mise-en-scènes communicate the Militia Tradition. For instance, the mise-en-scène of a seven-second shot at 1:03:01-1:03:08, where Collins is remotely communicating with the President and staff while executing a crucial assignment, highlights the continued civilian control over the military and reveals the fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. The same mise-en-scène also communicates loyalty, duty, courage, and selfless service. As signal specialist Shah prepares to jump into the ocean to fulfill his mission, he asserts: “Don’t think this is what heroes look like,” to which Collins responds: “Heroes look exactly like this.” This recognition by the captain reflects Shah’s transformation and the desired image of a soldier. In addition to being a cyber warrior, he also acquired fighting skills. This image highlights the demands of 21st-century warfare and the preferred image of the US military’s cyber soldier, playing an important role in both traditional and remote combat.

Man-mindedness is conveyed through dialogues, such as those at 7:37 - 7:38 and 15:31 - 15:33, communicating care, concern, and respect shown to the soldiers. In the first instance, the main character asks: “Interceptors secure?”, responding to news of a skirmish at the Fort Greely military base. The US military places a strong emphasis on teamwork and the well-being of soldiers. The effectiveness of the military force is directly linked to the physical and psychological training of its personnel. Following a brief skirmish, the main character queries Corporal Shah about well-being of the soldier Beaver (15:31 -15:33). Shah discloses that Beaver is unconscious, yet assuring that everything will be fine.

The portrayal of Maritime Influence receives significant attention in the film, employing various cinematic techniques such as dialogue at 4:50, mise-en-scène at 1:02:12, montage cut at episode 48:49, and the 10-second jump cut technique at the

movie's conclusion at 1:21:31. Upon welcoming the main character, Lieutenant Colonel Clark Marshall states: "Everything's pretty much the way you left it. Navy runs the boat; Army handles the missiles" (4:50-4:54). The message emphasizes the importance of various branches of the military, highlighting that its power and influence are tied to advanced weapon systems. The dialogue stresses the significance of weapons to the strength of the US military, while alluding to the enduring maritime influence. Emphasis on the army's role in missile control, its experience in defending the country's strategic armaments, and the strength of the arsenal is emphasized. Although the military's primary operations are land-based, the film unfolds on a Pacific base, showing the historical connection to naval operations and the ability to extend influence beyond land operations. This aligns with the US Army's 2030 strategy to be the world's most powerful military by converging efforts across land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

The mise-en-scène lasting 1 minute and 39 seconds (1:02:10-1:03:49) also refers to the Maritime Influence (1:02:10-1:02:15). The circular room depicted in the mise-en-scène is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and conveys the modernity and functionality of the remote anti-missile base (See Figure 2). The first few seconds of the scene are noteworthy, with mercenary entering the base's self-destruct password and all the pipes opening to sink it. This sequence aptly showcases the maritime influence of the US military.

Figure 2. The circular room of the military base (*Interceptor*, 1:02:30 minute)



The Maritime Influence of the US Army is also communicated through the montage cut technique. In the scene spanning from 48:46 - 48:59, comprised of 7 consecutive short shots, there is a rapid succession of the fight scene, the button launching the missiles, the tracking system for the launched nuclear missile, the same scene as seen from closer and farther away, with scenes alternating between wider and closer perspectives, including a close-up shot of the "LAUNCH" button. Such a combination of combat operations and countdown serves to underscore the critical nature of the situation, creating a palpable sense of urgency and the imperative for immediate action. The US Army, equipped with powerful weaponry, stands prepared to swiftly neutralize a missile launched from Russia, safeguarding the world from a nuclear threat. Shots

during 48:48-48:51 in the observed example effectively communicate the Maritime Influence of the US Army. This fusion of shots depicting ongoing battles and missiles reinforces the perception of an imminent threat and effectively conveys the potential dire consequences of failure. The technique enhances visual impact by establishing a dynamic rhythm, capturing the audience's attention and eliciting emotional engagement. The tense situation is skillfully employed to accentuate the importance and influence of courage and selfless service, integral values of the army ethos, particularly in a crisis scenario.

This attribute of the US Army is accentuated through the jump cut editing technique, where the same scene is portrayed in “different time periods”. This specific moment occurs in “Interceptor” at 1:21:31 – 1:21:41, as the wounded protagonist emerges from the ocean after defeating Beaver (See Figure 3). This editing tool effectively conveys the physical and mental struggle of JJ, emphasizing her determination. Each missed episode appears to propel her one step further, showcasing resilience and persistence. These 10 seconds also communicate the embodiment of courage, selfless service, and honor.

Figure 3. JJ Collins comes out from the ocean after defeating Beaver (Interceptor, 1:21:30 minute)



All dialogues in the film resonate with the fundamental characteristics and values of the US Army. Noteworthy among these is the following exchange: “Welcome to SBX-1, or should I say “welcome back”. I heard that you grew up in Spain at a base your dad was posted at.” The episode unfolds as Collins lands at the SBX-1 base on a helicopter, greeted by one of the officers. The dialogue illustrates the mutual respect between officers, with Collins' experience at the Spanish base emphasizing her dedication to the army. Recognition of her background and her father's service further highlights the atmosphere of heritage, camaraderie, and loyalty.

Courage, respect, integrity and selfless service are epitomized in the dialogue at 11:28-11:34 seconds of the movie: “JJ, this is on us now, you understand? We are the only thing standing between America and Armageddon. You up for this?” “Don't worry about me, sir” – JJ answers, followed by: “Sorry. Had to ask.” This dialogue attests to the responsibility that JJ is ready to shoulder. Colonel Marshall's apparent

correction indicates implicit trust in Collins' word, underscoring the importance of integrity and tact in communication between an officer and a subordinate. This interaction forms the basis of a healthy atmosphere and teamwork in the army.

In the concluding scene 1:28:53-1:29:00, a dialogue communicating honor is presented again. With Collins already in rehab, the President of the United States treats JJ with the utmost respect and at the same time friendly during her visit: "I think a soldier of your caliber would be better put to use on my National Security staff." These words not only convey honor and respect for Collins but also demonstrate the US Army's commitment to the well-being of its soldiers and the implementation of measures to aid recovery after combat situations.

Collins bears physical markers of her bravery, including scars on her cheek and mouth, disheveled hair, and a wounded hand, all indicative of unwavering devotion to her duty. Over her white t-shirt, she wears a bulletproof vest emblazoned with the US flag. This visual representation illustrates her endurance and serves as a reminder of the sacrifices soldiers make for their country while fulfilling their duty.

In this film, the weapon assumes particular importance in shaping the image of the US Army, communicated through vocals (4:50-4:54 of the film) and mise-en-scène (48:54-48:55 of the film). Collins' proficiency in using various weapons is highlighted. Furthermore, the weapon communicates the importance of various tools and technologies in effectively executing US Army missions and protecting national interests.

The image of the enemy is not emphasized in the film, but the reference to Russia as a threat for US is present to add context. The presence of a specific enemy is important for a film of this type, both from the dramatic and propagandistic perspectives. From the dramatic viewpoint, the use of a named enemy helps the viewers understand the stakes of the film based on previous media consumption experience, where Russia is very commonly a threat to global peace. At the same time, if we view this technique from the propagandistic viewpoint, it helps in conditioning the viewer's opinion of the real-world entity that serves the role of the antagonist of the film.

Conclusion and discussion

The formation of the army's image has acquired newfound significance in our time. Paradoxically, alongside the spread of humanist ideology, the number of violent conflicts worldwide is increasing. These stimulate the need for propaganda aimed at shaping the image of the army and enhancing the attractiveness of service. The number of US military bases and its involvement in conflicts worldwide makes the shaping and maintenance of US Army's image crucial. The components of the US Army's image are clearly defined in four key characteristics: Militia Tradition, Man-Minded, Mobilization Miracles, and Maritime Influence, along with the seven values of the US Army Ethos.

Various tools and media are employed to shape and maintain the US Army's image. One of those is film. There are numerous films shaping the image of the US Army. The Australian-US co-production film "Interceptor" (2022) is one of the latest examples of

similar films. Summarizing the content analysis of the film, the following conclusions can be drawn. In the movie “Interceptor”, three of the 4 main characteristics of the US Army are communicated: Militia Tradition, Man-Minded, and Maritime Influence. There is no reference to Mobilization Miracles in this film. Mise-en-scènes are the main means of communicating the Military Tradition of the US Army in the movie “Interceptor”. The Man-mindedness of the US Army is primarily communicated through dialogues. The high physical fitness and mental endurance of the main character enable her to find clever solutions in challenging situations. Combat-ready soldiers are possible thanks to appropriate conditions and care shown to the soldier. The film “Interceptor” employs dialogue, mise-en-scène, cut and match cut editing techniques to communicate the Maritime Influence on the US military. The events of the film take place in an interceptor base with unclear geographical coordinates and a small operating staff. The protagonist of this film embodies the ideal soldier of the US Army. The filmmakers adhere to the seven values of the US Army ethos, utilizing various film industry toolkit techniques to portray loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Dialogues and mise-en-scènes serve as the primary means of communicating the weapon in the movie “Interceptor.” The image of the enemy (Russia) is employed as a means of adding context to the movie.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.056>

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Conflict of interests

The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The authors affirm this research did not involve human subjects.

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NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND ARMENIA'S INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION: AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE PATTERNS OR MECHANISMS OF THEIR APPLICATION?

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Abstract

The article examines neoclassical realism and Armenia's international orientation as one of the directions in the transformation of the theory of international relations of small states. In this article, neoclassical realism is analyzed from the point of view of subjective aspects of policy formation and the influence of domestic political features of a small state on its foreign policy. Taking into account that neoclassical realism is a completely independent development of neorealism with a complementary elemental level of analysis of international politics. In terms of content, neoclassical realism of Armenia clarifies such concepts as resilience, national security, balance of power, balancing policy and others. The neoclassical model of Armenia's foreign policy as a small state allows us to study the conditions under which great powers and small states deviate from the policy of balancing. From this point of view, the article proposes to analyze international politics through the prism of a global rollback to state-centric politics. The article takes into account that globalization presents new challenges for small countries such as Armenia, which risks being marginalized as a result of the restructuring of both global and regional economic relations.

Keywords: Armenia, neoclassical realism, small states, national security, globalization, international orientation, European Union.

Introduction

At the present stage, the deepening processes of formation of supranational institutions and norms of international law, the strengthening of the role and importance of non-state players in the South Caucasus present new opportunities and new challenges for regional actors. In general, discussion about international relations is one of the most distinguished things for modern scholars including newcomers in scientific research. Different theoretical schools provide enough scientific base to provide useful information for different researchers including once belongs to social science. Political

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scientists are those who intended to deeply understand impacts of external politics on international relations acquired by particular countries.

The main topic of this paper is Armenia, especially political elites who currently has a different preference toward international cooperation. Assuming main variables of neoclassical realism, help to understand Armenia's treat in foreign politics. Rose and his colleagues estimate about importance of external actors on foreign policy. leader's decision is regarded as the key aspects for it, even though society is not accepting them. However, their interaction on outsider actors is very fascinating to be focused on it.

The main research question is based as following: How do Armenia's political elites is reacted on foreign policy actors (EU and Russia)? How do formal and current politicians intend to establish adequate relations with Russia and EU? In case to answer this question, here is discussion about different members of Armenia's political elites (Formel and current): Ter-Petrosian, Nikol Pashynian, and Serzh Sargsyan. Their attitudes to foreign policy are worth understanding. There are main arguments related to their decision making, even though we don't agree. However, core issue of this paper is not to judge their interaction. Discussion is based on the assumption done by neoclassical realists.

Research implementation is supported by secondary literature, that includes information regarding theoretical schools, as well as breaking news about Armenia's politicians. Different online resources are widely used as well. Understanding international relations is very vital for every scientist involved in scientific research. For this reason, here are different interesting literature consist of variety of theoretical schools helping us to emphasize general behavior of states, especially how they react on international cooperation supported by internal actors (Aleksanyan 2020; Minasyan 2020). Realism and Liberalism are one of the greatest theories presume interaction of individual souvenir republics with in environment. Realism mostly, argue about egocentric issues of state actors. However, Liberalism is quite different-the followers discuss about importance of cooperation and reciprocity. In our case main theoretical thought is neoclassical realism-emerges the role of internal actors on external issues e.g. their influence on foreign politics.

This particular research paper, is mostly based on evidence-based literature. They accelerate main international politics implemented by Armenia's local political elites. I intend to emerge them as a individual and party level. Those terminologies refer their decision as an individual as well as analyzing their political parties as a whole in general terms. In case to better understand Armenia's international political orientations, here is general historical narratives from 1990s years when they had new government headed by Ter-Petrosyan. His general assumption about European and Russian values is generally rewired. Another one is Saerz Sargsyan and last one Pashynian. I decided to select those public figures because their international interaction is better understandable for us. Ter-Petrosyan and Sargsyan are regarded as a formal leader of the countries who, however, stayed neutral in terms of close relations to EU. Despite the fact that Pashynian was on power after velvet revolution his political interests is not purely pro-European, neither pro-Russian.

To be obvious Neoclassical realism emphasize about internal political elites. In our case here is Armenia and their political leaders from the past and current one. Their interaction in international environment is really worth understanding without any hesitation. That's why particular research could be vital for some scholars comprising in such topics.

Research Methodology

In general, research methodology is really main body of such particular paper. Despite the fact, that I do not implement quantitative research in valley like Survey, there is importance to briefly describe the activities done, for the article.

Since this paper, is mostly based on analyzing already existed literature, qualitative methods are mostly used in cases. Collection different scientific arguments, support us to provide useful literature for this issue. At first some kinds of online resources are downloaded from the internet to have a general overview about neoclassical realism and political elites in Armenia. In addition to this, visiting local library, as well as discussion with professors from university give me right direction in terms of using suitable literature. Advice given to me had a dedicated impact on this paper.

In case to understand general preferences and attitudes of politicians to European Union and Russia, generalization is widely used. For example, I study generalized arguments of political elites while noticed from the meeting with local citizens. Comparison of formal and current political leaders is also used with this paper when I assume relationship between EU Russia with Armenia. Their interaction on foreign policy is understandable with this research method.

Theoretical frames

In this particular section there is discussion about general framework of states behavior in world politics. Especially, on hand is concentration on neoclassical assumption on international relations, especially action of local actors with international organizations or neighbors. Despite the fact, that Classical realism generally speaking about international cooperation's including stability of bipolar systems, neoclassical realism assumes that particular political elites use country's power (it could be welfare states, or poor one) to influenced on main decision-making process in International environment. So, this section refers some of the main challenges existed by world scholars. (Rose 1998, 1-3)

International Relations is one of the most interesting topics for scientists especially the one, engaging in world politics. It helps us to have a deep and comprehensive behave of states, especially how they cooperate between each other shaped by political leaders. It is worth mentioning that internal actors play a vital role in outside cooperation (Aleksanyan 2024). Their decision is widely based on main preferences of the society, however in some countries we cannot directly say that international cooperation is called by the society. Gedeon Rose and colleagues are one of the most significant authors of International Relation theories who mostly argues about of influence of local leaders on world politics. There are some scholars like Richard Berts

and colleagues who emphasized whether a multipolar system generates more conflicts than a bipolar one (Rose 1998).

In general, neoclassical realism states if international organization are able to had for international cooperation. Actually, Neorealism has differences from Neoclassical one, because that argus results of states interactions in IR field. It does not cover everything in detail. So, we need to understand deeply why states are acting in particular way? Who are main actors treats as a local authority in particular way?

Scholars from World politics also argue that innterpolitik covers case of states actors and their behaviors while they acting as a main decision maker in international environment as called domestic factors. Neoclassical realism explore incorporates both external and internal variables. Its adherents that the main aim and ambition of a particular country's foreign policy is called by its place in international system and, of course real capabilities. In terms of that, Foreign policy preferences are formed by actual political leaders and elites, however they may could not use all of the country's potential national resources to create political environment in world politics (Rose 1998).

Actually, some scholars are mostly focused on comparative issues related to this particular power that can be used by the states. There a three wave of books on those realistic themes. The first one appeared for societies in 1980 when Rober Gilpin and colleagues used relative power as a medium principle to impressive studies of international politics. As colleagues argued security issues is one of the most important one for particular country. It is emerged by internal actors. As Kennedy wrote "that there is a very clear connection in the long run between individual Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and cline as an important military power (or world empire)". Gilpin said that wealthier and more powerful states will have much ambition to have a larger bundle security than less developed one. (Rose 1998).

In addition to this there are some important scholars with whom there is a discussion about nature of international relations. Chris Aldan and his colleagues are one of the researchers who mostly focus on state's behavior in particular way. Their book mostly emphasized different approaches in international relations, however in our case discussion about domestic sources of foreign policy is very vital. They think that engaging in internal issues is very worth to understand. Generally, scholars may have a huge possibility to analyze deeply different political elites and not all. Some interest groups also influenced on foreign policy. They suggest three main approach. The first one is related to the institutions and regimes. A second one sees foreign policy making as being driven by economic system within states. And third one sees international cooperation as a results of different interest groups, even non-governmental organizations and media are acted. Now let's look each of them separately very briefly (Alden, Aran and Alves 2016, 63-65)

While talking about institution and regime, there is importance to understand state and the domestic environment including society to understand their react on international politics. Generally, state politics is emerged by local actors and country's apparatus and it is legitimized. So there is particular interest that is drown by the local elites. When we argue about society , historical experience plays an important role especially in international trades. If particular country had an open relation with its

neighbors and Europe, their citizens will have the same preferences in the future. Constitutionally elected local government delegated by the society has a obligation to protect their citizen's interests even though in international field. Society should react on other state's behavior and decide themselves correct direction of particular domestic government (Alden, Aran and Alves 2016, 65-68)

Here we argue about economic factors. Structuralists also identify well-being in economic way as a crucial thing in terms of international cooperation. Here is an example, that center-periphery relations based upon the economic exploitation of non and semi-industrial states. The third world's country produces a international politics with highly industrial states to gain main benefits from them. In such case, local elites use local consideration to support their capitalist interests. Different political leaders from rich country's also use their ambitions to gain a lot from developing country.

Formulation of foreign policy is not only depending on legal public government, other non -state actors also are able to play an important role in that scene, Christ Aldan and colleagues called it as a pluralism. The NGOs including different media organization are able to appear most important issue for public to forced local government to establish outside relations with particular actors. Especially when there is election in particular recognized territory, different non state cooperation intensively talks about main goals of each politicians to ensure citizens how well they behave. Sometime interest groups offer political mobilization for electoral support to government and political party to back their foreign policy decision. In addition to this, having public opinion in terms of foreign policy is also important to analyze. Especially, using social media and different computer tool help us to understand how people reacts on decision of any local or international recognized leaders. Their preferences should be understandable in a logical way (Alden, Aran and Alves 2016, 68-70)

At the same time with the expectation of Hagan and Hilsman, they mostly neglect the part played political parties. They can be seen as a main site for number of activities attributed in using domestic resources to influenced on international cooperation. Actually, there can be some political union who are directly financed by the outsider donors. In such case having loyal preferences with them is very acceptable to understand. Partis utilize their international networks to contradict the formal diplomatic bilateral agreements (Alden, Aran and Alves 2016, 70-80).

In our case there is Armenia and their political elites, since the restoration if independence. It is worth mentioning to analyze how they behaves in terms of international cooperation with some of their neighbors and European Union. Despite the fact that there were different political parties in the states power, I will only argue some of them which are still active in terms of determining country's joining international society. In case to understand their perception, I should review their political programs in general. In addition to this international cooperation of the local political parties is also important to be including in this paper. It will help us to identify main international orientation of some political parties in this country.

To sum up, there is a discussion about general frameworks of neoclassical realism and its influenced on different scholars. There is a much more to say about this theory, however I only analyze some main issues needed for this particular paper. In addition

to this, we understand that nongovernmental organization and media including different political parties, play a huge role on shaping international cooperation with outside actors. They sometimes have a power to forced local government to implement any particular steps to have a close relation with foreign partners. In this paper, discussion is mostly related to the member of Armenia's political elites and their determination in international policy.

Historical review of Armenia's political spectrum in 1991

In this particular paper there is general information about political elites of Armenia after restoration of Soviet Union. Arguments are related to the first president of the county and his international and local diplomatic relations with society. In addition, there is information about important events happened at the end of 20th century related to the Ter-Petrosyan.

Armenia is regarded one of the developing countries in South Caucasus region. According to the latest historical backgrounds, the country was under the soviet ruling in 1936-1990. It was a length of time of Armenia's dissolution from its independence roots. Like other South Caucasus countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan) Armenians were suffered lack of freedom and democratic values. However, after restoration of independence Armenia become sovereign states and since 1991 was headed by official directly elected president Ter-Petrosyan. It was period when first independent seat of ministers appeared in political spectrum. The president starts first international cooperation when he put Armenia from occupied countries to independence republic as he signs agreement with "Commonwealth of Independence States", that formed after abolishment of the Soviet Union (Iskanderyan, Mikaeilian and Minasyan 2016, 42-45).

It is not wondering, that Armenia's political life was related to the issues in Karabakh. Some politicians from the Karabakh committee were nominated as a chairman of the Council of Ministers. Vazgen Manukyan head for the position of Prime Minister of Armenia. And Petrosyan become a president, he served as a Chairman of the Parliament. There was another Karabakh committee leader Ashot Manucharyan who was appointed as a minister of the interior. At first glance after restoration of independence Armenia's political life mostly was feed by the member of Karabakh committee. However, in the second half of 1990 and the first period of 1991 was not clear because the new power had been institutionalized in an original way (Iskanderyan, Mikaeilian and Minasyan 2016, 45-47)

Let's look at CPA. The leaders from the Communist party of Armenia were not popular among society in late 1991. They were unable to head for main changes for the local citizens. The country needed more democratic reforms and international recognition as well as close tie with European family. With those communist ideas it was not possible. The main weaknesses of the party, was old fashioned ideas supported by Soviet Russian Federation. They intended to have a deep and comprehensive relations to nominate presidential candidates in 1991. However, something had to be happened and different preferences having particular individuals could not meet each other. The first presidential election was held in 1991 after independence referendum. Ter-Petrosyan was one of the luckiest persons who intended to take the main ruling

power in his hand. His main goal was to establish a democratic system as the main issue on Armenia's agenda. He had diplomatic characteristics regarded as compromise leader in terms of international and local relations with political elites. Due to his physical and mental skills the Armenia's political system was becoming more stable. Ter-Petrosyan was supported by his political party (Pan Armenian National Movements (PANM)), whose ideology was based on liberal movement and open relations with other countries. There is discussion about that political party in next section of this paper. Actually, PANM became the country's ruling party and create new political elites in Armenia. (Iskanderyan, Mikaelian and Minasyan 2016, 45-47)

Here is some main facts about Ter-Petrosian's international relations with its neighbors especially with Turkey. According to the historical fact, Ter-Petrosian was one of the most distinguished politicians in terms of establishment normal relations with Turkey. Despite the fact that the country was in ongoing conflicts with Azerbaijan, the president decided to increase awareness of the country abroad. Turkey was one of the main challenges in that time. Actually, their kinship with Turkey started after restoration of independence. First official international cooperation dates back in April 1992 when Turkey formal ambassador in Russia Volkan Vural met Ter-Petrosyan in Yerevan to discuss about mutual relationship in terms of good neighborhood. The Armenia's president attended founding meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and it becomes one of the founding members. There was another offer to Turkey's government as it called "Football diplomacy". However, it was not successful because the case of "Genocide" recognition is more important for Armenia's citizens. Since the Turkey did not recognize it, the border between those two countries is still closed. (Iskanderyan, Mikaelian and Minasyan 2016, 45-60)

To conclude this information, some of the representatives of Armenia's formal elites was not so successful in their political career. However, they do their best to establish normal and comprehensive relations with Turkey regardless conflict with Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrosyan the formal president of Armenia strongly follows liberal values of the political party called Pan-Armenian National Movement.

To be or how European to be?

Here is a general discussion about European Union's neighboring policy and its attitude to the South Caucasus countries including Armenia. At the beginning of this section, I review general historical facts about EU-Armenia relations, however it will be only in general level and does not includes all projects. Only some of them is considered as a main core of the EU Armenia relations. Attention is drown mainly regarded EU as one of the main partners in conflict resolution. In terms of neoclassical realism, it is worth understanding main attitudes of local governments to European Union.

While being Ter-Petrosian as an Armenian president from 1991 until 1998 (in 2 terms he resigned in 1998) relationship between EU and Armenia started in so called progressive way. Since the restoration of independence, The EU start cooperation with south Caucasus countries including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It starts regionalization of the territory of south Caucasus that means implementation of

different economic and social instruments to boost democracy and security reforms in each particular country.

In 1990, the EU began to form a new configuration of regionalism, a new European regionalism emerged, which led to a more active contribution of the EU to the creation of new international economic and political regimes. The EU together member states government and NGOs, has been major advocate of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. The government of Ter-Petrosyan was motivated to establish acceptable relations with its neighbors and use Russia's power in conflict resolution with Azerbaijan, however being involved in EUs project was more or less successful implemented. Before We moved to EUs role as a peacemaker here is some main information about EUs foreign policy with south Caucasus (Vasilyan 2019, 121-123)

In 1991 the EU became involved in the territory of the former Soviet Union including South Caucasus. The particular members of Armenia's government start joining in grant project called (TACIS) the aim of this one to booster market economy and democracy reforms as well as information and educational exchange programs. In 1993 there was another one called TRACECA it put in to the force in case to developed transportation infrastructure of Armenia and the South Caucasus countries. Those projects covered three South Caucasus countries. The EU not only helps local governments it also implements special instruments to facilitate civil society including non-governmental economic body to provide special platform for cooperation between third countries businessmen and economic actors resisted in EU. There was educational and scientific cooperation called TEMPUS helps locals to gained experience in EUs states. In addition to this the cooperation between public sectors and NGOs is also vital for EUs members as well. The Eastern partnership also help to boost regional cooperation in terms of economic and social issues of those countries including Armenia. (Vasilyan 2019, 123-125)

According to some theoretical frames of neoclassical realism NGOs also impose close relations with international organizations. The Armenian Center fo Public and Development was among such union that booster to cover some projects financed by EU. In 2002-2008 the subsidized activities implemented called "To unite the efforts of all people" this one including South Caucasus countries as well as Turkey. People from young initiatives were welcome to participate in such particular project. They considered that being together regardless different believe, would have positive results in human integration. In 2001 there was Alternative Star project it has a value to bring together representatives of NGOs from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the separate states like Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. its intended to provide mutual cooperation. (Vasilyan 2019, 125-130)

EUs involvement in democracy reforms in Armenia is one of the most distinguished. This step also includes having implementation fair election within the territory of Armenia. In 2003 there was a meeting with president of the RA Robert Kocharyan and Javier Solana (EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy). They discussed about main challenges in democracy referring to follow of the CoE commitments and cooperation with the EU on Media issues to avoid informational vacuum for citizens. Solana also indicated his anxiety against clash between society and local police. As a result, 10 people died in massive meeting

against government. Therefore in 2008 Solana congratulated the newly elected president Sargsian winning in presidential election.

After all EU still continue hist role as a main observer in Armenia's political life. As a result, in July 2015 President Tusk visited Yerevan and had a meeting with formal president Sargsian. He openly expressed readiness to cooperate "working together to open markets and by advancing on democratic reforms including economic growth and better business environment". Helping against corruption promotion would have helped Armenia to stay by the developed countries in EU (Vasilyan 2019, 130-135)

Despite the fact that there are mutual cooperation preferences between Armenia and EU, there is main issues that makes it impossible to subside regional cooperation within states itself. Long-lasted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the issue of Genocide, stop implementation of main projects. Azerbaijan's opposition to Armenia's self-determination erase with Yerevan in any policy space.

In this particular section, we discuss generally main historical facts about EU Armenia relations. There was a issue about different projects that had already been implemented with great success. We understood that in terms of mutual cooperation from both political elites from EU and Armenia, their integration is highly acceptable for public and non-governmental sectors. Financial aids spent for peaceful promotion had a huge impact on people's well-being, however clash between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan had an negative effects one peoples to people cooperation. These ongoing conflicts put main things behind from the mutual reciprocity and cooperation.

In the next section of the paper there is general discussion about current relations with EU including the steps implemented by current government of Armenia. Some of the information from their pre-electoral campaign is collected and being prepared for analytical review. Despite the fact that there were much more projects from EU than we enumerated, I only discuss main that showed us intention of political elites to European path (Vasilyan 2019).

Armenia and International Relations: general discussion about some of the political leaders from the past

In that section, there is general discussion about some political parties including current parliamentary one, who has different or the same preferences regarding European Union and Russian. Since the main core of this article is to attached neoclassical realism with Armenia's case, I discuss how do they implement international cooperation with foreign actors. Even though some of them nowadays are not able to influenced on country's political preferences, their view can be considered as an additional resource to fulfill our theoretical frame.

While arguing about local governments, there is main importance to analyze how political parties react on European issues in Armenia. In case to solve this particular gap, I will assume about main ideas related to the formal and current parliamentary political parties in this country. In some case, may I could not include all parties, however I arrange some of them that creates political environment in Armenia. And, of course, their preferences and ideas about European integration is also crucial to figure it out.

As far as already mentioned in the previous chapter, Ter-Petrosyan was representatives of the Pan Armenian National Movements (currently it is called Armenian National congress) currently appeal on nationality and liberality of the country. According to their ideological backgrounds they are purely liberal democracy. That one intended to support elections in multiple district political parties that even have different preferences. So, they strongly support human rights, among as civil rights without clash between society. They support independent judiciary reforms and check and balance between branches and government. Since this party is center-right they strongly support free market without main challenges. Private property among capitalism and less intervention in business by the government, is their one of the key topics to be accepted¹.

Members of The Armenian National congress does not have a seat in national assembly. However, it is worth looking inside their political ideas. Generally speaking, this political party is truly open minded regarding international relations, even though close relationship with European Union and UN. Despite the economic and social clash between EU and Russian Federation, the members of the Armenian National congress still believe peaceful mediation role of Russia between Armenia's and Azerbaijan's conflicts.

Their electoral campaign in 2021 was completely based on future development of relations with their neighbors. They probably blamed on Aliyev's government due to less possibility for future cooperation to solve Karabakh's conflict. The Armenians National congress was only one party who called for peace of dignified compromise. As far as the peace environment is one of the main factors for Armenians, their political campaign mostly argues how to solve the problems with Azerbaijan. They probably blamed Pashynian on not having enough communication with international community about this problem.

Due to this fact Russia become only one guarantee for peace in this region, as they argue. However, they still accept the ideas that the country should stay close with European union and its partners, as well as play the major role in Eurasia to avoid economic isolation. It sounds like that, their behavior could be neutrally- not too close with Russia neither nor with EU. They usually emphasize that integration in the global economic system, more working place will be created. Scientific and social cooperation with European Union is regarded as a main key for success.

Despite the fact, that Ter-Petrosyan (One of the leaders of Armenian National Congress) was one of the most pro-European by the end of 20th century, he still argues fundamentally about not having association agreement with European Union. On December 2013 He emphasized during radio interview, that Armenia become one of the most pro-Russian countries differ from Azerbaijan and Georgia. Refusing sign on association agreement would not result negatively on social disorder, as he said. So people could not have been rebelled against the previous government, since they were disappointed with western due to double standard. As he was representatives of political elites, his arguments are strongly stay beyond from democracy and European values. In Armenia many young people prefer European integrity, they have already

¹ Armenian National Congress. 2021. The electoral program of the Armenian National Congress. Accessed April 10, 2024. <https://anc.am/4241/>.

participated in numbers of international scholarship competition. However political decisions are not associated with people's preferences.²

Russian Narratives probably influenced on Politicians attitudes. As far as already mentioned Ter Petrosian regarded Russia as one of the main security guarantees in Armenia. To understand it briefly here is scientific view of the science Aram Terzyan. Probably in his particular paper there is discussion about Armenia's international cooperation that is influenced by foreign actors. According to his article Russia treat a "friend in need" to protect national security of Armenia and support both countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan) to solve this devastating conflict in peaceful way. Being in blockade of Turkish Azerbaijan union is additional economic problem for Armenian citizens.

It is useful to understand how Russia reacts on Armenia's foreign policy in terms of Sargsyan's presidency within country. This person ruled Armenia from 2008 until 2018. Currently he is a leader of Republican party of Armenia. The main ideology of this one is based on conservative ideals. The main core issue is to protect nationality from outside forces and facilitate communication of people within Armenia as well as the members of diaspora. They argue that each politician should handle with the main ideology of Armenian people even though, for international politics. The people of the nation are accepted to respect to the traditions and historical experience of Armenia³.

The international political ideology of Sargsyan's party itself was based on Russian narratives. Here are some one of the latest online publication about his preferences in favor to Russian federation. We can regard him as a political leader's internal actor who had an active role in foreign policy, while being a president of Armenia. On March 7, 2023 he was still thinking about close relations of Russia with Armenia. Despite the fact, that Putin had an intention to build "Soviet Union", his preferences to him was not changed. According to his point of view Russia is regarded as a main security guarantee for solving conflicts with Azerbaijan. He pointed out that it would be necessary to change interlocutor in terms of peaceful relations with Aliyev's government. He argued that negotiation process should go in a different way and not as Pashynian wanted. About Russian influence on Armenia's national security he assumed, that there was not better ally or alternative than Russia: It found useless to talk about NATOs military bases in this country, since their leaders are not interested in such things. Sargsyan never been anti-European he never had any arguments against EU and NATO, however he believed that their security interests are not as understandable as Russia's⁴.

In addition to this, A.Terzyan (2017) mentioned Armenia's security strategy noted in 2007 that argue about "Russia's main role for the security of Armenia as well as friendly linkage between those two nations are very important for future development". Being a main "Peacekeeper" in Armenia's political spectrum it something ridiculous

² Stepanyan, David. 2013. Levon Ter-Petrosyan explains why there can be no Euromaidan in Armenia. Accessed April 10, 2024. <https://arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=31C3EB20-6BDB-11E3-A7A00EB7C0D21663>.

³The Republican Party of Armenia. "RPA Program." Accessed February 20, 2024. <http://www.hhk.am/en/program/>.

⁴ Caucasus Watch. 2023. "Serzh Sargsyan: "Armenia Has No Better Ally than Russia"." March 9, 2023. Accessed January 20, 2024. <https://caucuswatch.de/en/news/serzh-sargsyan-armenia-has-no-better-ally-than-russia.html>.

because this country among Putin never protected human right even in conflict zones. His ambition to create an empires ruled by Soviet mentality. Despite this fact formal politicians of Armenia still regarded Russia as a “good friend” more than European Union. At first glance internal public actors in this country used to identify both actors in different way. During the presidency of Kocharyan the concept of strategic partnership was not full of identity related or cultural references is mostly focuses on shared economic and military interests. Regardless close kinship with Russia , Sargsyan preferred to establish European standards in Armenia, however he assumed that being a full member of European Union was not yet decided since it disappeared from their foreign policy agenda. Relations with Russian never contradict European values (Terzyan 2017, 183-190).

In 2013 it was not very successful for Armenia-EU relations because of Russian factor. Generally signing to Association agreement would give Armenia more benefits than being behind the Russian Federation. However, in 2013 Putin’s government warn country’s government to avoid any close relation with western partner. They offered local government to join Eurasian Customs Union leaded by Russia. Here we can clarify that European identity outweighed by Russian influence on domestic decision makers. Even for opposition parties such decision was not harmful for Armenia’s independence since they also assumed that the Russia was main security partner. About this decision Sargsyan emphasized that by signing to Free trade agreement mean increasement of gas price and electricity for the citizens. As he ensures economic interests was much important, then civilization (Baltag and Romanyshyn 2023; Khvorostiankina 2021).

In this case, we can argue that internal actors are able to decide themselves their action in foreign policy. At first glance here is Sargsyan’s decision to protect country’s economic interests however on the second side there is Putin’s interest to influence on Armenia’s local and international politics. According to the neoclassical realism the country is ruled be the preferences of main political elites, however non state actors also play one of the important roles in establishing international cooperation with outside actors. In this section of this paper, there was only general outlook decided by country’s formal presidents. Discussion was built in terms of local level of incumbents as they are representatives of particular political parties (Terzyan 2017).

International vector of Armenia in current time

In this particular section here is assumption about new government of Armenia, which was nominated after the revolution within whole territory of this country. We discuss about Pashynian’s international outlook and his perception and preferences in terms of international relations. He as an internal political leader. Arguing about main reforms implemented for future cooperation with EU, is widely reviewed over here. Before moved to analyzing general international relations of this country, here is review of Pashynans government How did he return in Armenia’s political elites as a leader of “Velvet Revolution”.

Probably this kind of revolution was one of the peaceful in Europe’s history. There was not an massive violence against peaceful citizens, who were asking better

European future in community. Due to this reason, society starts fighting against dictatorship. Also, they stayed against massive increasement of communal costs. It had negative effects on each Armenia's family. This kind of revolution was not only based on asking better life. These massive protests were a result of massive violent repression supported by Sargsyan's government and fraudulent election. According to the expert A. Gregoryan, this particular revolution was not only implemented by the society, NGOs leaders promoting democratic values and various informal organizations that support European Union, stayed together to overcome this massive problems. After April 2018, Pashinyan and a small group of different associates encouraged to people for massive mobilization (Grigoryan 2021).

Pashynian currently is a leader of Civil Contract. That particular political union was created on January 2013. In this period joining application was published in the daily newspaper that unsure citizens to join in. In general, the founder of the party among leaders, noticed main challenges existed in Armenia and therefore implementation reforms in democracy, is a core task for them. They assume the importance of velvet revolution, since the electoral fraud requires abolishment. To overcome this problem kinds of peaceful revolution is one of the solutions. Their programs is mostly based on the following main issues: 1. Creating long lasting peace with neighbors; 2. Formulating high quality electoral systems with accordance of Armenia's law as well as appointing states program for education and science. 3. Professional training for local military servants and adopting new technologies, is regarded as a vital for them⁵.

The main aim of the civil contract, was to abolish main conflicts with Azerbaijan. They intended to accept Pashynian's peaceful agreement and never follow the mistakes done by the previous governmental body. The unwillingness to return under the rule of the "Karabakh clan" as well as desires to achieve changes during the period of his premiership. After Pashynian had arrived in politics, corruption index of Armenia had already been increased. Their politics probably influenced on the society, it is reflected on the general telephone sociological research. According to the research implemented by IRI Public opinion poll, 54 percent of respondents see security as the main challenges of the country, while political instability was ranked second at 10 percent and 9 respectively. Economic and social problems is crucial only for 5 percent. In 2020 research carried on by International Gallup organization, almost 37 percent though that EUs interaction with "Armenia's September events" was positive (Haindrava 2022, 1-4).

On November 10, 2020 decided to sign one page statements that stops 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It includes deoccupation of all Azerbaijani territories adjacent to Karabakh occupied by Armenia as well as development peacekeeping operation and humanitarian aids for locals. In Such issue, Armenians mostly blamed every international actor for such resolution of conflicts including EU and Russian Federation. However, this statement did not change (Haindrava 2022, 5-10).

We can say that as a political leader, Pashinyan is the main decision-maker on the foreign policy of post-revolutionary Armenia. His interaction with EU is more positive, as it is seemed, than Serz Sargsyan may have. It looks like that current primer is much

⁵ "Civil Contract" party program. Accessed February 20, 2024. <https://www.civilcontract.am/hy/1622886298>.

more pro-European, rather than Pro-Russian. And his international cooperation mostly aims to becomes the country as one of the most developed in the whole South Caucasus. On November 17, 2023 he was appointed as a leader of delegation in Strasbourg, where European Parliament meeting was held. He refers on common values and democracy. As he said it was strategic choice and not by circumstances. He promised that Armenia was with EU as much close as it possible. He was so grateful because of dedicated support implemented by EU council to create peaceful environment between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is considered as main plus between EU-Armenia relations. Among other European political leaders, Pashynian expected to negotiate with its neighbor however President of Azerbaijan Alyev refused to seat behind them and talk about peace negotiation. However, in 2023 He attend the meeting to recognize sovereignty of each other's territory. Actually, the agreement to recognize territorial integrity with concrete numbers, was reached previously that states neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan never accept ambiguities while recognizing each other's territorial integrity. Despite his cooperation with Azerbaijan, he blames Alyev due to less capabilities to join different meeting hold by European leaders⁶.

Another one of the main steps, that was implemented for more closeness with the EU, was related to the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA)⁷. In 2017 The EU and Armenia set out to deepen their relationship by adopting this particular agreement. This one turned the page of the failed Association Agreement, however it manifested parties' ambitions to ask more comprehensive relations with each other. Despite the fact that it seemed very sceptics for some scholars, it still regarded as the main cooperation tool, which has just negotiated. Despite the fact that this agreement was negotiated before the velvet revolution, it's progressiveness is arguable during Pahinian's period. According to the Federica Monherini, this legal notes, will have a real positive influence on peoples well-being in Armenia. It helps European to strengthen cooperation on security matters, as well as the improvement of climates for investors and etc. Its probably repeat the same goals was set on May 2015 in Riga Summit. According to the power-based explanation, external governance it is determined by the EU's power and its interdependence with regard to the third countries. With this example, internal actors especially political elites mostly are depended on foreign policy's decision makers. In our case here is EU and its politics toward other states. There is hierarchical interdependence that influenced on international cooperation. According to the Declour and colleagues' domestic structure of international actors like EU and others, probably assume compatibility with domestic institutions of the partners. Their influence is generally is one of the huge (Khvorostiankina 2018, 15-20).

Actually, to be obvious, the current leader of the Armenia's government was one of the "European Friendly" while he was in opposition. His attitudes to Russian

⁶ European Parliament. 2023. "Armenian Prime Minister: "We must move steadily towards peace with Azerbaijan"." October 17, 2023. Accessed February 10, 2024. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231013IPR07127/armenian-prime-minister-we-must-move-steadily-towards-peace-with-azerbaijan>.

⁷ EUR-Lex. 2018. "Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part." OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4-466. Accessed February 10, 2024. http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2018/104/obj.

influences was not as positive as for example May Sargsyan had. Due to this reason Pashynyan mostly accepted the effectiveness of EU-Armenia relations in a positive way. Due to this fact he, in 2017 the opposition party member of Armenia denounced countries membership in EAEU on all side, with a focusing on its negative effects on countries economic development as well as on deepening its relations with neighboring Georgia and Iran. We can explain such narratives with Russia-Amenia close relations. Most probably they saw Putin's power as a main economic guarantee in the South Caucasus (Khvorostiankina 2018, 25-30).

Such attitudes to Russia, probably dates back EU-Armenia relations even though after velvet revolution. Therefore for Armenian politicians it is quite difficult to treat both actors in the same way. Future Visa-free movement and other benefits dedicated from EU, is regarded as a threat for Russian. Their massive intervention in country's external affairs is quite notable. Sometimes Pashynian argued negative dependence of Armenia on EU. He assumed that with such decision, EU's leaders are able to dictate political elites how to act in every case. However, he was not able to understand that Putin's decision to have a close friend on behalf of Armenia's government is a serious security challenges for local citizens (Khvorostiankina 2018, 30-35).

All those above mentioned prompt made us think that currently it is still difficult for Armenian elites to have a adequate international orientation. Both actors EU and Russia are still regarded as one of the main security partners of this country, however different preferences for each one is acquired by Pashynian. The reforms of new government leaded by current primer ministers will be more pro-European and their intention to fight against corruption, as well as creating different social security for locals, will be one of the guarantees for EU-Armenia close relations. Improvement of business claimants and implementation of good governance principle, is a plus for close tie with EU (Khvorostiankina 2018).

To summarize, currently international relations of Armenia is more or less depends on reciprocity and common values. Resolving conflicts with Azerbaijan is argues, as a one of the main challenges existed within country. Therefore, active participation of EU's leaders insures both parts to recognize each other's territory. With such decision, public trust to European Union increased, as the latest survey implemented. The discussion is mostly based on Russian and European narratives. Even though Pashynian, like the previous leaders of country, regards Russia as one of the main partners in conflict resolution and in economic issues. We see that Armenia currently stay neutral with EU's leaders. Neither Russia nor European Union cannot be regarded as a close friend for Armenian's. It is points I made after analyzing secondary literature.

Conclusion and discussion

To be obvious, this particular research analysis is based on gathering information from different resources, including papers, books and interview with local formal and current politicians. There was a research question, that required deeply investigation. How do Armenia's political elites is reacted on foreign policy actors (EU and Russia)?

How does formal and current politicians intend to establish adequate relations with Russia and EU?.

According to the general summarize of the paper, we see that still Armenian local government is not precisely very Pro-European, because they still regard Russia as one of the main security guarantees in post conflict situation with Azerbaijan. The core things, that probably related to the neoclassical realism is internal actors, especially how do they react on foreign policy decision makers. Sometime we see how Armenia's politicians are reacts on international narratives including being pro-European, however some of them including Sargsyan is not able to identify really interests of EU within Armenia's society. He argued about less interests from EUs leaders to Armenia. Despite this fact, we enumerate different reasons why Armenia still stay as a neutral between Russia and EU.

Generally, using secondary literature from different resources support to identify general problems occurred between Armenia with international partners. However, we did not discuss about non-state actors that are influenced on international cooperation, according to Chris Alden and colleagues. Because main core plan of this article is to compare different political leaders and believe of their political parties to understand how do state politics influence on their international relations.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.070>

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Conflict of interests

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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STRATEGIC PROSPECTS FOR USING INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ARMENIA: HOW EFFECTIVE IS REGULATION OF ATTRACTING INVESTORS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH?

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Abstract

The article analyzes the strategic prospects for creating stable conditions for attracting additional volumes of foreign investment in the Armenian economy, which is due to the lack of own funds for sustainable social and economic development. The relevance of issues related to the role and place of foreign investment in Armenia, occurring due to the globalization of the world and regional economy, creating or limiting conditions for the movement of capital, has increased sharply in light of the sharp intensification of the policy of attracting foreign investment in the South Caucasus region. The practical experience of the transition period of the market economy of Armenia is summarized, as the country became more dependent on the level of regional and global integration. At this time, flows of foreign capital emerged not only in the form of government borrowings, but also in the form of diaspora transfers, assistance from international organizations, and the creation of joint ventures with Armenian entrepreneurs. Restrictions on obtaining high technologies, both in the form of goods and technical documentation, and in the form of direct investment, were gradually lifted.

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Keywords: investment policy, investment landscape, sustainable economic development, 'open door' policy, Armenia, government debt, the South Caucasus region.

Introduction

The importance of investments in the process of economic development of the country and improving the welfare of the population is great. At the same time, some undesirable manifestations of investment processes may pose a threat to Armenia. The implementation of an effective investment policy (IP) is one of the most important issues for each country in the South Caucasus region.

The article shows that Armenia has a fairly liberalized investment policy, since the country has an 'open door' policy, but the investment picture is still far from desirable. Is the liberalized investment policy of Armenia capable of promoting sustainable development and investment reform? What are the features, goals and problems of the investment policy of Armenia? What are the priorities of the reform of effective investment policy?

Foreign investments play a significant role in the sustainable economic development of the host country. Investments enable to increase the production volumes, adopt cutting-edge manufacturing technologies and innovations and management experience, produce high-quality and competitive products in line with international standards, promote its diversification, create new employment opportunities, integrate into the global economy, etc. However, sustainable does not mean riskless. Alongside the positive effects of foreign investment policies on economic development and the growth of the host country's economy (Wagner 2023), there are also potential negative effects and risks:

- displacement of national capitals and companies (the so-called 'crowding-out effect');
- facilitating capital outflow from the country based on transfer pricing;
- formation of disproportionate (non-constructive) development of the national economy;
- formation of a resource-dependent economy;
- risks associated with an increase in government debt;
- formation of economic and political dependence and loss of sovereignty, security problems, etc.

For example, many experts believe that the share of foreign investments (FI) in the country's gross capital should not exceed 60-70%. The larger the volume of FI, the greater the degree of the country's dependence. The higher the government debt, the less opportunity there is for sustainable economic development in the country (Ferrarini, Giugale and Pradelli 2022). In the 20th century, as in the 21st century, such countries are doomed to exist in perpetual debt to other countries, working exclusively for their benefit, selling national wealth and enriching other countries. This process can threaten the sovereignty of the country, and especially of small states (James Bernard Quilligan 2002).

Another example of the negative impact of Foreign Investments (FI): with uncontrolled investments, capital will be invested in industries that do not ensure efficient returns. This also applies to environmentally polluting production sectors

transferred from industrially developed to developing countries and countries with transitional economies that have relatively lax environmental protection standards, and so on. To shape a positive and prevent negative manifestations of FI, it is essential to implement effective economic policies: establishing a system of government control, regulation, incentives, restrictions, prohibitions, and the development of strategy and tools. Based on the importance of the aforementioned, the article discusses the features and issues of FI.


Methodology

The article examines various existing theoretical, analytical and research works, reports from international organizations (USAID 2022), World investment report 2021 (UNCTAD 2021), World investment report 2019. United Nations conference on trade and development UNCTAD (UNCTAD 2019) reports, etc.), statistical data (World Bank, The Heritage Foundation, OECD), expert assessments from research centers, doctoral dissertations, legislative acts, development strategies and programs.

In the article mainly employing statistical methods; the dynamics of investment flows in Armenia are identified, and peculiarities of investments in Armenia are discussed by countries and sectors. By employing logical reasoning methods, the article identifies the features, tasks, and problems of Armenia's investment policy and proposes ways to address them.

Features of RA investments

Small countries usually have a relatively high share of FI compared to GDP, primarily due to their small GDP volume and 'open door' policies. However, in Armenia, despite being a small country, such a trend is not evident. Investment flow indicators are unstable. A stable increase in FI was observed until 2008. This was the outcome of privatization initiatives as well as investment by resourceful diaspora individuals who channelled investments to high growth market segments. The economic and financial crisis halted the growth trajectory of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to Armenia, and they have been trending downwards since their peak of \$944 million (9% of GDP) in 2008 (Figure 1). The reduced scope for privatization-related inflows as well as divestment in the banking sector associated with more stringent deposit requirements contributed to the downfall (UNCTAD 2019).


Figure 1. Net inflow of FDI in Armenia, 2000-2022 (World Bank Group 2024)

The FDI inflows into the RA has also decreased as a result of purported instances of restrictive business practices and uncertainties associated with the recent political transition have contributed to a “wait-and-see” attitude among investors. As a result, average FDI inflows have almost halved. Moreover, in 2020, investment activity was adversely affected by restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the net inflow of FDI amounted to only \$59 million. However, in 2021-2022, the gross inflow of FDI into Armenia increased. The year 2022 recorded the highest figure in the post-Soviet period (998 million US dollars, 5% of GDP). The reason for the increase in FDI is a consequence of geopolitical events (sanctions against Russia and Iran, the Russian-Ukrainian war), as a result of which many investment projects and companies migrated to Armenia.

The sectoral specificity of investments in Armenia causes concern. The main FDI-attracting sectors include electricity and gas supply with 62.6 percent of total FDI inflow in 2021 (\$476 million), mining (16 percent/\$122 million) and services (12.3 percent/\$94 million) (USAID 2022). While investors in the electricity and gas sectors are mainly market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking, in mining investments, they are natural-resource seeking (USAID 2022). As for investments in the manufacturing and high-tech industries, which are of key importance from the point of view of constructive reform of the national economy, their share is very small. The latter need government support and the creation of competitive advantages. This is one of the issues that concerns investment policy (IP) (Figure 2).


As with sectors, the origins of FDI are also quite concentrated. Russia is the largest foreign investor in Armenia, with a relatively stable share over the last years (Figure 3). In 2021, FDI inflows from Russia totaled \$512 million, or 67.3 percent of FDI inflows. Russian share increased even further. Russia mainly invests in Armenia’s electricity, natural gas supply, and telecommunications sectors.

Figure 2. Gross Inflow of FDI to the real sector of Armenia by sectors, 2016-2021, million dollars (USAID, 2022)



Armenia's second largest investor is Germany with \$95 million of FDI in 2021. In the past, Germany's FDI was concentrated in the mining sector. Other foreign investors in 2021 included Cyprus (5 percent), Italy (5 percent), and Argentina (4 percent).

Figure 3. Gross inflow of FDI to the real sector of Armenia by countries, 2016-2021, million dollars (USAID 2022)




Another indicator used to assess Armenia's largest investors is gross foreign direct investment flows. As Figure 4 shows, Russia accounts for almost 50 percent of total FDI flows, or \$5.2 billion, as of end 2021, followed by France (9 percent or \$955 million), and Germany (6 percent or \$572 million). Other major investors in Armenia's economy are Argentina (4 percent or \$355 million), Cyprus (3 percent or \$278 million), Luxembourg (3 percent or \$278 million), and the U.S. (3 percent or \$261 million), (Figure 4) (USAID 2022).

In summary, FDI in Armenia is dominated by "market-seeking and/or strategic asset-seeking investments", predominantly in the electricity and gas-supply sectors.

The number of countries that bring investments to Armenia is very limited with Russian investments ahead of all others (USAID 2022).

Figure 4. Gross FDI inflows to Armenia by country at the end of 2021 (in million US dollars)



Source: Statistical Committee of the RA (USAID 2022)

The role of investment policy in the process of implementation and regulation of investments

Many macroeconomic factors play a significant role in attracting foreign investments: the market capacity of the host country, the level of political security of the country, dynamics of the exchange rate of the national currency, geographical location, geographical and natural-climatic factors, level of infrastructure development, openness of the national economy, degree of integration with neighbors and the global economy, peculiarities of the business climate (production costs, tax system specifics, corporate tax rates, and other taxes, specifics of the system of financial incentives, cost and level of qualification of the workforce, level of development of transportation infrastructure, cost of rent and utilities, administrative procedures, assistance from local authorities in selecting local staff, obtaining financial incentives), etc.

Thus, the foundation of a country's investment attractiveness is based on numerous factors, among which IP (investment policy) holds special significance. State investment policy is a purposeful activity of government bodies and institutions aimed at influencing the investment market and redistributing capital flows to facilitate the resolution of issues of public importance, as well as attracting investments in priority areas of economic development (Wagner 2023; Khachatryan and Grigoryan 2024; Lakshminarayanan and Yepremyan 2023). The quality of a country's investment policies directly influences the decisions of investors, both domestic and foreign.

According to the logic of global processes in shaping the world economy and integrating national economies, in recent decades, there has been active liberalization of investment policies. Governments of countries continued to liberalize restrictions on international investments. However, in recent years, amid the contemporary geopolitical and economic situation, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent years, some countries have observed an intensification of investment policy and a trend towards tightening investment regulations and restrictions related to national security.

During the pandemic years, regulatory and restrictive measures in investment policy were mainly implemented in developed and developing countries. Twenty-five

countries and the EU, nearly all of them developed economies, adopted or reinforced screening regimes for foreign investment (UNCTAD 2021). Nevertheless, the policy of liberalization, encouragement, or facilitation of foreign investments still constituted a significant part of all measures. Many countries, regardless of their level of development, simplified or optimized administrative procedures, and some countries expanded their investment incentive regimes to attract a greater amount of foreign investment. As a result of this diversity, a distinctive geographical mosaic of Investment Policy has emerged. The geographical picture of investment freedom is formed based on research conducted by the Heritage Foundation (2023). According to these data, the investment freedom index is relatively low in East and Southeast Asian countries. By this measure, many countries in this region fall into the category of 'pressed' countries, even though they are leaders among rapidly developing nations. The Investment Freedom Index for Armenia in 2023 is 75%, indicating a high degree of liberalization.

The FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index) is also an Important FDI Indicator that measures statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment in 22 economic sectors across 69 countries, including all OECD and G20 countries (OECD 2024b). Barriers to FDI are widespread across countries. There is no country with no restrictions on FDI, according to the FDI Index methodology, although the extent of restrictions varies across jurisdictions. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region tend to have higher scores under the Index on average with a greater propensity to screen inward investment and more frequent use of foreign equity limits at a sectoral level (the regime in export processing zones in these countries, which is often more liberal, is not captured in the Index).

EU countries collectively have the fewest restrictions on FDI. Larger countries also tend to be more restrictive, partly because they may be richer in natural resources, but also because they often have larger markets which offer host governments more scope to impose discriminatory conditions on investors without discouraging inflows (Misturai and Rouleti 2019). For most countries, sector-specific limits on foreign equity ownership have been the most common form of discrimination faced by foreign investors.

FDI restrictions tend to arise mostly in primary sectors such as mining, fishing and agriculture, but also in media and transport⁸.

Armenia ranks 11th to 12th in the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, with a score of 0.019 points. Minor restrictions exist in the Tertiary-0.038, Transport-0.167, Air-0.5, Media-0.25, Radio & TV Broadcasting-0.5, Business services-0.006, Accounting & Audit-0.025 sectors (OECD 2024a).

Some regional dimensions of the investment policy task

The main legal act regulating the investment sphere in the Republic of Armenia is the RA Law "On foreign investments" adopted in 1994. In the investment sphere, the RA Government is guided by the principles of 'open door' policy, liberalization of

⁸ The FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index). OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. <https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g5501-en>.

relations pertaining to investment activities, establishment of national and more favorable regimes for foreign investors, proper protection of investments, and other principles adopted in international advanced practice⁹.

National investment policy is implemented within the framework of the national foreign economic strategy. Its specificity depends on both the content and goals of the strategy for economic development and the predominant direction of foreign trade policy—import or export policy—as well as the balance between the trends in foreign trade policy, ranging from protectionism to liberalization (Wagner 2023).

The goals and expectations of Foreign Direct Investment in the Republic of Armenia are formulated in two key documents: Development Strategy of the Republic of Armenia for 2014-2025¹⁰ and Export-Oriented Industrial Policy of the Republic of Armenia¹¹. In the first document, the investment priority is the continuous improvement of the business investment environment, as well as the simplification of business and investment operations, and the reduction of government intervention, which is aimed at protecting the interests of investors. In the second document, the priority is the formation and development of leading, high-tech, and export-oriented industries.

The effectiveness of investment policy depends on the overall strategy of the country's effectiveness, especially the business and investment environment. Due to regional instability, difficulties arise in Armenia, which limits the tasks of defining national investment policies, strategies, formulated goals and priorities (USAID 2022). Within the framework of investment goals and priorities, criteria for evaluating investment program projects are formulated. The existing criteria are presented in the Decree of the RA Government “On the procedure for approving the selection, development, evaluation and determination of priorities of public investment projects”¹² applied to projects with a cost exceeding 1 billion dollars. For projects with a smaller budget, the Law “On the Budget System” applies.

Evaluation criteria of the public investment projects are:

- impact on the human capital,
- public significance of the infrastructure,
- compliance with the strategy of the sector,
- the influence of project on climate change,
- the project's risk level,
- economic internal rate of return (EIRR).

The existing criteria for evaluating investment program do not take into account the importance of a whole range of goals and priorities that could contribute to

⁹ Ministry of Economy of the RA. 2024. “Investment Policy.” Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://mineconomy.am/page/96>.

¹⁰ Resolution of the Government of the RA “The 2014-2025 strategy of Armenia’s development”, March 27, 2014, No 442-N (in Armenian). Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://www.gov.am/files/docs/1322.pdf>

¹¹ Extract from the minutes of the session of the Government of the RA ‘On giving approval to the export-directed industrial policy strategy of the Republic of Armenia’, December 15, 2011, No 49 (in Armenian). Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://www.irtek.am/views/act.aspx?aid=65893>

¹² Resolution of the Government of the RA “On approving the procedure for the selection, development, evaluation and prioritization of public investment programs”, February 9, 2023, No 175-N (in Armenian). Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=174111>

constructive changes in the economic development and investment policy of the country. The reason is the lack of a clear formulation of the economic development strategy and IP.

Investment policy is excessively liberalized. Prohibitions and restrictions are minimal. Regulation is primarily carried out through general incentives. However, these are mostly weak factors and are rarely considered the main reason for attracting investments.

The total value proposition a country offers that address the investor's key investment drivers—for example, labor market, operating costs, real estate, etc. — are also important for attracting investments. Also, incentives that offset some of the costs and difficulties in realizing these drivers (for example, offsetting the costs of recruiting, training, and employing workers) can be very attractive to investors (Wagner 2023). There is practically no sectoral, including industrial investment policy. In the investment policy of the RA, there are minor restrictions and control in certain sectors, as well as some sectoral incentives (mostly in the form of tax and customs duty exemptions or reductions, financial support) in agriculture, healthcare, R&D, and IT (USAID 2022).

Sectoral policy is a necessary prerequisite for constructive reform in structural restructuring. Such policy is implemented in many countries, particularly in developed and rapidly developing ones. For example, in China, FDI projects are divided into five types: encouragement, restriction A, restriction B, prohibition, and permission, using corresponding tools. In the absence of sectoral IP in the national economy, sectors oriented towards natural resources and the domestic market are formed and developed (including strategic sectors).

Efficiency-oriented productions are not of interest to foreign investments. They represent a national interest, and the introduction of investments into these productions is impossible through a system of general incentives. Creating competitive advantages and investment interests in them is possible only through stimuli adapted to the production specifics and active government support (in many cases, through state initiative and collaboration). At the same time, a system of prohibitions and restrictions is necessary to regulate foreign investments of interest since their large volumes or significant involvement in the national economy lead to serious negative consequences, such as the 'Dutch disease' effect, economic dependence, environmental issues, etc. For sectoral policy, it is necessary to group sectors and industrial branches (productions) and develop the corresponding investment toolkit. Such a proposal is presented in the Investment Reform Roadmap of Armenia report, but only for the development of incentive systems (USAID 2022).

The investment policy of the RA is not revised in accordance with global and regional economic and geopolitical changes and trends, and the level and stage of the country's economic development is not taken into account. Industrial policy should sensitively respond to changes and undergo revision and reform. Industrial policy should sensitively respond to changes and undergo revision and reform.

IP should also be developed in the context of the industrial policies of neighboring countries to gain competitive advantages. General incentives do not create competitive advantages because they are similar to the incentives of other countries. In our case, the

problem is further complicated by the fact that neighboring countries have additional, more favorable factors in the presence of similar incentives.

The territorial differentiated investment policy of the RA should also undergo revision. Currently, the investment stimulation system is implemented in border areas and free economic zones. In the conditions of polarized economic development in Armenia, a primary task is the development of investment priorities and a new toolkit in accordance with territorial characteristics.

The enclave nature of investments is also a problem. Foreign investments follow the logic of a unified economic space and are not interested in integration into the national economy. Essentially, foreign investments operate entirely on imported products, without connections to local servicing and accompanying components or the creation of subsequent production cycles, do not exhibit a multiplier effect, and do not contribute to the formation of territorial production complexes (or clusters). These investments represent economic enclaves. To establish the principle of the unity of the global economy, several international structures (OECD, APEC, IMF, WTO, especially TRIMS) have at the institutional level formulated a system of requirements, prohibitions, and restrictions. For instance, prohibitions on the presence of a local component in production, restrictions on export control, prohibitions on income repatriation limitations, requirements for export liberalization, etc.

In contrast to these requirements, there are numerous other means and instruments of investment policy through which specific outcomes can be achieved, i.e., the integration of foreign productions into the national economy. There is a need for the development of appropriate tools in Armenia's IP for small, medium, large, and extra-large productions. Although small and medium productions are more responsive (flexible) to economic changes, they are artisanal or handmade productions with limited development capabilities and a weak multiplier effect. Large and extra-large productions play a crucial role in the sustainable and rapid development of the national economy and the diversification process. In countries with transitional economies and third countries, the incentive system primarily operates for small and medium productions; however, the regulation mechanisms for large and extra-large productions are either weak or ignored.

One of the priorities of Armenia's IP is the export direction of investments within the framework of an export-oriented industrial policy. Emphasizing exports without considering other priorities (import substitution, the significance of industrial centers, territorial and sectoral priorities, etc.) makes constructive structural restructuring of the national economy impossible. This, in turn, is a key principle of economic development. In other words, there is a need to develop the export direction of investment policy. In a broad sense, the responsibility for the effectiveness of the investment policy lies with the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia. However, for attracting investments, the presence of a specialized structure is also important. In the past, this function was entrusted to the Business Armenia foundation.

Currently, the Enterprise Armenia Fund (Investment Support Center) is operational. Following the principle of a 'single window', it provides comprehensive support to local and foreign investors, offering information on investment opportunities and conditions in Armenia, assistance in dealing with government bodies, consultation on

necessary resources and potential local partners, and more. It is worth noting that the Enterprise Armenia Fund does not receive state funding to carry out these functions, whereas the Business Armenia Fund used to receive approximately 1 billion Armenianian drams annually from the state budget. To enhance the effectiveness of industrial policy, institutional reform is necessary.

Reforms in IP are also necessary at all stages of investment implementation. Recently, screening and monitoring of investments have gained significant importance. These tools are primarily applied in sectors of strategic importance (Manukyan and Ktoyan 2019). The main obstacle to investments is the unpredictability and inconsistency of actions by government authorities (World Bank Group 2015).

The diaspora is Armenia's key competitive edge. There are an estimated 7.2 million Armenians living in 137 countries. Diaspora foreign direct investment – DFDI – is a major resource for Armenia. An analysis reported by the World Bank for 1994 to 2004 found that 69 per cent of foreign investors were diaspora related and 68 per cent of companies with FDI had diaspora ties. The importance of the diaspora has almost certainly broadened over time. More recent research on the role of DFDI is not available. It is fair to note that the strong presence of DFDI is not a result of pro-active targeting of potential investors among the diaspora. Also, some very notable contributions by the diaspora have been philanthropic rather than direct investment.

Armenia has virtually unrivaled access to talent and business connections across all sectors (UNCTAD 2019), and consistent and effective efforts are needed to expand the use of diaspora investment potential.

Conclusion and discussion

The processes of foreign investment in post-war Armenia are taking place in very contradictory and complex conditions, which reflects both the transition of the world economy to a new phase of globalization and regionalization, and the specific problems characteristic of the development of the economy of a small country. The military, political and economic problems specific to Armenia have been compounded by the economic transformation downturn associated with the transition to a market economy.

The research has shown that the volumes of foreign investments in the Armenia are limited and concentrated in a few sectors, primarily focused on raw materials, market outlets, and strategic areas that do not contribute to constructive restructuring of the national economy. There is also a high concentration of foreign investments from investing countries. For example, the leading country in investment is Russia.

IP plays a significant role in the investment regulation process. The development of the national economy and the reform of its sectoral structure largely depend on the effectiveness of IP. Ensuring their effectiveness is a complex and multifaceted process. The need to revise the RA IP is evident. This process should be continuous and constantly adapted to global and regional geopolitical and geo-economic changes and trends, as well as aligned with the country's level of development. Many legislative acts are outdated and need to be updated. The RA IP should be implemented in three directions: 1. policy to enhance the overall investment environment, 2. sectoral investment policy, 3. territorial investment policy.

A liberalized IP is not a guarantee of attracting investments. The liberalization of small countries is perceived in some professional circles as a natural and positive phenomenon. According to this perspective, the ‘open door’ policy is considered the best way to attract investments. In their opinion, prohibitions and restrictions on IP can be fatal for countries with a small domestic market and limited opportunities. However, in our assessment, the ‘open door’ policy without strategic limitations and prohibitions, coupled with a system of common incentives, is not the best way to attract investments and implement constructive reforms. Without strategic prohibitions and restrictions in the national economy, productions oriented towards natural resources and consumers, as well as strategic production, will form and develop. However, large volumes and involvement of foreign investments in these productions carry significant risks. While short-term positive changes may result from such investments, serious problems may arise in the long term: the ‘Dutch disease’ effect, profit leakage, economic and political dependence, environmental issues, and so on. It is essential to realize that the problem lies not only in the volume of investments but also in attracting the desired investments. While investments can have a positive impact on economic development, they also bring serious risks, even existential problems. In our view, the weak application of the toolkit of state regulation, control, prohibitions, and restrictions, justified by the increase in investment volumes, is not a positive but rather a worrisome phenomenon.

At the same time, in parallel with the tools of prohibitions and restrictions, there is a large toolkit of incentives, the effective use of which can help ensure a large flow of investments in the desired areas and directions. General incentives do not create substantial investment opportunities, as they are similar to the general incentives of other countries and thus cease to be a competitive advantage. If other countries have different positive factors influencing investment attractiveness, the significance of general incentives is further diminished. The implementation of sectoral and territorial policies, the development and application of corresponding incentives with active government participation and involvement, are key to success. This will ensure both an increase in the flow and the formation and development of desired investment directions.

The implementation of this task is most likely for the Republic of Armenia in the conditions of a numerous and globally widespread diaspora. There are challenges in harnessing the potential, fostering collaboration, engaging, and gaining the trust of the diaspora. Serious efforts are required to regulate and strengthen the relations between the homeland and the diaspora.

IP in the RA will achieve significant results if measures are taken to improve the investment environment and other factors influencing investments, as economic development is a cohesive system, and the effectiveness of IP depends on overall efficiency

Thus, considering the existing problems in the investment policy of the Republic of Armenia, we believe that its modernization is highly relevant. It is necessary to establish a national ideology with narratives such as ‘national revival’ and the ‘Armenian dream’, and a policy based on the logic of national development should be constructed.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.087>

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Conflict of interests

The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The authors affirm this research did not involve human subjects.

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DIMENSIONS OF THE SHADOW REFORMS OF YURI ANDROPOV'S BUREAUCRATIC MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE MYTHS OF THE TOTALITARIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE USSR

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Abstract

The article discusses the issue of bureaucratic leadership and economic reforms in the USSR during the administration of Yu. V. Andropov, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The article analyzes Andropov's consistent policy in the Soviet bureaucratic system and his uncompromising position in the fight against corruption. In this regard, the article emphasizes the years of his leadership, in which the reforms of the Soviet economy occupied a significant place, trying to inspire confidence in the Soviet society and citizens. However, the totalitarian regime of the USSR and the bureaucratic system simply blocked the package of measures proposed by the General Secretary.

An analysis of the works examining the personality and party and state activities of Yu. V. Andropov allows us to conditionally distinguish two periods of the formation and development of the historiography of the problem. The first, personifying the Soviet era, ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The second covers the 1990s, as well as the beginning of this century. Within the framework of the first period, the activities of Yu. V. Andropov were covered in various works devoted to the problems of modern Soviet history. Against this background, the position of Western researchers turned out to be preferable. In the West, the steady growth of interest in Yu. V. Andropov on the part of Sovietologists was mainly due to his activities as Chairman of the KGB. At the same time, it cannot be denied that, as a rule, the noted works were distinguished by their tendentiousness and bore the imprint of the Cold War.

Keywords: Sovietology, Soviet society, Andropov, USSR, state power, KGB, communist party, corruption, reforms, post-Soviet Russia.

Introduction

The processes of democratization, the formation of the foundations of civil society in post-Soviet Russia, the associated radical revision of basic ideological attitudes, among

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other things, have led to a significant increase in public and scientific interest in the issues of recreating an objective picture of those political processes that took place in the recent Soviet past. At the same time, the traditionally important topic of the role of the individual in history has attracted increasingly significant attention from the scientific community. In particular, throughout the post-Soviet period, domestic and foreign researchers have constantly turned to the problems of the activities of individuals who personified the highest party and state power in the USSR, largely determining the main vectors of its development. In this context, the figure of Andropov, a prominent figure who for many years occupied key positions in the party and state apparatus of the USSR, is of undoubted interest. Having passed through the main stages of the Soviet hierarchy, in particular, holding the post of Chairman of the KGB for a long time, he ended his political career as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. To a certain extent, the long path that Andropov traveled reflected not only all the contradictions, but also possible alternatives in the development of late Soviet society.

In light of the reforms of public administration being carried out at this stage of historical development and, especially, in the context of the large-scale anti-corruption campaign being carried out today, the study of the party and state activities of Andropov, whose name is associated with decisive attempts to combat violations of Soviet legality and bribery, seems relevant and meets the tasks of modernizing Soviet society.

Andropov's leadership as a new chance for the USSR

On the morning of November 10, 1982, Leonid I. Brezhnev died. Two days later, Andropov became Secretary General. Many did not expect (or did they drive away such a thought?) that the seriously ill Andropov would agree to shoulder the burden of responsibility for the country. But he did it.

Andropov ruled the country for only fifteen months. However, a close look at his life and career suggests that he was ready to begin a program of economic reform in the Soviet Union long before he assumed office as leader of the country (Burns 1983). Perhaps he would be able to implement a model of economic development similar to the Chinese one. Maybe the Soviet empire could have transformed itself into a kind of cohesive economic federation rather than descending into economic chaos. Readers should remain impartial when addressing this issue. Researchers of this period of the history of the USSR are inclined to believe that events could not have happened otherwise than the way they happened. We observe these events of the past in our time as inevitable, but we forget that at any moment history could take a different turn.

In 1967, Andropov was appointed head of the KGB (Committee for State Security). He was an intelligent and well-educated man. Andropov's intellect is evidenced by his enormous interest in literature, in particular poetry, and art. He himself made his own significant contribution to spiritual life, was fond of poetry, loved and knew how to write poetry. He believed in the system that raised him, and was determined to preserve the unity of the Soviet empire. He had little tolerance for dissidents and local nationalists, whom he saw as little more than tools used by the West to undermine the

Soviet state. In 1968 in Czechoslovakia, he was a strong supporter of repression as a way to combat the Prague Spring. He also believed that the Soviet dissident movement of the 1970s and 1980s was nothing more than an invention of the Western powers; talk of “human rights,” he argued, was a coordinated plan to attack the foundations of the Soviet system. By the early 1980s, Andropov’s KGB had learned to use various countermeasures (e.g., psychiatric hospitals, deportations, arrests) to suppress political dissidents. Being a supporter of reforms in the economic sphere, it should, however, be said with certainty that Andropov did not intend to change most of the foundations of the Stalin-Brezhnev totalitarian regime. By and large, he was one of the most prominent “architects” of this regime, and he lacked awareness of the main features of the regime as shortcomings of Soviet society (Olcott 1985; Brown 1984).

Notably, however, he opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, believing that the war would be a quagmire and that no important national interests were at stake. The international position of the USSR after the deployment of troops deteriorated sharply. The United States reacted extremely aggressively to this action of the USSR. They quickly managed to consolidate the West and many Third World countries, especially Muslim ones, on an anti-Soviet basis. The United States announced sanctions on the Soviet Union. In particular, the issuance of licenses for the transfer of high technologies to the USSR was prohibited, and previous licenses were canceled (in the amount of \$150 million). On January 6, 1980, Carter announced the unilateral curtailment of scientific, cultural, trade and economic ties with the USSR (deGraffenreid 2023).

In our opinion, it was precisely what is often considered a serious flaw in Andropov’s biography - his fifteen-year stay at the head of the security agency - that contributed to the formation and consolidation in his character and consciousness of the desire for a comprehensive account and comparison of all factors and trends, even if they seem random and insignificant. It is obvious that in the KGB, the caution inherent in Yuri Andropov has intensified and turned into a new quality, necessary for the highest political leader, and deep calculation has become habitual when making and implementing decisions (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1983).

Being a prominent figure in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with an understanding of all the ins and outs of the state, Andropov understood that his main goal was to improve the economic situation of the country. He advocated for a change in attitudes towards work, for the fight against corruption and arbitrariness in trade. What measures of economic change in the country did the new Secretary General use? Labor discipline measures were tightened, to the point that raids were carried out in public places to identify truants and parasites. Andropov led an active fight against speculation and non-labor sources of income. Measures to combat corruption and trade abuses have been strengthened (Kramer 1977).

Andropov, while still chairman of the KGB, collected a huge amount of material about embezzlers, bribe-takers and extortionists. Consolidating his power, he dealt the first blow to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which rivaled the KGB, headed by N.A. Shchelokov, who covered up robbers and speculators. Evgeny Chazov, who in those years held the position of Deputy Minister of Health of the USSR, wrote in his memoirs that here it was no longer he confrontation between Yu. V. Andropov and N.

A. Shchelokov, whom Andropov called “rogue”, but rather there was a confrontation between two organizations that have the ability to control citizens and the situation in the country. And it must be said that the only one whom N.A. Shchelokov feared and hated, and also his first deputy, Brezhnev’s son-in-law Yu. M. Churbanov, was Andropov. Such was the authority and power of the KGB at that time (National Security Archive 1981). However, such “targeted strikes” against the most odious representatives of Brezhnev’s circle could not lead to radical changes in the corrupt system of nomenklatura benefits, but were purely tactical in nature (National Security Archive 1983). One of the most high-profile cases related to the fight against corruption, in our opinion, is the famous “Cotton Case.” In the book by historian Fyodor I. Razzakov, “Corruption in the Politburo: The Case of the “Red Uzbek”,” the author writes that “in fact, the “Uzbek Case” was the first link in the chain of secret operations of the “Kremlin globalists” who aimed at the elimination of socialism and the restoration of capitalism in USSR” (Razzakov 2009). In our opinion, this complex and voluminous topic deserves a special approach and a more detailed study in a separate article. Andropov also continued to insist on increasing the economic influence of domestic products and the complete elimination of foreign goods.

An efficient economy under an unstable totalitarian political regime

The Secretary General’s peculiar policy in the economic sector was effective. In particular, already in 1983, an increase in national economic production volumes of 6% was achieved. However, the measures introduced by Andropov were temporary, and they were unlikely to provide long-term economic growth. If Andropov or his successor had listened only to the advice of Western economists, for example, they would undoubtedly have embarked on a program of significant economic decentralization. And he would probably be kicked out before the ink was dry on his program. But despite the likely opposition from party and government bureaucracies to any reduction in their power and status, a leader seeking decentralization can make a compelling case for his policies. After all, it was Vladimir Lenin who introduced the New Economic Policy in 1921. But by granting concessions to private enterprise, Lenin was careful to maintain party control over vital economic and political sectors (Sullivan 2022; Herman 1983).

Andropov’s reforms directly affected the structure of the state apparatus. In particular, after coming to power at the end of 1982, Andropov noticeably reduced the number of staff of the Secretary of State. In a speech at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the first plenum, which he held as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Andropov drew special attention to the fact that in order to implement the 1983 plan, it is necessary to make it the conscious undertaking of everyone employee. “Now it is especially important and necessary for every worker to understand that the implementation of the plan also depends on his labor contribution, so that everyone understands well the simple truth that the better we work, the better we will live,” said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Marxists Internet Archive 1982; Marxists Internet Archive 1983b).

Subsequently, 19 ministers lost their jobs, and new members of the Communist Party were re-elected to the most responsible positions. Andropov, like his

predecessors, is trying to form around himself a certain group of associates who are ready to support all his reforms. The Secretary General also attracts prominent scientists and doctors of economic sciences to government activities. During the same period, there was a relaxation in terms of state pressure on the intelligentsia. In the future, the activities of the leaders of the Communist Party will be aimed precisely at reducing the number of persons involved in public administration and at improving relations with the intelligentsia.

Reform actions regarding foreign policy Andropov adhered to a more open model of foreign policy than his predecessors. However, relations with the United States were still extremely tense. During Andropov's short period in power, several key events occurred that influenced the development of the USSR's foreign policy strategy. On March 8, 1983 Ronald Reagan calls the USSR an "evil empire." It should be noted that some sources claim that the author of the expression was the President's speechwriter, Anthony R. Dolan (Free Frank Warner 2003). On March 23, 1983, a Soviet fighter shot down a passenger plane with 283 passengers on board, which is why moments of pressure on the Soviet government began to slip through the international press. Improving relations with China. US deployment of nuclear missiles in Great Britain, Germany and Belgium. Despite the fact that Andropov tried to achieve detente in international relations, his reforms only led to deterioration in the position of the USSR on the world stage. As a result, we can say that Andropov's reforms were logical and integral; they were aimed at improving the economic and social situation in the country. However, the General Secretary himself did not have time to implement all his ideas, since in the autumn of 1983 Andropov's health sharply deteriorated (Bennett 2022). The country needed a young and courageous ruler capable of guiding the USSR along a completely new path of development. However, the country had to wait several more years for global changes (Sullivan 2022).

Soviet citizens did not believe in a changing present and bright future

Andropov's reforms were carried out in the early 1980s, between the "heyday of the era of stagnation" and Gorbachev's Perestroika. Soviet citizens simply did not believe in a "bright future", they did not believe in the present either - they lost interest in study, work, and creativity. What Andropov would call "sloppiness" and "parasitism" triumphed. It was these that the new Secretary General intended to eradicate first, without going into the reasons that gave rise to these phenomena. And, in fact, many citizens of the USSR associated Yuri Andropov's rise to power with restoring order in the country. People expected tough measures against rampant crime and the mafia, the eradication of corruption and strengthening of loose labor discipline (Olcott 1985). The stern Andropov becomes popular, hopes are associated with him for the renewal of society, a "return to Leninist norms" in the party, he is perceived by people as a fighter against privileges, corruption and permissiveness (Marxists Internet Archive 1983b, 1983c).

These reforms were not minor. If implemented, they could well lead to additional steps to revive the economy. Of course, not everyone shares this opinion. Some believe that the evidence for Andropov as a genuine reformer is too speculative and that he

died too early for us to predict what might have been (Lomagin, Mironova, Titov and Oshchepkov 2023). Some also doubt that Andropov was the progressive figure to implement genuine reform. Regarding the above, firstly, there is no contradiction in history with an authoritarian leader who is also a reformer. In fact, from the point of view of Russian history, only an authoritarian leader is able to carry out reforms (Rothacher 2021). A man cannot be progressive unless he is first and foremost a man of order and discipline. Changing any entrenched system requires a steady hand and determined navigation. Otherwise it cannot be.

Andropov saw the campaign to improve labor discipline as a large-scale operation. On August 7, 1983, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On strengthening socialist labor discipline," which provided for penalties for defected products, absenteeism and lateness to work, and drunkenness in the workplace. However, at first it was not possible to adequately implement this operation. In some cities, police raids were carried out in cinemas, large stores and other public places, aimed at detaining truants; however, often the struggle to strengthen labor discipline boiled down to bosses "scolding" employees who allegedly "wandered around the shops" during working hours (O'Riordan 2023).

In this context, it is also necessary to mention the following transformations that took place during the reign of Andropov:

- a high-profile fight against corruption, which led to the arrest of a number of high-ranking leaders;
- law on labor collectives: from now on, members of labor collectives had the right to discuss plans, contracts, and wage structures. However, the law remained unfinished; as a result, meetings of labor collectives were either not organized at all or were of a formal nature.
- a law that expanded the rights of enterprise managers to spend funds. He, in particular, established the dependence of wages on the volume of output.

At a meeting with party veterans held on August 15, 1983 - the last public event with his participation - Andropov said that ideological work, and therefore the education of a civilized person capable of taking responsibility, is devalued by all kinds of disorder, mismanagement, violations of laws, money-grubbing, bribery. Without social security for ideological work, which includes the eradication of the above-mentioned vices, the success of ideological work, according to Andropov, is impossible (Marxists Internet Archive 1983a, 1983c).

At the already mentioned meeting with veterans, Andropov described this principle as follows: in an economy of such scale, such complexity as ours, one must be extremely careful. Here, as nowhere else, the proverb is true: measure seven times, cut once. That is why, when preparing major decisions, we try to scrutinize every issue, we undertake large-scale experiments in order to calmly, without haste, study how the proposed innovations work, how they affect planning and labor discipline, labor productivity, and the efficiency of social production in as a whole (Krausz 2023; Galushko 2021).

The fact that before radical reforms were carried out, corruption and its accompanying crimes were not burned out in the USSR to such an extent that no one would think about anything like that, seriously interferes with the implementation of

reforms, undermines and compromises them. For many civil servants, heads of enterprises and institutions, reforms have become only a way of personal enrichment, not at the expense of their own labor, but through the appropriation of what was created by others, including previous generations. This, in turn, has a corrupting effect on all social strata, and also gives ignorant people the feeling that any reforms, not just the current ones, are just a method of theft. We think it is no coincidence that the deep market transformations currently underway in China are accompanied by measures, sometimes quite harsh, aimed at eradicating crime, including corruption.

Conclusion and discussion

Andropov died in 1984 from kidney failure at the age of sixty-nine. His plans for reform went with him to the grave. His successors were unable to cope with the task of reforming and modernizing the Soviet system. What would modern Europe be like if the Soviet Union gradually reformed, got rid of its economic encumbrances and became a new kind of confederation? We do not know. While more research into Andropov's life and politics is needed, it is clear that he represents one of those great "might have beens" in modern European history. At the very least, he deserves his own full biography, written by scholars who have access to the latest sources and materials.

According to a statement by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, in 1991, 27% of respondents to the question "Which state, public and cultural figure of Russia and the USSR will people remember in decades to come?" named Yuri Andropov. Next in the poll rating were Lenin and Gorbachev, who were more than twice as far behind Andropov.

Andropov planned a large-scale modernization of production, transport, construction, and the scientific and technical sphere. However, his Acceleration strategy was not fully implemented. In general, it can be stated that the reforms were mostly of an economic and disciplinary nature, but with regard to everything else, Andropov remained a great conservative. To be fair, it should be noted that the establishment of discipline and order in the country and in the production sector made it possible to stop some negative processes in the economy and even achieve a slight increase in labor productivity.

The concept put forward by Andropov deserves special attention: Andropov's concept of the level of education of the people is especially noteworthy. In the post-Soviet era, the state's interest in elements of social progress, education, health, culture and science, sharply declined with the establishment of what Andropov calls an exemplary social order. On the other hand, as noted by prominent figures of science and culture, it is the state of these areas that largely determines not only the current state of the country, but also its future development. While shortages of funds are often cited as the reason for the deplorable state of these areas, this is less convincing when one considers the huge sums being transferred abroad, and especially the almost complete lack of proper taxation of windfall profits from capital and real estate.

The tragedy of Andropov as a thinking statesman was that he came to power while already a sick man. His idea was fresh, it worked in the right direction, but it died out

too early. His tragedy turned into a tragedy for the country, and the “promoters” did not develop the work that he had only outlined, but which he could not give momentum to.

The brief history of Andropov as the country’s leader is truly a tragedy for him as a person, which became one of the reasons for subsequent trials for the people of Russia and the peoples of the republics of the ex-USSR. Andropov is a talented reformer who came to power too late. However, this does not mean that his theoretical and political legacy has lost its relevance. It is not an archive, but an arsenal of socio-economic reforms.

The positive result of Andropov’s rule is, of course, an attempt to eradicate corruption using tough methods. However, this is where the advantages of the Andropov era of rule end: many experts are sure that the rule of this leader did not bring anything good or bad to the country, it only kept the shaky country from complete collapse. In addition, it was not possible to completely eradicate corruption - its positions remained strong in various fields of activity.

Andropov passed away on February 9, 1984. The Politburo nominated Konstantin U. Chernenko, but his health did not give him any real chance of long rule. He suffered from cardiopulmonary failure. He was a transitional figure, necessary for those who aspired to become the country’s highest official in order to gain time to strengthen their positions. The period of party and state rule by K. Chernenko was the shortest in the entire history of the Soviet Union - only 13 months.

Supplementary material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.7.101>

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Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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REVIEW BY:

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Abstract

The book analyses the main factors of European integration crises, taking into account eight major cases from the early 1950s to recent times. The author pays special attention to constitutional crises, the euro crisis and the migration crisis, thus showing that crises have been an integral part of the process of European integration from its very beginning. Although the book does not analyse the current confrontation between Russia and the West, the author argues that European integration began with a serious setback, when member states failed to implement plans to create a European army through the European Defence Community. The global scale and radicality of the ongoing changes allow many researchers to suggest the formation of a new system of international relations. In parallel with these processes, many provisions and phenomena characterizing the system of international relations itself are being revised.

Keywords: European Union politics, European integration, constitutional crises, international relations, Franco-German political leadership, stagnation, adaptation, transformation, regression.

The modern world, including modern Europe, being forced by circumstances to respond to numerous and alarming challenges. This is the challenge of the crises of European integration, globalization and, at the same time, the challenge of the growing diversity of the world community. These are environmental and demographic, energy

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and resource challenges. This is the challenge of the unsurmounted policy of force, aggravated by the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Schramm 2024, 1-32). This is the challenge of terrorism and drug mafia. And finally, these are the challenges of war and conflicts between countries and nations that are trying to destroy international law and world order. In parallel with these processes, many provisions and phenomena that characterize the very system of international relations are being revised. Including one of the basic principles, the foundations of this system is the sovereignty of the modern state, as one of the key subjects of international relations.

The problem of erosion of sovereignty attracts more and more attention. One of the processes contributing to this phenomenon is the regional integration of national states. And here, first of all, we are talking about a uniting Europe. Now we are dealing with a new Europe, which, despite the heavy legacy of past discord and wars, is uniting into a single union, accepting more and more new members. However, the creation of a united Europe was gradual. At the very beginning, it was mainly about economic and technical cooperation (Schramm 2024, 33-60). But already in the course of the last decade, the construction of a political union has begun; cooperation has been established in such areas as social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy; a common defense and security policy is being put into effect. In the conditions of the collapse of the bipolar system, Europe represents a new pole, a center of power, influencing political processes not only on the continent, but throughout the world.

Many years later, the EU found itself at the crossroads of various paths for further development, approaching the moment of transition to a new stage of existence. Depending on what Europe will be like in the future, whether it will become a single state, whether it will be just a confederation of states, or something else, the future of the entire system of international relations depends. Therefore, the EU, its institutions and processes are of interest to most researchers who are concerned about the future. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that these integration processes within the EU are the only ones of their kind, and, therefore, unique in terms of the practical implementation of ideas that have worried great minds for many centuries. The relevance of the problem lies in the fact that the European regional integration process is unique in its kind and serves as fertile ground for the emergence of many different views on integration processes, as well as theories reflecting these processes within the framework of various models. By analyzing theoretical models of development, it is possible to forecast both the integration dynamics itself and the final result of the integration process, which has a great influence on the development of the system of international relations as a whole. Knowledge of theoretical foundations allows one not to move blindly, but to prudently evaluate and analyze each subsequent step (Schramm 2024, 61-89).

This book is devoted to the study of the current stage of variability of the results of European integration crises. The theoretical basis of this work is the concepts and models of Western European researchers, in which they consider integration processes in the European Community, and then the EU political system (Schramm 2024, 91-129). Of course, hundreds of scientific papers are devoted to the study of the history of

European integration processes, the identification of their patterns and the assessment of possible consequences, but these topics remain relevant, since today it is hardly possible to say that the contradictions that accompanied the development of the EU at all stages have been overcome (Schramm 2024, 205-241). On the contrary, with each new step forward, the integration process becomes more complex and complicated, which gives rise to dilemmas that cannot be solved by the experience of other countries and peoples, since history knows no precedents for setting such problems. Therefore, the study is supposed to identify a theory or model that most adequately assesses the changes occurring in the EU structures and predicts the further direction of the evolution of European integration processes (Schramm 2024, 131-164, 165-203).

The subject of the research is the crises of the European integration process, as well as modern European integration processes, which have received their institutional expression in the form of the European Communities and are currently developing within the EU.

The purpose of this book is to analyze theoretical models and concepts of European integration from the point of view of their possible application for the analysis and proposal of variants of development of European integration. The author analyzes the following crises: the crisis of the European Defense Community (1952-1954); the empty chair crisis (1965-1966); the oil crisis (1973-1974); the budget discount crisis (1979-1984); the crisis of the end of the Cold War (1989-1992); the crisis of the Constitutional Treaty (2004-2007); the euro crisis (2009-2012); and the migration crisis (2015-2016). According to the author, in order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve several problems: firstly, to consider and analyze the theories, concepts and models of European integration; secondly, to determine the direction of development of integration processes, to study them using the concept of multi-level development management; thirdly, to study the possible direction of development of the EU.

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**THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE EU: FACING NEW REALITIES,
EDITED BY CLAUDIA WIESNER AND MICHÈLE KNOTD. PALGRAVE
MACMILLAN, CHAM. XIII, 230 PP. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35040-5>.**

REVIEW BY:

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Abstract

This book discusses the multiple implications of the war against Ukraine for the EU political system. It draws on a number of different authors to analyse the main dimensions of the Russian attack on Ukraine and the subsequent large-scale war, which impact the global order and EU foreign policy. In the context of war and Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU needs to position itself in a changing world order, internal and external challenges to liberal democracy and the development of its strategic autonomy. In various chapters of the book, the development and strengthening of strategic partnership and friendship with Ukraine is considered by the EU as one of the central foreign policy priorities. Without the support of the Ukrainian partner, it is difficult for the EU to achieve positive results in European politics and play the role of an influential power in the international arena. In this context, various authors note that only the formation of political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine will be the optimal way out of the full-scale war and crisis that Ukraine has found itself in. Only the combination of opportunities and efforts will allow the Ukrainian political elite and society to eventually stand on par with leading European countries.

Keywords: war, peace, aggression, Ukraine, enlargement policy, European Union politics, global order, normative power, strategic autonomy.

Analyzing European integration within the framework of the concept of multi-level governance, it is necessary to note that the normative and other acts adopted by the EU authorities are addressed and affect, ultimately, the interests of citizens, which is expressed in the existence of rights and obligations (Knott and Wiesner 2024; Costa and Blanc 2024; Jørgensen 2024). The institutional aspect of the EU development assumes a gradual evolution of supranational authorities. This issue has become more

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acute in connection with the change in the geopolitical situation in Europe as a result of the EU expansion to the east and the formation of an economic and monetary union. At the moment, the issue of the political configuration and the mechanism for implementing power is in the spotlight. In connection with this issue, the issue of leadership in the EU is relevant. Frictions between small countries and countries with great economic potential are not decreasing, and after Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, these frictions have only intensified. Therefore, the expansion of the EU should be considered not in quantitative, but in qualitative, that is, political terms.

At the current stage of the war against Ukraine, the EU is faced with new realities, since the concept of multi-level cooperation also assumes that actors in integration processes can be not only EU member states, but also political and business elites, trade unions and transnational corporations and banks, various international organizations (Smith 2024; Wiesner 2024; Müller and Slominski 2024). It should be especially noted that EU legal norms receive mandatory legal force in the territories of states that are not members of the EU, as in the case of the Schengen area.

The political significance of integration processes and expansion lies not only in the fact that, moving east, the EU is increasing its resource potential. On the one hand, the political hegemony of the EU is being formed in the main territory of Europe, which gives it a completely different international status and positions. On the other hand, the admission of new members with completely different socio-economic and environmental characteristics, with deep interethnic and interstate contradictions will not be painless for both the EU and the newcomers. Therefore, development within the framework of the concept of multi-level governance is entirely justified. The concept allows for an explanation of differentiated approaches, such as 'Europe of several speeds', which will be applied in practice when creating a European socio-economic and political development model; the expanded EU will not represent a single picture for a long time. Significant differences have emerged in European affairs and in matters of global political significance. Moreover, the necessary reservations and the consideration of certain factors are increasingly becoming an obstacle to this. Therefore, it is so important that the expanded EU be built on a solid foundation, using the existing legal framework and institutions (Chaban and Zhabotynska 2024). And this corresponds to the historically traceable and justified tendency towards decentralization and balancing of power along with the creation of a public space of security and internal order, protected from the outside by a strong common political will, since in this case the risk of individual actions is minimized, social unity becomes achievable and the efficiency of the market economy increases.

In addition, the EU is in a state of constant development, continuous movement. It is difficult to predict the final result of all these processes. It may well happen that at this stage the direction of the EU evolution meets all the parameters, but after some time, under the influence of Russia's war against Ukraine and a whole range of internal and external factors, where, perhaps, some will even determine, the structures and institutions of the EU will be subject to changes, which will correspond to a new theoretical model of European integration (Knodt, Ringel and Bruch 2024).

Therefore, summing up all of the above, we can only say that even in the conditions of the Russian war against Ukraine, the EU remains a resilient and unique project,

which has practically embodied a new phenomenon of international relations. The direction of its development is not unambiguous. At this stage, the principles of its organization and the mechanism of its functioning can be most accurately reflected by the concept of multi-level governance. However, any theory or concept is subject to obsolescence, so it is possible that over time, this concept will be replaced by a new one, more fully and accurately reflecting the basic principles and trends of the development of the EU.

It is important to keep in mind that many authors consider the potential impact of the war in Ukraine on EU studies. It is obvious that the Russian war against Ukraine is the most destructive war in Europe since the end of World War II. At this stage, EU studies will be related to the war. Therefore, the Second Karabakh War of 2020 is also mainly important to consider in thinking about the dynamics of European integration, since this war in Nagorno-Karabakh should also cause a 'Zeitenwende' in EU studies. In this respect, the concept of multi-level governance reflects two dimensions of EU development. The functional dimension is related to the division of domestic and foreign policy into the competence of national and supranational authorities. The fate of national sovereignties and the political configuration of Europe depend on how powers are divided. The institutional dimension includes, on the one hand, the question of EU membership and, on the other hand, the structure of supranational authorities and decision-making mechanisms (Gawrich and Wydra 2024; Zaremba 2024).

Taking into account the Russian war against Ukraine and the provisions set out in the Treaty on EU, political union presupposes the resolution of issues related to the adoption of a common policy in the field of foreign affairs and security, including economic; disarmament and arms control in Europe; and the development of a common defense policy. Achieving these objectives meets the basic provisions of the concept of multi-level governance, since, firstly, contradictions between common and national interests are resolved. Secondly, the problem of national sovereignty ceases to be a stumbling block that hinders close political cooperation. This is possible provided that various actors operating at different levels, primarily supranational and national, form an integrated system of joint decisions. Practical confirmation of this provision can be demonstrated in the strengthening of the importance of the European Parliament, the general expansion of the EU's powers.

Thus, the concept of multi-level governance allows taking into account the heterogeneity of the EU, the differences in the political and socio-economic situation in its different member states. This is precisely the goal pursued by the principle of 'enhanced cooperation', according to which the delegation of additional powers to EU bodies by individual member states is permitted. At the same time, the sources and norms of law issued by them on the basis of these powers will extend their effect only to the territory of the member states participating in 'enhanced cooperation'.

Given the complex nature of the integration processes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict the development of events around the Russian war against Ukraine, so it will be necessary to focus on creating a few separate institutional elements with a guaranteed margin of safety and ensuring a high degree of procedural flexibility within the EU. Politicians who will be responsible for the enlarged EU must have at their disposal a set of rules concerning institutions and procedures with which they can

respond in a timely manner to the challenges of their era. The main emphasis in institution building and ensuring flexibility must be placed on the scale of the EU as a whole. At the same time, large-scale projects will still be necessary in order to constructively introduce institutional reforms into the agenda with the help of extensive negotiating packages, so the EU institutions and its member states must constantly update and strengthen this foundation. Most likely, there cannot be any absolutely indisputable results of changes in political processes at the regional or state level. There may only be assumptions that will be justified with an indefinite degree of probability, or will be completely incorrect, and possibilities that can also be realized only partially. These processes depend on many factors, which theories and concepts of European integration processes are trying to identify.

At this point, it is only possible to say with certainty that in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine, the EU is more than a simple sum of parts of nation states, and that the EU undoubtedly remains a unique phenomenon in the system of international relations, so further theoretical research will continue. After all, the final direction of the EU and its further institutional development remain resilient. Since politics at any level, state, regional or international, is a mobile and organic, not mechanical process, and it is impossible to accurately predict and forecast further developments. Planning is even more complicated by the practically unpredictable impacts that the Russian war against Ukraine has on the international system: the consequences of globalization are as little amenable to calculation as the possible inevitable circumstances arising from the new balance of power in the international arena. By making decisions on the expansion and deepening of the EU, the heads of state and government have outlined goals, the global impact of which must be discussed today. Since it is not possible to move from reliable forecasts to unambiguous policy recommendations, the task of the debate that reflects this process should not be to propose a single sensible and realistic approach to solving the problem, but to consider possible courses of action, with a panorama of different expectations and scenarios before us. The solution should not be the fearful uncertainty that many heads of government showed when making decisions at the reform summit, defending their national veto positions, but rather a discussion of measures to ensure flexible institution-building that will enable EU decision-makers and policymakers in the second decade of this century to have at their disposal a reinforced structure to respond adequately to the challenges of their era (Knott and Wiesner 2024; Costa and Blanc 2024; Jørgensen 2024). Since in an enlarged EU there will be even less room to create political space for interaction and communication; shared memories and the collective awareness that countries are living in a truly fateful time for the community will be eroded; the vision of the final goal of integration policy will become, on the one hand, even more necessary to define a common goal, but on the other hand, in the enlarged EU it will be increasingly difficult to jointly create an institutional structure that is resilient to external influences. The EU, in its dynamic development full of difficulties, is turning into a new type of structure that does not fit into simple formulas and continues to develop through further changes and adaptations.

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
Abstract

This book examines the dynamics of national and regional security in the age of *Zeitenwende* amid polarization and conflict management. Through a comparative analysis, the authors reveal the intricate problems of border dynamics and practice in cases of border disputes and conflicts in the member states of the OSCE. The authors offer their approaches on how to peacefully settle the disputed borders, which can be supported by the EU, the NATO and the OSCE. It can be of significant help in preventing security crises and conflicts. In this regard, a number of solutions that can affect the Russian-Ukraine war and the settlement of Russia-Ukraine relations are highlighted. From the author's approach, it becomes clear that various European countries and international organizations should play an active role in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and the strengthening of European security.

Keywords: war, peace, aggression, Ukraine, enlargement policy, European Union politics, global order, normative power, strategic autonomy, stabilitocracy.

The issues of polarization, shifting borders, governance and ensuring military security have interested politicians, philosophers and scientists almost from the very beginning of meaningful collective life of people. The formation of states on the European continent was accompanied by armed struggle of nations for survival, in connection with which there was an acute need to ensure protection from the threat of armed attack from outside. European scientists were engaged in the study of this problem, tried to determine the criteria for the fairness of the use of force, the law of war and defense, were engaged in a comprehensive study of wars in an attempt to develop a system of state security and a collective regional system of ensuring security, to minimize the consequences of war (Mihr 2024; Isakova 2024; Yalcin-Ispir 2024).

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Theories of polarization, management and provision of military security of borders, as we perceive it at the present stage in relation to state policy, were first introduced by European and American researchers in the field of international relations and implied a complex sphere of military-civil studies of strategy, technology, arms control. At the same time, it was exclusively about hard military security (Sapeha et al. 2024; Miljokovic 2024). The development of technologies and the growth of interdependence of world processes, such as economic integration, the impact of environmental pollution on the territory of one state on the world climate, etc., led to an expansion of the range of challenges and threats to states and the entire world community (Kulesza 2024; Kurmanov 2024). In the context of globalization, the term 'international security' was developed; there was also a classification of the term 'security' by the breadth of coverage and spheres of life and a comprehensive approach to ensuring international security was developed. At the same time, researchers demonstrated different approaches to the role of military security in the context of ensuring international security.

Polarization, shifting borders and ongoing governance, studies of transformation and development in the OSCE region, as well as strategic security NATO and the EU are important elements of the international security system and basic security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area. Almost from the very beginning of the transformation and development in the OSCE region, many intergovernmental organizations found themselves in the center of the process of transformation of the European security system, which implied qualitative changes in the elements, i.e. the main mechanisms of interaction and structure in the field of security on the European continent (Mihr and Pierobon 2024; Toktogazieva, Saniia. 2024). In this regard, a number of questions arise: what is the modus vivendi of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and the EU in the Euro-Atlantic area, given the cross-membership of most member states? How will this relationship be expressed in practice (modus operandi)? To what extent is it possible to distribute responsibilities and roles between the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and the EU; how will the complementarity and interaction of these institutional pillars of the Euro-Atlantic area be ensured within the framework of highly contradictory and conflictual transatlantic relations?

In the book, the relevance of the study of the process of transformation of the European security system is determined by the need to assess the directions of its development, its causes and motivations of the main players. In addition, the dynamics of NATO development and transformation in themselves and the interaction of the EU and NATO as a whole create new institutional structures, new forms of cooperation and decision-making, which significantly affects the integration processes in Europe and the nature of transatlantic relations. Due to these circumstances, there is an increasing need to obtain objective knowledge about the factual side of this interaction.

Since the countries of the OSCE region view both organizations as key partners and partly competitors in the sphere of international cooperation on security issues and itself seeks to play an active role in the European international security system, the need to study the relationship between NATO and the EU at the present stage is dictated by the existing intensive contacts with each organization. The importance of the NATO and the EU for the countries of the OSCE region has increased especially

due to their expansion. In the context of modern wars and military conflicts, when Russia's relations with the United States, NATO and the EU, due to Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine and various circumstances, have found themselves at a confrontational stage, when, despite the existence of a treaty framework, institutions and cooperation mechanisms, the parties are again faced with a choice of the future nature of cooperation, studying the interaction of NATO and the EU becomes necessary for forming a policy towards not only each of the organizations separately. Moreover, Russia's war with Georgia in 2008, the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022, NATO and the EU have put forward proposals for a new comprehensive mechanism for European security, effectively raising the issue of revising the main parameters of the current security structure in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are talking about the resilience of the common security space, which may include both individual states and existing institutions. The new mechanism is designed to ensure the indivisibility of the security space and arms control in Europe. In this regard, it is also extremely important to understand the specifics of interaction between NATO and the EU, their institutional advantages and limitations in terms of the possibilities of achieving appropriate negotiating results under the new mechanism (Nakashidze 2024; Abeytia, Brito and Ojo 2024).

The subject of the book is specific aspects of polarization, border shifts and current governance, as well as studies of transformation and development in the OSCE, EU and NATO region. First, the declared goals and level of relations are considered; second, the means at the disposal of the EU and NATO in the institutional, military and financial spheres; third, specific examples of their practical interaction (Mihr and Pierobon 2024; Reznichuk 2024).

Based on the stated goals, the authors set themselves the following tasks:

- 1) To conduct a critical analysis of some theoretical approaches applicable to the topic of this study.
- 2) To identify the main stages of migration policy development in the OSCE region, early warning models in the OSCE, strategic security of NATO and the EU, models of border disputes among OSCE countries.
- 3) To analyze the officially declared nature and level of relations: how institutions formulated goals in relation to each other, how consistent are the existing definitions and whether they contain formal restrictions for the development of inter-organizational cooperation.
- 4) To examine the means that the OSCE, NATO and the EU have at their disposal in three main areas: institutional, military-political and financial, which is important for identifying the level of autonomy and/or dependence of one organization on the other.
- 5) To assess the rationality of human rights, as well as digital civil activism in Central Asia
- 6) To analyze the transformations of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the way to EU membership
- 7) To examine the mechanisms of European integration of Ukraine in the context of Russian aggression, which Germany, Italy, Poland, Estonia and Greece have

at their disposal with the support of Ukraine. Meanwhile, special attention is paid to the impartial position of Turkey regarding Russia's war against Ukraine.

8) The dilemma of proper governance of the 44-day Azerbaijani war against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Russia's war against Georgia in 2008, the Azerbaijani war against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia since 2020 and the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine since 2022 have become direct evidence of the crisis of international institutions and mechanisms for ensuring security, which were unable to prevent the large-scale militarization of Russia and Azerbaijan and the subsequent armed aggression against civilians. The inability of the OSCE, the EU, NATO and the UN to take timely adequate measures to resolve the conflict has become an important signal for all European countries that further degradation of the military-political dimension of European security could lead to the emergence of other armed conflicts on the continent that could destabilize the regional system of international relations (Dzebisashvili 2024; Zanatta and Alvi 2024). The question arose about the need to revise collective approaches to ensuring European security. In this regard, from a scientific point of view, it seems very timely and appropriate to conduct a conceptual understanding of approaches to ensuring European military security (Ambrosetti 2024; Kostakos 2024). It is necessary to assess the role of the force factor in modern international relations and determine the level of significance of military security in the structure of regional and European security (Đuković 2024; Lamč 2024). It is necessary to consider the role of states, military-political blocs and international organizations in ensuring military security (Cupać 2024). It is necessary to emphasize the importance of existing international treaties and agreements in the field of strengthening European security and the need for their modernization, as well as the need to develop new agreements (Bruno and Fazio 2024; Pierobon 2024). Answers to these questions and consideration of the European security model require a comprehensive approach, implying an analysis of the existing documentary base, as well as the impact of political events taking place in Europe and statements by official representatives of European states on raising or lowering the level of security (Dyduch and Góra 2024; Kapp and Fix 2024). It is assumed that information on ongoing negotiations, study and creative rethinking of research in the field of international and European security will be analyzed, since these studies present different, sometimes alternative, conclusions and recommendations (Veebel and Ploom 2024; Manoli 2024). Only on the basis of an analysis of theoretical approaches, a comparison of the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in the field of ensuring security with modern military-political realities and needs is it possible to carry out a conceptual, not divorced from reality, understanding of the European system of ensuring military security, and to draw conclusions and recommendations regarding ensuring military security in Europe at the current stage of development.

The book examines the main parameters, institutions and mechanisms of the system of ensuring human and military security in Europe, their role and effectiveness; identifies current problems in ensuring European security and makes recommendations for their solution. In this sense, the evolution of the theory of ensuring military security

is studied, on the basis of which an assessment is given of the current state of military, regional, international and European security.

A comparative analysis of the modern architecture of military security in Europe is carried out, its strengths and weaknesses are identified both in the European space and in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The authors determined the role and prospects of the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO in ensuring European security, taking into account the potential of these organizations, the accumulated experience in this area, the instruments operating within their framework, their ability to take into account the interests of all European states.

The authors consider it relevant to strengthen the existing agreements and arrangements in the field of ensuring military security in Europe, analyze their implementation, and present possible recommendations for increasing their effectiveness or the need for modernization. Based on the study, present possible recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of the model of ensuring European military security, which should be adapted to modern realities.

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