POLITICAL COMMUNICATION DURING THE 2020 WAR: SETTING THE STAGE FOR DEFEAT

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46991/jos.2024.26.2.185

Keywords:

2020 war, military defeat, crisis management, information warfare, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh

Abstract

The present paper looks into the Armenian side of the 2020 war in the pursuit to elucidate the non-military factors that led to the devastating defeat of the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. Based on the available public records (public statements, media publications), as well as non-structured interviews with select high-ranking officials, the article aims to improve expert-level understanding of the wartime management that led to the Armenian defeat. This paper also attempts to launch a discussion on wartime behaviour of the political elite in Armenia.

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Published

2025-01-10

How to Cite

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION DURING THE 2020 WAR: SETTING THE STAGE FOR DEFEAT. (2025). Journal of Oriental Studies, 26(2), 185-209. https://doi.org/10.46991/jos.2024.26.2.185