The Criminal Procedural Presumption of Innocence and the Criminal Substantive Presumption of Fault

Abstract

The correlation between the criminal substantive presumption of fault and the criminal procedural concept of the presumption of innocence is the main focus of this article. First, the author reveals the essence of the presumption of innocence as a criterion for assessing evidence, discusses it within the framework of the proper proof principle and makes the case that the requirements that make up the content of these principles are unnecessarily absolutized, and sometimes unrealizable. The author makes the case that some conditions, such fault or signs of the subjective side of the crime are typically impossible to establish through the use of particular kinds of evidence in criminal procedures.

Additionally, the article introduces a new concept of fault, examines the component of criminal law the presumption of guilt, and argues that it contradicts the concepts of the presumption of innocence and proper proof.

The author substantiates that the opposition of the criminal procedural presumption of innocence and the criminal legal presumption of fault in practice is resolved in favor of the presumption of fault, leaving on paper an impossible requirement arising from the presumption of innocence that the fact of committing a crime with a confession of guilt is subject to proof by relevant, admissible and reliable evidence in full and cannot be based on assumptions.